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Section A: Preface 
This portfolio comprises three sections: an empirical research project, a case study, 
and a publishable paper.  Each piece was completed during my training at City University 
London and together demonstrates my competence as a counselling psychologist. This 
portfolio provides evidence of my knowledge and skills within research and practice, 
demonstrating critical and independent working, to the standard of a professional 
doctorate.     
Overall these sections provide an indication of the development of my identity as a 
counselling psychologist with a growing social constructionist epistemological viewpoint.  
Through the research element, my epistemology refines to that of the critical realist, whilst 
maintaining a deconstructive underpinning and critical lens in understanding and presenting 
the findings.  The process of planning the research component inspired the publishable paper 
section through the struggles met maintaining epistemological identity within a traditionalist 
or realist/empiricist environment.  Instead of resting my case in the ethics boardroom, I 
decided to produce a paper that might provide some reference-based support for budding 
counselling psychologists.  Prior to the research element being considered, the pre-disposition 
for engaging in difficult work was spotted by my NHS clinical supervisor.  He supported me 
in completing work with a woman who was living with an identity as ‘a mad woman’, which 
left her presenting as physically disabled and housebound.  In working with this colleague 
who aligned himself with a systemic school of thought, my social constructionist 
epistemology was able to extend into the therapy room, through the use of the 
psychodynamic model.  Being encouraged to follow my social constructionist thirst for 
thinking and working creatively helped me to challenge a variety of ways of thinking, from 
therapy room to the multidisciplinary clinical team meeting room.   
Having a positive experience early in my training helped cement my de-constructive 
ideology and gave me the confidence to choose a difficult research project, inspired by my 
clinical work.  This engagement in research that was service-user inspired provided the fuel 
to continue with the project despite major challenges.  In identifying with the position of ‘the 
other’, and challenging ideas of the status quo, the various sections of this portfolio provide a 
range of windows into the way in which I have worked as a trainee counselling psychologist 
and endeavor to continue to work as a counselling psychologist. 
 
 10 
The first section of the portfolio is the empirical research project.  As briefly 
mentioned, this was inspired by a service user on one of my placements.  Being told that a 
nod and a smile from a psychiatrist was interpreted as a dismissal into the identity and 
language of a mad person caused me to re-think my notions of what is perceived as madness.  
It also provoked me to question how mental health professionals believe they are seen versus 
how they are actually received by service users.  After realizing the frequent change in mental 
health terminology, yet a lasting reaction against a range of terms, I decided to explore the 
term madness.  A literature review revealed that service user perspectives are largely included 
as part of the diagnostic formulation only.  This echoed the client’s view that her voice was 
translated into the language of madness.  Current research discussed the history of the term 
and focuses on the anti-psychiatry movement, moving away from who it matter most to –
those who are labelled.  As such, I recruited service users to explore the construction of the 
term and the function of those constructs.  Following the use of semi-structured interviews (3 
individual and 1 group), the interviews were transcribed and a discourse analysis formed the 
analytic procedure.  The results described the use of the term madness in a light minded 
manner to be used in everyday language (with possibility to offend), as an offensive term 
with negative connotations, as a description of an actual experience, or as claimed identity 
that is positive.  The consequences of being deemed mad as well as the media impact of 
foregrounding madness was outlined.  It appeared the process of re-claiming madness as a 
term to describe an experience or as a positive celebration of difference. The consequences 
for counselling psychologists appeared clear – we need to encourage the deconstruction of 
mental health terminology and not be afraid to allow words that sit outside of official 
terminology to be discussed.  The idea of ‘normalising’ was also challenged as it encourages 
the divide of ‘us and them’.  Instead, I proposed the idea of encouraging counselling 
psychologists and other professionals to look at the individual’s own experiences and making 
sense of them within their context, providing informed, individualized formulations and 
solutions.  
  The next section of this portfolio demonstrates my professional practice through the 
inclusion of an in-depth case study. This case study represents my developing interest in 
working psychodynamically, informed by systemic thinking.  The adaptive perspective lends 
itself to this marriage of models and retains my social constructionist epistemological 
grounding.  In working as a trainee psychologist, this case provided an incredibly interesting 
opportunity to attempt to engage with a woman who presented as what would previously be 
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called a ‘hysteric’.  The client described how she became incredibly dizzy after a 
confrontation with a family member.  This symptom increased to the point where she felt the 
‘world fell apart’ and left her unable to walk, bathe, and dress unaided.  It also left her unable 
to read or write. In working reflectively, I was able to challenge the constructions held by the 
client as well as the build an awareness of the subtle emotional/transferential impact of 
working against a long-standing identity of illness.  Historic presentations of anxiety, PTSD, 
and agoraphobia had been managed in the past, though unresolved.  However, the continued 
access to physical health services sustained the idea that there was a ‘cause’ and the cause 
could be found by an expert and cured.  After some time the client was able to hold the idea 
that anxiety was present, as a result of early trauma, and was impacting her physical health 
problem.  Overall my focus on identifying and de-constructing the client’s years of defense 
mechanisms helped to widen my lens to see the function of those defenses.  This left her 
husband as the centre of her world and positioned as her carer.  The ‘sick role’ also deflected 
any blame for missing years of her childrens’ life through her agoraphobia and ignored any 
potential for both husband and wife to question difficulties in their marriage.  As the sessions 
continued, the function of her role in the family also proved to be difficult to change.  In 
order for the client to‘re-surface’, her husband would have to re-position himself in a less 
dependent role.  Through supervision and personal therapy, the impact of projected emotional 
material became clear and I was more able to identify my role in maintaining the client’s sick 
role.  Towards the end of the work, I was able to maintain my ability to ‘hold’ the client 
without fearing to go beneath the surface that was presented.  The client responded well and 
enjoyed reclaiming her identity of a forgotten past.  This work was extremely challenging but 
reaffirmed my choice to work with cases that other deem unfixable.  In maintaining my social 
constructionist identity through therapeutic models that encourage de-constructive thinking, I 
was able to challenge the wider world of the client, outside of the therapy room, as well as 
realize the impact of myself as both part of the problem and the solution.  
The last section of the portfolio demonstrates the end-point of my time on the doctoral 
course.  Following the challenges faced in the production of the research project, I was 
determined to produce a publishable paper that stood up for counselling psychology and 
encourages research projects that can provoke social change to break through bureaucratic 
and epistemological barriers.  The paper forms the necessary requirements for submission to 
the Counselling Psychology Review.  It is hoped that counselling psychologist reading the 
paper will use some of the examples of why counselling psychologists are suited to research 
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and supports the use of qualitative methodologies that are congruent with non-realist 
epistemologies.  An awareness of the identity crisis within the clinical and research world of 
the counselling psychologist was also integrated into the paper.  The challenges faced in my 
own research were outlined, as well as recommendations for how to approach similar 
resistance in for future projects.  My own experience delayed my research significantly.  
However, in maintaining my passion for the subject, and reminding myself of the inspiration 
for the research, I learned how to take on the challenges a counselling psychologist faces in 
their multi-faceted portfolio careers, in order to encourage meaningful social change. 
These pieces of work are presented in order to demonstrate my competencies within 
counselling psychology in terms of research, clinical practice and service delivery.  However, 
I also hope they present my passion for trying to engage in community and societal roles of 
the counselling psychologist.  Throughout the doctorate course, we have been encouraged to 
take part in the field of psychology ‘beyond the therapy room’.  I hope the development of 
my skills in research, practice, consultation and teaching will facilitate my ambition of 
encouraging social change from the therapy room to the board room.  Through my personal 
underpinning in social constructionism, I am able to make use of therapy models that 
encourage a process of deconstruction, research that challenges thinking whilst engaging 
those who need to be heard, and consulting other professionals in a way that encourages 
creative thinking without appearing threatening.  I sincerely hope this passion continues 
within my own person and spreads to other professionals, policy makers and beyond.    
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Abstract 
Overview: Currently service users views are included as part of the diagnostic 
construction.  The impact of mental health language is difficult to explore as terminology is 
shifting through the decades.  The term madness has survived.  Therefore constructions of 
this term and its societal and subjective consequences can be investigated.   Objectives: The 
objective of the study was to investigate what constructions are held in regards the term 
‘madness’, as well as the perceived ‘function’ of those constructions from the perspective of 
mental health service users. Design: A qualitative methodological approach was used to 
deconstruct the term ‘madness’ using Discourse Analysis. The term was chosen as it 
represents a long-standing construct that has not changed over time unlike current mental 
health terminology. Service users were asked to share their constructions of the term as 
current literature on the topic is lacking from the mental health service user 
perspective. Method: Following NHS Ethics approval, participants were selected from 
Service User Involvement Forums in West London using opportunistic sampling. Individual 
(n=3) and Group (n=4) semi-structured interviews were used. Discourse Analysis 
methodology formed the analytic procedure. Results: The term ‘madness’ can be placed 
within a continuum of similar terminology such as insane or crazy but the use of the term has 
varied functions: 1) Flippant, non-offensive, non-labelling term; 2) Labelling and harmful, 
with or without intention to do so; 3) An accurate description of ‘an experience’; and 4) 
Labelling but positive, indicating creativity/uniqueness. Conclusions: The term ‘madness’ is 
not clinical, though clinical terms may be translated as ‘madness’. The term can be harmful 
when misused (e.g. through the media). The term is most helpfully re-claimed and re-
constructed by service users, in order to encourage acceptance. A change in clinical 
philosophy, re-thinking the use of clinical language as well as re-considering normalising, 
and suggesting opportunities to encourage transparent working are promoted. 
Keywords:  Madness, Mental Health, Mental Wellbeing, Mental Illness, Discourse Analysis 
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Chapter 1 – The Introduction 
 
Unless we are to diagnose entire cultures as psychotic, we have to rethink the 
question of what counts as mad, locating it in social and cultural definitions rather than 
assuming a trans-historical identity of the insane. (Hodgkin, 2007, p.4) 
 
1.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the author seeks to enlist the help of recent literature in uncovering 
what constructions society holds about the term ‘madness’ today. How these meanings serve 
to do something in the contexts where the term is used will also be explored. What is clear 
from the published material is that the general view of madness is not clear. The central 
tenants of ‘madness’ in major literature appears to be in the form of historical explanations, 
citing the ‘rise of psychiatric power’ and ‘mechanistic/reductionist views’ that do not satisfy 
professionals in the mental health field or those designated as ‘mad’. A political and 
philosophical debate then seems to be the motivation behind the published material. 
Uncovering why madness as a term has been maintained throughout this time appears to be 
less reported, lost instead to the political debate. As a result, the perceived function(s) of 
madness usage today is over-intellectualized and therefore inaccessible to those who are 
associated with ‘madness’.  
However, more recent papers show a growing trend towards the publication of 
patient’s narratives in the search for meaning (e.g., Allen, 2005; Adams, 2003; Barnes, 2008; 
Campbell, 2009; Fearne 2010). In terms of how this information is used clinically, Barrett 
(1996) argues that patients’ narratives currently are only included as part of the diagnostic 
construction. After reviewing the main literature, which is dense in the book volumes but 
limited in the form of research articles, the author will attempt to look at some of the recent 
directions in published articles which may give further insight on the meaning(s) of madness 
today and on the perceived function of these different meanings. This will be explored with 
application to counselling psychology and the aims of the current study. 
1.2 Assumptions on madness 
Whilst one would normally begin by searching for a range of definitions of a term, 
this will not be the case here. The quote from Hodgkin (2007) at the beginning of this chapter 
serves as a more pertinent attempt to position the constructions sought by this paper, as 
opposed to definitions. The function or functions of a particular construction is the topic of 
interest in this research paper. The methodology chapter includes a current ‘definition’, 
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sourced at the time of writing, in order to ‘check-in’ with what ‘official’ terms are currently 
offered in society, in contrast the authors own assumptions.  
The overwhelming literature response to meaning(s) of madness has been from the 
field of psychiatry, with particular attention to the establishment of the mental health system 
in the USA. Some recent readings on the history of madness include Gracefully Insane: The 
Rise and Fall of America's Premier Mental Hospital (Beam, 2009); Creating Mental Illness 
(Horowitz, 2002); Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the Enduring 
Mistreatment of the Mentally Ill (Whitaker, 2002) and Madness: A Brief History (Porter, 
2002). The last example traces theoretical routes throughout Europe as opposed to 
foregrounding the USA, as per the evident choice of the other authors. Overall, at the times of 
each era of madness cited, the professionals at each point would offer explanations of 
madness, rather than assumptions. The functions of these ‘explanations’ appear to have 
altered only a moderate degree throughout history, generally serving to inform ‘treatments’ of 
various guises. 
In the 18th century, madness supposedly ‘advertised itself in a proliferation of 
symptoms, in gait, in physiognomy, in weird demeanor, and habits. It was synonymous with 
behaving crazy, looking crazy, talking crazy. Villagers, churchwardens and doctors alike – all 
could spot “antic dispositions”’ (Porter, 2002, p.35). These assumptions therefore had a 
function of being able to identify madness without necessarily having any ‘expertise’. In the 
‘clinical world’ of today, the debate on mental health terminology and the supposed function 
of each particular mental health ‘phrase’ continues (see Muijen below). Conversely, if the 
view of Psychiatrist and Academic, Thomas  Szasz (e.g., 1961) were taken, the actual 
existence of madness or mentally illness would be dismissed entirely. Clearly, there are many 
‘experts’ in the mental health field who have their assumptions of how madness can be 
defined (or dismissed entirely). However, historically, we see the term madness extended to 
philosophy, art, political – and even spiritual – understandings.  
1.3 Why explore madness today? 
The meaning of madness has been explored throughout history, from references to the 
‘Golden Age’ of Greece to the writings of Shakespeare (e.g., King Lear), to the more 
contemporary medium of film (e.g., One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest). As per Porter’s 
(2002) picture of the 18th century noted above, the last example from the world of film hints 
at a more general view of madness. A knowledge and diagnostic ability is held without a 
person being exposed or trained in the supposed ‘phenomenon’. Currently, treatment plans 
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for those deemed not to be sane are decided upon by mental health professionals, which 
suggests that there is an expert knowledge and definition of what it is to be sane, insane or 
indeed ‘mad’. However, in 2006, Dr. Matt Muijen, Regional Advisor for Mental Health at the 
European Region of the World Health Organisation, highlighted the problems associated with 
(mis)understandings of umbrella terminology, arguing that: 
... ’mental health’, ‘mental ill health’, ‘mental wellbeing’, ‘mental illness’, ‘lack of 
mental wellbeing’ are all being used, and we all assume that we are talking about the same 
group and the same concepts. It is very dangerous. In the Helsinki Declaration we 
consistently used either ‘mental wellbeing’ to talk about positive mental health, or ‘mental 
health problems’ to talk about negative mental health, and already this could lead to debates 
about the meaning of those concepts. We cluster together a whole group of disorders and a 
whole group of people who actually have nothing in common. We talk about people with, let 
us say, relatively minor anxiety states and people with very major forms of schizophrenia as 
part of the same group. It is unhelpful because they need very different interventions leading 
to different outcomes. (Great Britain, 2007, p.92). 
Therefore, there appears to be a core misunderstanding of what different people mean 
when they use these labels. In the above statement, Muijen goes so far as to suggest that 
people with different diagnoses should be group-labeled differently, and that it is ‘dangerous' 
to call them or think of groups as the same. This suggests that the constructed taxonomies of 
mental health should be segregated, perhaps into ‘mild mental health’ and ‘real mental 
health’ catgories. It does not question assumptions behind these taxonomies but instead 
creates a fear in the audience that positions schizophrenia at the extreme end of some 
imagined scale. The result is that these ideas are further cemented rather than deconstructed 
and questioned. If positioning individuals at the ‘extreme end’ is interpreted as modern-day 
madness, would his statement have a different impact on the audience? Does mental health 
versus. mental illness mean anything different to the lay public? Where does the concept of 
madness fit into this equation? 
The author of the present study has chosen to look at how ‘madness’ is constructed 
today, as it is a term that remains relatively persistent throughout time. It is a word that stands 
up to what Bahktin (1971) calls ‘great-time’, whereby all significant words, although 
fluctuating to some extent, continue to have importance beyond their immediate context 
(Lindsey, 1993). The novelist image of what madness is has endured throughout the citations 
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of the word madness. The opposing phrase 'small-time' may relate to mental illness, or mental 
health, which are only present in our current time, and their meanings continue to vary and 
alter (Lindsey, 1993), as Muijen’s terminology debate (Great Britain, 2007) seems to suggest.  
Moreover, the recent labels may be used when the individual using them is actually 
referring to their own or others’ idea of madness. This highlights how language is constantly 
creating and recreating meaning with varying functions, within different contexts. The 
functional consequence of this term to an individual may be detrimental to engagement with 
services. In a recent article, Williams (2010) describes how, historically, the emergence of 
constructions of madness or insanity, “coincided with ways in which relations of order and 
power were administered in a newly industrializing world”, and that “these influences have 
had tremendous impact on the ways individuals are viewed and treated” (p.111). Williams 
strongly suggests that this continues to be the case today, in terms of how such  individuals 
are viewed, treated and managed. In the field of counselling psychology, one of the key 
components of a National Health Service (NHS) psychologist role is multidisciplinary team 
working (MDT). Being involved, from initial assessment to end treatment with an individual, 
positions the MDT as  decision makers. Therefore, their own constructions may be pertinent 
in deciding how to manage patients.  As an active part of that team, counselling psychologists 
could play a role in understanding, and possibly deconstructing and challenging these 
assumptions at both an MDT and patient level. 
1.3.1 Clinical terminology 
In recent years, there has been a strong focus on de-pathologizing terminology within 
the mental health sector. For example, we now talk about psychosis rather than 
schizophrenia. In addition we currently have proposals of ‘Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome’ 
being brought into the new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; 
APA, 2013), with schizophrenia being only one of 11 labels within the diagnostic category of 
Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders. Shifting language can also be seen 
from National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Director Thomas Insel’s neurogenetically 
orientated article, Rethinking Schizophrenia. The work states that we can now think of 
schizophrenia as a syndrome that can be re-positioned as a neurodevelopmental disorder.  He 
goes on to say that, like other mental illnesses, we can position psychosis as the late stage of a 
neurodevelopmental trajectory, where the end-symptoms are observed in the form of 
psychosis (Insel, 2010). This theory extends to other mental health disorders in his earlier 
article on re-thinking mental illness (Insel & Wang, 1970). 
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Clinically, we talk about ‘mental illness’ rather than ‘insanity’, though the terms are 
used interchangeably in the media. One example is from Dr. Wessely (Institute of Psychiatry, 
London, UK) on the Norway massacre in 2011, who argues that the media and the public’s 
first assumption is that the perpetrator, Breivik, must be mad specifically because he has 
committed such atrocities (Wessely, 2012). The same article quotes terms such as being 
‘insane’ and having ‘mental health problems’ as a means of explaining Breivik’s behaviour. 
The use of these different terms highlights the varied terminology that exists in the psyche of 
the lay public. In this case, Wessely reports the publically perceived function of associating a 
mental health label with Breivik as a means to provide a legal device to exonerate him from 
responsibility. If so, it would appear that the public’s reaction to portrayals of madness, and 
the consequences of association to madness, is viewed as negative. The idea of a stigma is not 
present in this example but rather, the notion of the consequences of labelling are 
unsatisfactory in relation to the public’s idea of justice.  
The association of stigma, and consequences of it, are present in current literature.  
These follow the ideas of ‘labelling theory’, which came into popularity following sociologist 
Thomas Scheff’s seminal book, Being Mentally Ill (Scheff, 1966). The overall idea of the 
ensuing debate was that being labelled mentally ill causes one to be mentally ill; similar to 
the public’s reaction to Breivik’s labelling, Scheff’s 1966 original theory foregrounded the 
act of the labelling through institutional measures. At the height of its popularity, labelling 
theory itself was contested (e.g., Davis, 1976; Gibbs, 1972; Gove, 1970). However, following 
Lewis's (1971) analysis of therapy transcripts, it was updated in 1989 and 1999 to include the 
emotional impact of labelling, to include the chain reactions of shame and anger, resulting in 
poor outcomes for individuals and their families.  
Recent studies show that the development of ‘insight’ into a range of mental health 
conditions, particularly psychosis, lead to an increase in depression and suicide (Lewis, 2004; 
Drake et al., 2004). Furthermore, another study found that after 4 years, individuals who were 
more aware that they suffered from ‘mental illness’ were likely to become more depressed, 
with a greater likelihood of attempted suicide’ (Crumlish et al., 2005). More recently, Barrett 
and colleagues (2010) reported similar findings but put forward the explanation that the 
individual’s negative beliefs about psychosis were the important factor for developing 
depression and increasing the risk of suicide. This is particularly pertinent for the current 
study as it suggests that the individual’s construction of modern-day madness, when 
perceived to apply to them, has a negative impact, and possibly to an injurious degree. 
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Equally, the construction of madness that a person holds, in relation to him/herself, might 
also lend itself to a lighter or more positive function.  In thinking about how terms may be 
used in language, phrases such as 'I have lost my marbles', rather than, 'I'm suffering with a 
chronic mental illness called schizophrenia, which I will live with for the rest of my life’ 
seems to suggest a different type of label that a person is identifying with, and what they are 
suggesting to the outside world in relation to this chosen identity.  As noted earlier from 
Muijen (2007), the meaning of certain phrases appears to have very different consequences. 
Conversely, Weinstein (1983) suggested that, when legitimately thought of as mental 
illness, the patient's ‘insight’ that he or she suffers from such a label may be conducive to 
improvement. In this view, the application of a mental illness label, where appropriate, can be 
therapeutic for the client. Illness in this context was however not a diagnostic 'imposed' label. 
Historically, an individual would undergo an assessment by their G.P. and then have a 
psychiatric assessment to be allocated a diagnostic label and receive treatment accordingly. 
However, with the emergence of Wellbeing Centres in the UK, as part of the Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) agenda, a person can self-refer, forgoing the 
attachment of a psychiatric label. However, they may be 'stepped-up' to secondary care 
services if scoring too high on depression and anxiety scales. This gives rise to the question 
as to whether new constructions of madness have emerged.  
The debate on labeling is ongoing and as yet does not appear to have impacted on 
clinical treatment or in media representations of labels such as mentally ill, mad, or insane. 
Therefore, there is a need to continue the debate, at a more deconstructive level, so that the 
consequences of re-thinking madness reach beyond the level of textbook lectures. The reason 
for this shift not occurring sooner is debatable, though it is evident that the terminology 
surrounding madness and its consequences are not new to the world. 
1.3.2 Madness through the ages.   
Throughout history, madness has had many names and associations, interpreted across 
cultures with negative connotations. For the purposes of this review, the words 'lunacy', 
'insane', and 'deranged' will be assumed to equate to the common language that comprises 
'madness'. Casey and Long (2003) compiled terminology on madness from a literature review 
and listed labels as: ‘possession by evil spirits’, ‘punishment for past wrongs’, ‘mystical 
experiences’, ‘biochemical imbalances’, ‘faulty genes’, ‘feeble mindedness’, ‘social-
deviance’, ‘the product of damaging interpersonal/social environment’, ‘faulty thinking’ or 
‘the result of past traumatic experiences’ (Casey & Long, 2003, p.92). Spread throughout 
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history, these associations extend beyond the views of western culture, though it seems only 
with the emergence of psychiatry that the language of madness has since expelled spiritual or 
mystical explanations. The rise of psychiatry will be discussed later in this review. At this 
point the reader will find that some of the (mis)understandings of what madness means will 
seem familiar. However, it may create unease as one realises that the past views of what 
madness is still resonate in today’s society.  
According to a timeline created by Roberts (1981), at the turn of the last century, 
people with mental health difficulties were referred to as ‘defective’, ‘lunatics’, and ‘insane’ 
and believed to be prone to committing homicide, and attempting to murder and maim 
(Roberts, 1981). In 1890, the meaning of madness was dismissed and was thought to be 
caused by an erroneous nervous system and believed to be incurable (Roberts, 1981). In 1900 
the mad were incarcerated in large, overcrowded, under-resourced ‘madhouses’ or ‘asylums’ 
to protect them from exploitation and protect society from them (Roberts, 1981). 
Furthermore, in 1904 the Eugenics Movement called for compulsory sterilization of the 
insane to prevent racial degeneration (Roberts,1981). 
Later in the 1980s, the UK Mental Health Act (1983) used the term ‘mental disorder’, 
defining it as ‘mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic 
disorder and any other disorder of the mind’. It emphasized reception, care, and treatment of 
mentally disordered patients, and placed legal controls on medical treatments, particularly 
surgery, electro-convulsive therapy, and mood-altering medications.  
Today, Mental Health Law allows for compulsorily hospitalization of those 
individuals with an approved social worker or the next of kin for assessment (Section 2), or 
emergency treatment (Section 4) lasting a maximum of 28 days or 72 hours, respectively 
(Mental Health Act, 2007). The reason for admission must be that the person needs 
assessment and possible treatment for the protection of themselves or others. Previously it 
was the case that a woman may be detained into a hospital at “the request of the husband of 
the woman”, “without the evidence of insanity” (Szasz 1973, p.55). Furthermore, in Russia, 
individuals were detained for political reasons; revolution itself was thought to trigger an 
epidemic of “latent deviance in apparently normal people” (Beer, 2008). In brief, if you are 
seen to be decenting, you will be ‘classed’ as insane, and ‘treated’ as such. Currently, the 
psychiatry profession has been appointed the designator of those who are sane or insane. 
Therefore, does the contemporary definition of madness  lie with them? 
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1.3.3 Psychiatrists – the deemers of madness 
Thomas Szasz is a well-known author on the topic of madness and has numerous 
books, including, The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), Ideology and Insanity (1970), The 
Manufacture of Madness (1970), and The Second Sin (1974).  In his books, Szasz (1961, 
1973) famously put forward the idea that there was ‘no such thing as mental illness’ and that 
it is in fact a man-made myth! Indeed, Szasz’s name is usually associated with the anti-
psychiatry movement that emerged in response to the medicalization of matters of the mind 
and the treatment that followed from these medical-models. In his book, The Age of Madness 
– The History of Involuntary Mental Hospitalisation, Szasz (1973) explores the rise of 
psychiatric power over those deemed insane. 
More recently, Szasz (2001) has argued there is no meaning of madness for 
psychiatrists as practices such as detaining, drugging and invalidating their experiences, by 
translating content into ‘lack of insight’ or ‘delusional states’ continue. However, it is worth 
noting that Szasz himself is a psychiatrist by designation; later in this review we will see that 
not all psychiatrists are the same.  
Another name in the defending of the mad (referred to as ‘voice of unreason’) against 
psychiatry (referred to as the ‘voice of reason’) is Michael Foucault. In Madness and 
Civilization (1965) and, more recently, History of Madness and Madness (2006), Foucault 
presents a history of the division between madness and reason, a history of institutions, and a 
history of power between us/them. In this way, it is the general narrative that has been 
accepted by society that allows psychiatry to determine polarized view of sane/insane to exist 
by consent. However, although this leads us to an understanding of what madness means for 
society, it perhaps objectifies 'the mad' as those who are the subject of academic and 
philosophical debate. Therefore, it further creates an ‘us/them’ way of thinking that sustains a 
power divide to which society subscribes towards. Furthermore, it does not add to any 
progress into the understanding of what madness means today in terms of clinical application. 
The only solution would be to refer to the opening quote in this review (Hodgkin, 2007), 
though this may prove untenable. With the development of access to therapy outside 
psychiatric ministrations (for some), it may be that it means something entirely different to 
those who would otherwise be seen as experiencing madness. Furthermore, what if madness 
is experienced in another form, a meaningful one of being touched by the hand of a 
mystical/supreme being? 
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1.3.4 Explorations of the myth of madness 
In recent years, Richard Bentall has been a popularized figure within the realm of  
mental illness study. Here, the term madness is used only as it is Bentall’s chosen word – the 
most recent term for separating the mad from the sane. In his book Madness Explained, 
Bentall (2004) looks at what he describes as the most severe types of mental disorder – the 
psychoses. Bentall's book is similar to that of Szasz in its description of the rise of the 
psychiatric movement, and the emerging attempts to understand mental illness through 
mechanistic biological framing. It differs in its focus on the development of the tools by 
which psychiatry now diagnoses someone based on a classification manual (e.g., ICD and 
DSM). The beginning of classification originated – according to Bentall – with German 
psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin. This seems to have begun the metaphorical medical ball rolling 
towards further redefining insanity. What was then termed dementia praecox is now more 
universally known as schizophrenia. However, as Bentall points out, the method of 
diagnosing people in this way can never be an absolute measure of the barrier between sanity 
and insanity. This runs contrary to 'the giants of psychiatry', such as Kraepelin who had 
suggested that people either suffered with mental illness or they did not, quashing the belief 
that one might be able to interpret madness as eccentricity (Bentall, 2004). 
1.4 Boundaries of madness 
Where Bentall brings together historical and modern understandings of madness is in 
reported studies that show the 'first-rank' or 'positive' symptoms of schizophrenia seen in all 
people. The first study Bentall cites was conducted at the end of the 19th century, and 
focused on hallucinations. It found that in interviews of 14,000 men and women in the UK, 
8% men and 12% women reported at least one experience of vivid hallucination (Sidgewick, 
1894, in Bentall, 2004).  
 Bentall reports that modern surveys have continued to provide evidence that 
hallucinations are experienced by people who, importantly, appear otherwise ‘normal’ and 
who have felt the need to seek psychiatric treatment. The recent studies have not had random 
distribution of participants, who had been taken mainly from student populations. Therefore, 
its generalizability is somewhat limited. However, Bentall cites a survey in the USA, which 
comprises 18,000 participants. This study by Allen Tien (1991, in Bentall, 2004) cited 
between 11% and 13% of participants reporting experiences of hallucinations. However, 
these studies differ not only in time and location but in their results: the former reported the 
experience of hallucinations at ages 20–29 and the latter in old age. Furthermore, the latter, 
 24 
US study, reported fewer incidents of visual hallucinations. This suggests that there is not a 
clear divide between madness and sanity. However, the difference in the two studies shows 
that cross-cultural and historical variation play a role in what constitutes symptoms of 
madness in those otherwise considered to be sane. 
1.4.1 Madness in the sane 
Evidently, the lines of madness can be blurred further, as there have been exceptions 
allowed in psychiatry to allow for hallucinations in the sane, despite it being seen as one of 
the defining points of separation from reality. In 1925, at the height of the ‘classification’ era 
of Kraepelin – his ‘clinical manifestations of mental illness’ book having been published 5 
years previously (Bentall, 2004) – an article was published in the British Medical Journal, 
reporting the case of visual hallucinations in a patient (Ormond, 1925). The case study was 
explained by the author, an ophthalmic surgeon, and compared with Galton’s earlier work 
that suggested a ‘sane and healthy person’ could have ‘visual presentations’ that could reach 
the level of hallucination. This was attributed to some neurological origin in the occipital 
region of the brain. However, if the person was distressed by this and saw a psychiatrist, 
would they therefore be diagnosed as mad? 
Current developments in general medicine have led to the ‘discovery’ of Charles 
Bonnet syndrome (CBS).  However, there is disagreement in the medical world as to how this 
actually occurs. It is believed that  loss of sight leads to some form of compensation in the 
brain. An article titled Visual Hallucinations in Sane People (Rosenbaum, 1987) and a later 
review by Gold and Rabins (1989) noted the phenomenon being reported for several hundred 
years without consensus on whether these hallucinations should be considered a separate 
syndrome, CBS, or whether eye disease or brain disease is a necessary or exclusionary 
criterion for diagnosing this syndrome. Overall, it was understood to occur in elderly people 
with decreased visual acuity; the article concluded with recommendations for diagnostic 
criteria. However, the literature, published in psychiatric journals, still seeks this 
categorization rather than exploring the difference of having hallucinations that are 
distressing, leading to diagnosis of psychosis and antipsychotic medication, and someone 
who has a hallucination and is deemed to have CBS. This may mean that those otherwise 
deemed ‘mad’ could perhaps pass for sane and vice versa, depending on which doctor they 
see. This leads us to consider the personal account of people who experience hallucinations. 
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1.4.2 Personal accounts of hallucinations from the sane.  
The personal accounts of those who experience hallucinations have been noted in case 
reports from psychiatric journals with view to explain their presentations within a diagnostic 
framework. However, there are individuals who have the academic reporting means and 
ability to position their experiences outside of madness. One such study is from Goldstein 
(1976), who reports “several highly organized visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic 
hallucinations” (Goldstein, 1976, p.423) that he experienced for three days before undergoing 
spinal disc surgery. Of particular interest to this review, Goldstein asserts that if he was 
identified as ‘psychotic’ before the experience; his article would be “nothing more than a 
report of a very common, trivial experience” (Goldstein, 1976, p.423). He then continues to 
state evidence for his sanity due to his employment background and the temporary nature of 
the occurrence. However, this ability to self-diagnose and self-determine how one is viewed 
after such an experience is rare. Later in this review, the experience of madness by those 
deemed mad by others will be explored.  
1.4.3 On being sane in insane places 
In a famous experiment, Rosenhan (1973) described a case whereby eight individuals 
reported unusual auditory experiences at US psychiatric hospitals. They were subsequently 
admitted and given a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The study is from a psychology platform as 
opposed to medicine or psychiatry, yet it supposes that there is an amount of leniency the can 
be allowed in misdiagnosis. Subsequent studies of a similar time also criticized the methods 
used in the 1973 study, though it is cited widely in the field of psychology as an example of 
the importance of context and diagnosis in psychiatry. Crown (1975) rebutted that, 
“psychiatric diagnosis, particularly of schizophrenia, is culture bound rather than absolute 
and depends on the interaction between the symptoms presented by a patient (or pseudo-
patient) and the background and training of the psychiatrist” (Crown, 1975, p.453). 
Importantly, when admitted, the pseudo-patients dropped any symptomology but “were not 
detectably sane” (Rosenhan, 1973, p.252) in the environment of a psychiatric hospital. 
Furthermore, the original 1973 study reported that at the end of the pseudo-patient’s 
admission, each of the pseudo-patients who had been diagnosed schizophrenic was classed as 
having schizophrenia ‘in remission’.  
This is arguably the most important consequence of a diagnosis of modern-day 
madness; people diagnosed with any other disorder can seemingly return to sanity, though 
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individuals who are given a diagnosis of schizophrenia or psychosis can only ever have their 
status updated to ‘in remission’.  
In 2001, Scribner revisited Rosenhan’s work in order to evaluate whether any 
progress had occurred in the mental health field over the past several decades. Conversely, 
these were individuals with a history of psychiatric illness and in the midst of an acute 
exacerbation of their respective ‘illness’ (Scribner, 2001). It was found that these individuals 
did not gain admission to their desired facilities. Scribner concludes that this shows a shift in 
psychiatric services that forces individuals to “maintain a level of dysfunction that is neither 
too mild nor too severe, ensuring that he or she squeezes into that ever-shrinking range of 
disturbance that is deemed to be suitable for treatment” (Scribner, 2001, p.258).  
This controvertibly proposes that the meaning of madness today might be influenced 
by the services that provide provision to treat them, and that the mad are able to modify what 
the meaning of madness is to the service providers in order to seek treatment. 
1.5 Whose madness is it anyway? 
The ambiguity over what counts as mad begs the question: how can madness be 
portrayed so that it fits into a general understanding and renders services receptive to that 
construct? It also suggests that, to the professional, the idea of how ‘ill’ is ‘ill enough’ to 
provide acute services? It also links to Muijen’s (2007) mental health versus mental illness 
debate, whereby there may be a move toward mild mental health versus ‘real’ mental health – 
modern-day madness – in determining service provision. Perhaps the term madness now has 
its meaning embedded as a great-time word from something accessible in different forms 
throughout history – the media. 
1.5.1 Media’s madness 
The literature accounts of madness on behalf of psychiatry – and its emerging 
counterpart, the individuals deemed mad – may not quite fill the overall (mis)understanding 
of what madness means today. Although there appears to be a raft of viewpoints from 
psychiatrists and the affected individuals,  people in general have an idea of what madness is 
– apparently, without having being exposed to it. This can be seen to have occurred 
throughout history in various guises of media portrayals. Whether from Shakespeare, Edgar 
Allen Poe to films such as One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975), the exposure of media 
portrayal of madness has been the debate of research publications. 
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According to a recent review by Nairn (2007), English-speaking societies have a 
considerable store of images of the mad, which are embedded in known narratives and 
official practices. Using a social constructionist viewpoint, Nairn supposes that these notions 
“rely upon recycled vocabulary, metaphors and other tropes, and narrative fragments that 
have accumulated over hundreds of years” (Nairn, 2007, p.139). This perspective allows the 
recipients of such knowledge to be familiar with biomedical cornerstones such as 
‘schizophrenia’, ‘psychosis’ and both ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’, as seen throughout 
this review, dating back to the 18th century. Nairn has published works on media depictions 
of mental illnesses over the last decade and has come to categorize clusters within the bank of 
images available as: ‘animal(ity)’, ‘damaged goods’, ‘incomplete’, ‘out of control’ and 
‘possessed’ (Nairn, 2007, p.139). These do not categorize the mad as per the method in 
mental health services, though gives a picture as to the meaning of madness to the general 
population. 
Importantly, such narratives available through media are evidently open to the general 
population, which therefore includes both those deemed mad and those who ‘do the 
deeming’. This may therefore be an important means to answering the question of what the 
meaning of madness is today, and to understand why some will go to great lengths to avoid 
the usual ‘route of diagnosis’, preferring to opt for psychotherapeutic treatment. 
However, as Nairn (2007) states, the data collected had some exclusions that leave the 
results to be reviewed with caution. The samples taken were from newspapers, television 
documentaries, soaps, and dramas in the UK, USA, Australia, and New Zealand. Nairn’s 
work on madness in the media spans 10 years, therefore the ideas can be taken as a snapshot 
of the discourses of specific types of media at a given point in time. However, Nairn’s work 
neither indicates the impact on the meaning of madness from media to the individuals most 
sensitive to the portrayal, those deemed mad; nor does it show its impact on the general 
public, or the clinicians who diagnose or give treatment to people entering the mental health 
system. It would be illuminating to examine works of the past literature and media, and its 
effect on the meaning of madness and therefore on service provision. 
There are a number of works that seek to link psychoanalytic understandings (both 
pre- and post-Freud) the works of Shakespeare (See Edgar, 1970; Feder, 1980; Sakeld, 1993) 
in order to understand the meaning of madness in the characters. Although historically of 
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interest, this does not fully explore the meaning and consequences of understanding(s) of 
madness today. 
However, Liam Clarke’s (2009) Fiction’s Madness book provides an initial look into 
how this might be done. In the form of essays rather than an academic work, he takes 12 
works of ‘classical literature’, from Shakespeare to Kafka to Kingsley Amis, exploring 
mental illness and proposes how understandings can be rendered from stories. The result is 
that some recommendations are given to address the reductionist nature of diagnostic 
teachings and look at the context of both the authors and the protagonists in understanding 
the meaning of madness.  
This is further supported by Crawford and Backer (2009) who suggest that parallels of 
psychiatric teachings can be found, perhaps to a more rich and experiential degree, by writers 
of fiction. It is hoped that through the discourse of fiction, the psychiatrist-in-training can 
examine the human experiences, emotional responses and behaviors of both patients 
(fiction’s protagonists) and their carers (secondary characters). This opens up a debate on the 
meaning of madness ‘for whom’, which as discussed later might be particularly important for 
clinical practice. 
1.5.2 Media’s madness in therapy 
Whilst we may not know every impact of media’s portrayal of madness, we can see 
some attempts to see its influence on pockets of society. Perhaps most pertinent to 
counselling psychology, is its impact on therapy itself. Tutter (2009) looked at the reaction of 
clients when they presented with the proposition of taking medication in its activation of 
‘romantic fantasies of madness’. Tutter explores what she calls a “defense analysis’ of their 
objections, which may be feared and concealed as a source of shame, destruction, and loss, 
and also cherished and revered as a source of power, inspiration, and mystery” (Tutter, 2009, 
p.631). According to Tutter, the romanticized texts are also known to the therapist and, 
therefore, inadvertently lead to the therapist colluding with the idea that medication may 
quash inner wishes and desires – taking the meaning from madness. 
Moreover, recent attention has been given to delusions themselves that might change 
the attitudes of both client and service provider towards the function of ‘the madness of 
today’. The discussion here focuses on delusions, which Roberts (1991) suggests are ‘a 
means of sense-making’. He argues that delusions themselves may help the individual 
attribute meaning to “unaccountable, unpredictable, anomalous experience” (Roberts, 1991, 
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p.19). This theory fits with the Foucauldian constructionist approach towards the meaning of 
mental illness. It also supports earlier assertions from Lansky (1977) that a delusion is 
restitutive in “ameliorating anxieties by altering the construction of reality” (Lansky, 1977, 
p.160). This has intriguing applications for the acknowledgement of the importance of the 
content in the narrative of people deemed mad. However, the application of these theories to 
practice may remain with the therapist, and not be translated to the end-user – the client. 
Furthermore, how might it be conveyed through psychiatry’s end-users – the patients? Could 
this change the meaning of madness for them? 
1.5.3 Madness for the ‘deemers of madness’ 
A recent paper looks at the meaning of madness today through an interview with a 
psychiatrist. The psychiatrist’s name is not used, though he has quite clear views on the 
meaning of madness for him, which he calls “the abyss”. Furthermore, the interviewee states 
that there is a not-so-clear delineation separating the sane from the insane. For him, “sanity is 
sustained by the network of validating, affirming connections that exist in a person’s life, 
connections to other beings” and “if those links fail, one falls” (Atwood, 2010, p.344).  His 
definition neither creates a generalizable idea of the meaning of madness for all, nor does it 
necessarily represent the views of all psychiatrists. However, this seems especially interesting 
as a new means by which to examine the meaning is of madness today in a novel way. 
Furthermore, in terms of its application for further analysis it lends to the possibility that the 
interview itself might be qualitatively interpreted to draw out themes of the experience of the 
psychiatrist (phenomenological). It may also be used to understand the processes emerging 
from the language (or discourse) used, and the positioning of the interviewer, the interviewee 
and the target audience.  
A possible new direction in the journey towards understanding what the meaning of 
madness is today might first be achieved by first exploring what it means for whom – the 
subjective meaning(s) of madness for those on both sides of the mental health front.. 
Subsequently, it might be possible to explore the meaning of madness in a more general way. 
To achieve this, one might be able to begin with the grounded theory approach, using 
interviews for example, and then later testing this at various presentations and focus groups. 
If starting at the point of the question ‘what is the meaning of madness, for whom’, this 
would begin with ‘the client’ and ‘the people who work with the client’. The latter would be a 
vast array of individuals ranging from G.P.s, student professionals to therapists (both public 
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and private). Importantly, the ‘meaning of madness for the system of the client’ might be the 
overall aim. This would therefore include family and friends.  
Earlier, it was noted that these individuals were historically the ones who decided if a 
person was ‘mad’; today, once a person is deemed mad in the modern sense, such individuals 
are the ones whose consent is required, for the patient’s detention under a section of the 
Mental Health Act. 
1.5.4 Meaning of madness from the (ex)mad 
An article from Madness Strikes Back (Rose, 2008) brings the meaning of madness 
today into the context of this review, and has applications for both research and service 
provision. Particularly pertinent is the clarification in the article where Rose elucidates ‘who 
are we talking about?’ Rose points to the gaze of the World Health Organization (2005) and 
the economic impact of on mental health services of the increasing incidence of depression 
(WHO, 2005, in Rose, 2008). However, Rose then states that these individuals will perhaps 
have voluntarily seen their routine family doctor and never see a psychiatrist. This is in stark 
contrast to someone who is “subject to compulsory psychiatric treatment, or given a 
stigmatizing diagnosis such as paranoid schizophrenia” (Rose, 2008, p.639). Furthermore, 
when thinking about what – or how the medical-model world – constitutes severe 
symptomology, Rose suggests that voice-hearing might be meaningful to those who 
experience it. The aim for the article is to promote service-user involvement in research to 
redress the power imbalance between psychiatry and service users. In allowing their views to 
be heard by means of systematically collecting ‘user testimonies’ it is hoped that the 
emergence of a new type of researcher is introduced as ‘user researcher’ that is, ‘someone 
who is both a researcher and has experience of psychiatric services’. In the Rose article, 
‘patient-centred systematic reviews’ are named as a new type of movement, which was 
created to match traditional medical systematic reviews that measure the effects of 
treatments. 
At first sight this may entice the reader to believing that this is the new direction for 
research that captures the meaning of madness from the experiences of those historically 
deemed mad. However, it is worth noting ethical considerations, as well as applicability. If 
the aim is to create a nomothetic knowledge, then the researcher’s inevitable bias will need to 
be elucidated as underlying assumptions and personal acknowledgements at the outset, before 
interpreting the data. This seems to be a pertinent factor of note in the Rose (2008) article. 
Indeed, Rose, reveals herself as a service user, without clarifying her own assumptions and 
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‘bracketing’ them before conducting the study. This may however have been done, though it 
is not made explicit in the article. For this emerging and potentially rich area of research to 
fulfil its aim, this aspect needs to be addressed in order for this type of research to be 
accepted alongside the predominant medical literature.  
The danger of maintaining the current imbalance might lead us to believe that society 
has not moved on from Foucault's suppression of the voice of unreason (replaced by 
psychiatry as the voice of reason?). The supposed silencing of the views of those who have 
experienced 'madness' in its varied forms has been noted by Barrett (1996), in an 
anthropological study of a schizophrenia facility, patients’ narratives are only included as part 
of the diagnostic construction (Barrett, 1996). Indeed it may be that ‘testimonies’ might be 
extended to service providers, as well as services users. We must consider that both sides of 
the power divide are potential providers of data into 'personal experience’.  
Overall, the literature appears to associate madness with a lifelong label which, if 
associated with negative beliefs about the label’s consequences, predicts a negative outlook. 
However, for some groups, madness is now a term that is re-positioned as positive and even 
celebrated. The most renowned example of this movement is perhaps Mad Pride (Curtis, 
2000). Through associations such as MindFreedom, Mad Pride is now an international 
movement that describes itself as providing “an opportunity to empower psychiatric survivors 
and raise public consciousness about human rights through various activities such as art, 
theatre, music, poetry, protests, vigils, and more” (see www.mindfreedom.org). The use of 
language previously connoted as being negative is also used in groups such as Friends of East 
End Loonies (F.E.E.L.) in London, formed by service users, carers, and professionals.  
Therefore, Mad Pride celebrates the term madness, reclaiming it as a sense of 
uniqueness and difference, in a similar way to minorities such as the L.G.B.T. (Lesbian Gay 
Bisexual Transgender) and black community have reclaimed previously derogatory terms 
(e.g., the term ‘queer’ reclaimed by the L.G.B.T. community). This embodies the modern 
movement of identity politics, which Anspach (1979) describes as “activists attempt to create 
an identity for themselves and to propagate this newly created sense of self to others” 
(Anspach ,1979, p.675). These examples point to a less polarized us–them understanding of 
the word madness within certain contexts, in the present day.  
However, as can be seen from the review overall, there are pockets of individuals who 
have their own (mis)understandings of the term madness, which do not appear to be 
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changing. Therefore, for there to be any lasting impact from deconstructing and 
reconstructing madness, we must surely build our understanding from the people who are 
affected most by the current (mis)understandings – that is, those who identify with having a 
mental health concern. The other sources of knowledge on madness, whether from media or 
mental health professionals, can then reconstruct a more helpful idea of the contemporary 
term from those who are most affected by it. 
1.6 Aims of current research 
The aim of the current research is to seek a deeper understanding of what constructions of 
madness are held by NHS service users. The study will use discourse analysis to explore the 
service users’ constructions of madness through the use of language, and examine the 
function of different interpretive repertories on their subjective world (behaviour, thoughts, 
and feelings). Current literature fails to allow a process of deconstruction and reconstruction 
from the perspectives of the service user. Therefore, the current study is particularly 
warranted in order to impact service provision from a client-centered level, rather than 
imposed from ‘expert’ understanding. 
In exploring the research question, the objective of the study will be to enlist service users 
who identify with having a mental health difficulty. It is hoped that they will be able to 
understand the following: 
• what is meant by madness, from a number of different sources;  • how the term is used in different contexts, and explore what impact (if any) this has 
on their subjective world; and  • where the term is used within society today from contexts the service user mentions. 
 
1.7 Personal reflexivity 
When thinking of the topic of ‘madness’, the reader of this review might have a 
different perspective from that of the author. Therefore to put the work into the context of the 
author, it should be explained that the inspiration for this research stemmed from an NHS 
placement at what was once known as the County Lunatic Asylum – current ‘patients’, 
‘clients’, or ‘service users’ still refer to it as such. It had been suggested in service-user 
meetings that those who do not attend appointments, or fail to engage with the service, do so 
because of its association with ‘madness’. the review author’s personal view is that this 
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‘association’ brings about thoughts of asylums, the shameful past of psychiatric practice, and 
the inhuman treatment of others who are deemed to be suffering from a total break from 
normality.  
The need to answer this issue of perceptions of madness and its treatments was 
brought about from the new establishment of psychological 'well-being centers’ that cater for 
individuals who present with anxiety of depression, yet do not necessarily need a referral 
from the G.P. Therefore, the person may receive a short intervention and then be discharged. 
One might question whether words like 'depression’ and ‘anxiety’ have themselves been 
circulated so much into our western language that they no longer resonate with the de-
humanizing label of 'madness'. Does the term exist in these new contexts of mental 
health/wellbeing? This prompts the question of what it means to be mad in a world where the 
sufferer does not have to be first diagnosed as such in order to in order to receive support.  
Two personal events also impacted on the choice of the term madness as the subject of 
study and provided motivation to pursue this for a doctoral length piece of enquiry. The first 
was a client with whom I was working for over a year. The client stated that the psychiatrist 
who reviewed her weekly thought she was mad. She stated that whenever he asked how she 
was, once she started to tell him how she was truly feeling, his nodding smile indicated to her 
that he was now listening to the language of a mad person. The psychiatrist no doubt felt they 
were showing empathy, though to the end-user, a smile and a nod was interpreted as deeming 
madness. The second event was when questioning whether the word madness still evoked a 
strong reaction in society. The author of this study was struck by a response from a colleague 
who exclaimed,  “Are we even allowed to use that word anymore?” Combined with the 
response from this client, this suggested that the term has endured in its power and therefore 
is the ‘great-time’ word needed for the current study. 
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Chapter 2 - Methodology 
2.1 Overview 
 This chapter provides an outline of the route from research question to the chosen 
methodology.  This includes the researcher's views towards ontology and epistemological 
positioning, feeding into the methodological approach adopted to explore the research 
question. This is followed by a detailed description of the method used.  This includes sub-
topics of sampling, participant recruitment and ethical considerations, data collection, 
transcription and the approach to analysis. The assumptions of the researcher will also be 
outlined as this will be pertinent to the chosen methodology and ontological assumptions. 
2.2 Methodological rationale  
 The aim of this paper is to try and explore the research question within the context 
that it is being studied.  As such, the study will firstly try to capture constructions of the term 
‘madness’ through the  use of language, from the perspective of mental health service users.  
This includes the 'how and when’ for those being interviewed at the time and context of the 
study.  In doing so, the study aims to explore the possible function(s) of the different 
discourses that emerge in the interviews.  Through this initial piece of investigation, it is 
hoped the findings will have implications for the existing discourses and practices in the field 
of counselling psychology.  As such, the anticipated outcome would be a promotion of future 
exploratory work, whether this be in a research or clinical format. 
 The reader must take note that the research is not trying to ‘answer’ the research 
question but rather to ‘explore’ it.  The reasons for this become clear when the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions held by the researcher are illuminated in the next section.  
This has directly informed the choice of methodology.  The study does not aim to measure, 
compare or predict quantifiable variables by trying to ‘control’ the research environment.  
Using, Silverman’s (1993) distinction of terminology terms, in order to explain the method – 
‘a specific research technique’- one must first look at the underlying methodology – ‘a 
general approach to studying research topics’.  Generally speaking, Willig (2008) argues that 
‘not all research methods are compatible with all methodologies’ (Willig, 2008, p8). 
Fortunately, in this study the researcher’s ‘general approach’ to research flows from their 
general view of the world.  This provides a study which is harmonious with what knowledge 
can be found in the study, based on the researcher’s critical stance on what knowledge can be 
found in the word in general.  This epistemological position fits with what has come to be 
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known as the Social Constructionism (see ‘Philosophical Underpinnings’ below for 
overview).  
 According to Silverman (2013) a researcher’s concern for an ‘in-depth’ focus on 
people's activities (or representations of those activities) is best facilitated by using 
qualitative methods. In order to explore the research question, a quantitative approach would 
not allow this focus and would be out-of-synch with the researcher’s epistemological 
commitments.  This is what Ricoeur (1970) calls ‘the hermeneutics of suspicion’, aiming to 
discover something beyond the initial aspect of analysis, to allow a deeper interpretation to be 
made which can ‘challenge the surface account’ (Smith, 2008, p.18).    
 Potter (2003) asserts that methods and analytic perspectives are typically underpinned 
by broader philosophical principles and assumptions.  Bryman (2004) supports this notion 
and goes further to argue that because ontological assumptions and epistemological 
commitments feed into the way questions are formulated and research is carried out, 
decisions about methodology in research are based on how the phenomenon investigated is 
ontologically viewed, from which the underlying epistemology which then informs the given 
research methodology. Therefore these assumptions will be elucidated first, in order to 
identify the natural choice of research method chosen – Discourse Analysis, hereafter 
referred to as DA. 
2.2.1 Discursive Analysis (DA) and Discursive Psychology (DP): An Overview of Philosophical 
Underpinnings  
Instead of beginning by explaining the variant of DA chosen for this project, is 
important to firstly explicate the background to the emergence to DA and the philosophical 
underpinnings that necessitated its creation.  This includes views around ontology and 
epistemic commitments. 
  
2.2.2 On matters of Ontology and Epistemology 
According to Madill and colleagues (2000), epistemological positions commonly adopted 
within qualitative psychology range from the opposing standpoints of ‘radical relativist’ to 
‘naïve realist’ (Madill, Jordon, & Shirley, 2000). Along this continuum, there are few 
researchers who would place themselves at either extreme (Breakwell, Smith, & Wright, 
2012).  The naïve realist view of the world asserts that the world is ‘knowable and is just as it 
appears to be’ (Madill, Jordon, & Shirley, 2000, p.3).  This sits well with the positivist view 
of the world in which the natural sciences, and to some degree, areas of psychology still 
closely ally themselves with.   
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 To put this into a psychological context, we would look at existing discourses such as 
the scientist-practitioner role used in applied psychology and notions of evidence based 
practice. From this viewpoint the naïve realist would have the belief that their work is 
informed by research that acquires knowledge from what is already ‘out there’, in the same 
way that is found reported in the natural sciences.  The evidence-based practice would also 
therefore be based on this tangible view on the acquisition of knowledge. 
 At the opposite end of this view of what we can say about the world, we find the 
radical relativist.  This stance asserts that there are multiple and competing views of the 
world, and that these ‘knowledges’ are socially constructed purely from available linguistic 
and discursive resources (Breakwell, Smith, & Wright, 2012).  Already we see language that 
would suggest the basis for this study.  However, using the same example from the 
psychological perspective, the radical relativist would question the available existence of the 
role of a scientist-practitioner as a term socially constructed, and therefore any evidence-
based practice that results from this as a construction based on dominant views from 
established institutions (e.g. BPS, NHS, educational bodies).  Therefore the view of the 
researcher here is one of ‘critical realist’.  This can stance can be seen as a middle ground 
between the two extremes on the epistemological continuum.  From the critical realist 
perspective, one acknowledges the existence of an objective and real world, though argues 
that our access to this world is mediated though a lens of social, cultural and historical 
practices.  According the Breakwell and colleagues, this also includes the linguistic and 
discursive practices which we are brought into from the outset of our existence  (Breakwell, 
Smith, & Wright, 2012).   
 Using this perspective on the previous example from psychology, one would now 
suggest that the ‘scientist-practitioner’ role is one that can exist, though through existing 
discourses that are available within a socially constructed context of psychology. However, 
the critical realist would also view the knowledge acquired from the scientist-practitioner 
role, as one of many types of knowledge, all acquired through the lens of the afore mentioned 
social, historical and cultural practices.  Therefore any ‘evidence based base practice’, would 
also be viewed as subject to the same conditional view of the world.   
 The researcher’s view of knowledge comes from a Social Constructionist rather than 
objectivist or positivist ontological understanding of the nature of the world.  The study is 
therefore held by the belief that knowledge is produced through social interaction and cannot 
be understood as external realities with built-in essences that act on and constrain people, but 
rather as emergent realities in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction in which 
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meaning is generated through interaction (Bryman, 2004).  It is the researcher’s view that 
knowledge thus derives from understanding individuals’ subjective interpretations and 
meanings in the social construction of their reality (Bryman, 2004).  The current study aims 
to unpick how people use or do not use their constructs of the term madness from within their 
own realities at a given point in time.   
 It is hoped that this piece of work will provide some initial understanding on 
the meaning and usage of the word madness and the functions of those meanings within the 
context of the individuals interviewed.  Further studies may then seek to explore this topic 
within a wider context to enable services to address the beliefs held within the 
current zeitgeist.   
2.2.3 Validity and quality: scientific rigor 
In reading this current study, one must be familiar with the aforementioned views on 
what kind of knowledge the researcher believes can be looked at (epistemology), informed by 
their view of how the world can be seen (ontology).  By trying to explore the research 
question from a critical realist position, the research does not hope to ‘generalize the 
findings’ in the way empiricist or hypothetico-deductivism approaches aim to achieve 
(Willig, 2008).   
 However, this does not make it less ‘empirical’.  Qualitative researchers are not 
interested in the identification of cause and effect relationships but are instead interested in 
the meanings attributed to events by the research participants themselves (Willig, 2008).  
They offer a unique contextual richness not seen in quantitative methodologies.  However, 
one is still able to question the efficacy of such an approach in terms of its reliability and 
validity.  Qualitative studies address these issues in the following ways (adapted from Willig, 
2008).  Links to the current study are outlined below:  
A. Participant validation – allowing participants to challenge or correct the researcher’s 
assumptions about the meanings investigated in the research (e.g. allowing 
interviewers questions to be questioned and encouraging de-construction of all 
terminology).  
B. Ecological validity – often attempting to see participants in natural settings rather than 
artificially ‘controlled’ environments (e.g. in a centre already used by most of the 
service users). 
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C. Reflexivity1 – By continuously reviewing their own assumption and role in the 
research, the researcher discourages impositions of meaning, thereby promoting 
validity (e.g. outlining assumptions throughout the study and foregrounding them in 
the interview as well as in the write up). 
D. Deliberate limited reliability – qualitative researchers look at specific, particular 
phenomenon in great detail, in order to capture (one of many available) participants’ 
frame of reference or view of the world at that moment.  It therefore does not aim to 
test a hypothesis that can be applied to a larger population (e.g. the current study 
highlights the context of the study as the only source of exploration, and analysis of 
what the research is able to examine via the limitations of the research). 
 Some argue that the view on reliability is a matter of choice for the qualitative 
researcher, as when methods are applied rigorously and appropriately, the results generated 
should be reliable (Silverman, 1993).  In addition, if the aim was to achieve some 
generalizability, one could attempt to use accumulative techniques (Willig, 2008).  In this 
way, a particular observation made in one text is checked against related observations in 
other contexts in order that some overall view or wider conclusions may be drawn.  The latter 
approach fits with the objective of the current study.  However, this piece of work will 
employ the use of ‘as natural as practically possible’ setting and using participants who are 
familiar with one another and feel able to challenge the assumptions of the researcher, in 
order that the study has merit if seen only from within the time and context it was 
investigated. 
 The current research took account of some of the criticisms of scientific rigor in 
qualitative studies by working through the methodology outlined by Potter and Whetherell 
(1987) with particular attention to ‘stage 8: validation’.  The areas to keep addressing were 
outlined as ‘(a) coherence (b) participants orientation (c) new problems and (d) fruitfulness’ 
(Potter & Whetherell, 1987, p.169).  Following these guidelines also allowed a greater 
reliability as it means that the same approach could be repeated by another researcher 
interested in the same question.  
 Already the theoretical underpinnings, and philosophy of the chosen methodology, 
DA, can be seen to emerge.  This foundation to DA is an approach to thinking about 
knowledge, the world around us, and how we might come to understand one another, is not 
limited to DA but extends to become the foundation to ‘deconstructionism’, post-
                                                          
1
 See reflexivity section for more information on the importance and use of reflexivity in research. 
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structuralism and ‘critical psychology’ (Burr, 2003).  How the researcher arrived and the 
chosen methodology will therefore have been informed by the history of this approach and 
it’s attachment to the study of psychological phenomena. 
2.2.4 Social constructionism and the turn to language 
Social constructionism has with roots in linguistics, sociology and the broader 
humanities (Burr, 2003). The foundations of social constructionism can be philosophically 
traced to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and John Austin (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1953; Austin 
1962).  This came as a reaction to the other approaches of the time which focused on trying to 
either hypothesizing what goes on ‘inside someone’ (psychodynamic) or opposing view of 
examining observable behaviour to infer internal states (behaviourism).   Wittgenstein argued 
that terms such as ‘emotions’ or ‘thoughts’ are not inner events  which occur only within the 
head of the person who is said to have the emotion, or though, but are related to social 
activities.  However, this way of thinking did not materialize fully within psychology until 
the 1970s, accompanying a ‘crisis’ in social psychology, with Gergen in the US and Harré 
and Secord in the UK arguing for a new vision of psychology with an emphasis on language 
(Burr, 2003). Social Constructionism became a means to debate ‘constructions’, brought into 
social existence through language. 
 According to Burr (2003) and Potter (1996) there is no single way of defining social 
constructionism.  Therefore, instead of trying to define social constructionism - which in by 
essence would not be able to be singly defined – we can instead, we might loosely think of as 
social constructionist any approach which has at its foundation one or more of the following 
key assumptions2 based on the work of Gergen (1985): 
1. A critical stance towards ‘taken-for-granted knowledge’. Knowledge of the world 
(and ourselves) should be looked at through a critical lens.  This critical stance would be 
taken when confronted with the traditional notions such as our notion that our ‘objective 
observations’ on the world are able to gain answers on the world.  This positioning would go 
further to question whether we even can be ‘objective’ and ‘unbiased’ in our observations.  
This way of viewing the world runs in direct contrast to notions of positivism and empiricism 
which continue to exist in the natural sciences, and to a certain extent, in certain fields of 
experimental and applied psychology. This opposing viewpoint supports the ability of the 
observer to gain the answers of the world, and that what exists is what we perceive to exist. 
                                                          
2
 See Burr (2003) for a broader look at Gergen’s (1985) assumptions and overview of Social Constructionism. 
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Social constructionism cautions us to be ever-suspicious of our assumptions on how the 
world ‘appears to be’.  
2. Historical and cultural specificity. From this position, one would assert that what 
we believe to know about the world, ‘the categories and concepts we use, are historically and 
culturally specific’ (Burr, 2003, p.3).  This suggests that one understands the world depends 
upon where and when in the world that person lives within.  For instance, when looking at 
that commonly held psychological ideas such as having a ‘self-concept’, we (in the western 
world) more commonly associate this through our western psychological filter, using 
constructed concepts of ‘independent’ and ‘autonomous selves’ (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  
Heine (2005) asserts that ‘different cultural environments provide different contingencies for 
specific thoughts and behaviours and, as such, render different kinds of thoughts and 
behaviors as functional for fulfilling similar underlying motivations (Heine, 2005, p.536).  
Indeed our current notion of what constitutes ‘psychology’ was previously (and perhaps 
currently in some contexts) seen as being encompassed within the field of ‘philosophy’ 
(Weiner, 2012).   
3. Knowledge is sustained by social processes.  Social constructionists propose that 
our understanding of the world comes from ideas that constructed between people.  
According to Burr (2003), through our daily interactions between people, and by use of the 
tool of language, that our versions of reality are invented.  The use of language in the creation 
of these ‘ideas’ or ‘constructions’ are particularly important for the social constructionist.  
Our notion of what we currently believe to be true is thought to be created and bound by 
social processes and interaction in which people are constantly engaged with one-another.  
This suggests that our version of knowledge can also change through the same process. 
4. Knowledge and social action go together.  As mentioned in the last section, our 
understanding of the world can become ‘understandings’ of the world, through social action.  
According to Hayes (1997) this negotiated process creating and re-creating ideas of the world 
through social interaction and use of language, mean we are able to have ‘knowledges rather 
than knowledge’ of the world (Hayes, 1997, p.7).  Furthermore, Burr (2003) asserts that 
different constructions also bring with them, or ‘invite’, a different kind of action from 
human beings. A possible example may be how people view someone who is homeless.  If 
seen to be ‘dangerous’, ‘unpredictable’ and a ‘social drain’, the responding social action may 
be to avoid.  However, if they are to be seen as ‘victim of circumstance’ and with a history of 
‘mental health’, they may be position under the mental health umbrella, and thought of as ‘in 
need’, inviting ‘mental health professionals’ to approach them to address ‘their need’. 
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2.2.5 The ‘Turn to Language’ and emergence of Discourse Analysis 
Although there may be other ideas on what constitutes social constructionism, the 
principles above provide the main areas of agreement between social researchers.  From the 
areas already covered, one may sense a theme of ‘reaction against’ something that existed 
before the emergence of social constructionism.  In brief, the movement began in the 1950s, 
from philosophers, communications theorists, and sociologists as a reaction against 
established individualist, essentialist notions of the world.  These established views asserted 
that language could be used provide ‘a set of unambiguous signs with which to label internal 
states and with which to describe external reality’ (Willig, 2008, p.92). 
 Language, which was previously positioned as the passive vehicle for our thoughts 
and emotions, was to become viewed as an active process (Burr, 2003), seen to ‘construct’ 
versions of social reality and achieve social objectives (Willig, 2008).  The key works of this 
time can be found with Wittgenstein (e.g.1953), Austin (e.g.1962) and Foucault ((Foucault, 
1965).  However, it was not until the 1970s that social psychologists began to take a stand 
(e.g. Gergen, 1973, 1989) again of the prominent school of choice at the time – cognitivism.  
The ‘turn to language’ became more established in the 1980s, with seminal works such as 
Potter and Whetherell’s (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology; Beyond Attitudes and 
Behaviour, providing not only a critique of cognitivism but also a means to challenge the 
existing methodology of producing social research.  Their means to produce a viable 
alternative centred on social constructionist underpinnings, providing a detailed analysis of 
interview transcripts using a Discourse Analysis (DA) approach. 
 The philosophies, research interests, and assumptions as to how DA should be defined 
also vary and different analytic interests, schools of thought, and understandings of 
‘discourse’ can easily be identified both within and across disciplines (e.g. Parker 2005, Burr, 
2003, Wodak & Meyer, 2006).  However, broadly speaking, DA researchers find that the 
study of language is important.  Furthermore, DA suggests that when people state a belief, 
opinion or express a position, they are taking part in a dynamic process, a conversation in 
which has a purpose and in which each person within that interactional communication has a 
stake (Willig, 2001).  In taking into account the social context, the DA researcher will be 
mindful the participant has a number of possible discourses available to them, though will 
orient towards a particular way of responding in order to perform certain social actions or 
functions (Breakwell, Smith, & Wright, 2012).   
 42 
  The discourse researcher is interested in identifying recurrent patterns in language 
use. In exploring the dynamics and dilemmas of people’s active sense making, the detail of 
people’s practices of categorisation, accounting and explaining all lie at the heart of this 
analytic task (Potter and Whetherell, 1987). As a result, and in keeping with its social 
constructionist epistemology, the focus of DA is on how versions of our social realities are 
achieved within/through language (Willig, 2001). 
2.2.6 Discursive Psychology (DP) and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) 
 Since Potter and Whetherell’s (1987) initial publication, the applied field of Discourse 
Analysis (DA) has continued to develop.  Whetherell (2001) identifies up to six variants of 
how discourse analysis may be done, however, this paper will focus on the two major 
branches currently reported: Discursive Psychology  (e.g. Potter, 2003) and Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis (e.g. Parker, 1992: Willig, 2001).  Broadly speaking, each can be 
described for their respective focus on micro and macro features of discourse (Burr, 2003).  
 
2.2.7 Discursive Psychology (DP) 
DP is rooted within ethnomedology3 sociology and conversation analysis4 (see 
Wiggins and Potter, 2008 for full history of DP).  Indeed this tradition of being influenced by 
the principles of conversation analysis continues within DP (Willig, 2001), more recently 
placing particular emphasis on examining naturally occurring text and talk (Hepburn and 
Wiggins, 2005; Potter and Hepburn, 2005).  This approach focuses on the micro, or fine-
grained aspects of discourse in order to explore psychological phenomena.  Therefore, the 
psychology of DP lies within its interest in psychological phenomena, with investigations in 
to memory, attribution and identity.  Within this approach, these concepts are rejected as 
cognitive processes and instead viewed as discursive actions (Willig, 2001).  The action 
orientation of discourse refers to the notion that people do things with words (Austin 1962), 
they account for, explain, blame, make excuses, construct facts, use cultural categories, and 
present themselves to others in specific ways taking the interpretive context into account. The 
discourse researcher is interested in identifying recurrent patterns in language use DP aims to 
get a better understanding of the micro-mechanisms of the production and re-production of 
practices.  
                                                          
3
 Ethnomethodology was founded by Harold Garfinkel (1967). 
4
 Conversation Analysis (CA) commonly cited as being developed by Harvey Sacks (e.g. 1989, 1992). 
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2.2.8 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA)   
FDA is arguably5 based upon the work of social theorist and philosopher, Michel 
Foucault.  Instead of looking at discourse within the micro, fine grain filter, FDA rather than 
viewing language as an individual action and creation, FDA widens the focus to consider the 
larger macro structures that influence available discourses (Willig, 2008).  The common areas 
of interest include historical, institutional and cultural influences on knowledge, and the 
relationship between knowledge, social action and power relations (Hook, 2001; Burr, 2003). 
 As Willig (2008) clarifies, ‘while discursive psychology is primarily concerned with 
how people use discursive resources in order to achieve interpersonal objectives in social 
interaction, Foucauldian discourse analysis focuses upon what kind of objects and subjects 
are constructed through discourses and what kinds of ways-of-being these objects and 
subjects make available to people’ (Willig, 2008, p.96). 
2.2.9  The best of both worlds? 
According to Willig (2008), although there is a growing attempt to ‘differentiate’ 
between the two main types of DA (as above), most researchers emphasize the overlap and 
‘cross fertilization’ between the two versions.  Certainly the view from Parker (1997) and 
Potter (1997) that the two versions come from different theoretical and disciplinary positions 
(CA, ethnomethodology, sociology vs. post-structuralism, philosophy) are valid.  However, 
Wetherell (1998) presented a paper that suggested ‘a synthesis’ of the two versions, 
encompassing a ‘twin focus’, would ‘allow for the reader to pay attention to both the situated 
and shifting discursive constructions as well as the wider social and institutional frameworks 
within which they are produced’ (Willig, 2008, p110).  Therefore an integration of the two 
discursive methods may not only be possible but also beneficial. 
 
2.2.10 Criticism of Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology 
One of the main criticisms of both Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology 
research is that there are limitations incurred as a consequence to using interviews as a data 
collection method.  Instead, there is a move to trying to observe naturally occurring 
conversations (e.g.  Potter & Mulkay, 1985; Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  The debate of the 
                                                          
5
 Hook (2001) argues that a Foucauldian discursive method never truly existed, though attempt to look at how 
it may have looked had there not been mis-applications of his original ideas. 
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usefulness of such data analysis are that it creates an ‘unnatural’ type of interaction, and 
therefore should not be used as a substitution for more 'naturally occurring' talk.  However, 
the topic being studied and the 'answers' to be found are assumed be co-constructed locally 
occasioned research interactions, and designed to be open-ended and conversational.  In 
terms of applicability, a conversational, co-constructed interaction is seen by Counselling 
Psychologists and their clients in their everyday therapeutic environment.  In addition, group 
settings, such as the service user group recruited for this study, are environments in which the 
participants are well versed in the co-constructed interactional style seen in this research 
study.  Therefore although the data is locally occasioned (and perhaps limited to), the 
environment is familiar to the participants, and therefore replicable to some degree, whether 
in a research or clinical setting. 
 
2.2.11 Rationale for Discursive Psychology   
The methodological options available to the researcher are thus far filtered by the 
epistemic commitments to Social Constructionism, informed by a critical realist view of 
ontology.  The research question could be read from both a DP or FDA perspective.  
However, the reason for choosing DP is in the emphasis within the context of the work.  
Although it is assumed that broader historical, cultural and institutional factors may influence 
the discursive positions available, being able to examine this fully may neglect form the 
micro-mechanisms of talk-in-interaction that occurs between the participants and myself.  As 
the research hopes to have implications for health professionals and particularly counselling 
psychologists, it was felt that focusing on the discourse practices between mental health 
service users and a (trainee) counselling psychologist (the researcher) would be more 
appropriate.  In the next section, which will elucidate the researcher’s individual reflexivity, 
one should be aware of assumptions of the researcher as well as the role they may be seen to 
serve within the interviews. Whilst thinking about the exploration of meaning(s) of the term 
madness and its contextual usage, the researcher will be able to use the DP approach to focus 
on the management of stake and interest, whilst acknowledging their role within the talk.  In-
keeping with the aim of DP, the researcher will be interested in how people display 
sensitivities about, and manage the potential interactional consequences of, inferences that 
other people (including the researcher as a trainee counselling psychologist) might draw 
about themselves in virtue of what they have said (McKinley & McVittie, 2011).  
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 However, given the overlap between some of the procedures for doing analysis (e.g. 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Willig, 2008) the researcher is aware that the analysis may change 
as the reflexive journey through the piece of work, which may evolve and change in 
emphasis.  Indeed it has been contended that the key to the analysis of discourse be the 
development of an analytic mentality rather than stark adherence to a rigorous methodology 
(Billig, 1988).  Therefore a blended approach between Potter & Wetherell (1987) and Willig 
(2008) will be used, being mindful of Antaki, Billig, Edwards and Potter’s (2003) guidance 
regarding the practicalities of doing DP research. 
 According to Hayes (1997) one of the main aims of any discourse analysis is to reveal 
the act-action structure of a sequence of actions constitutive of an episode of human 
interaction. This includes the special case of reflexive interactions when the other is oneself – 
the researcher definitely counts himself as a fellow human and therefore agrees that reflective 
accounts are needed throughout the study. 
2.2.12 Critical language awareness   
The researcher notes the awareness of the language used with the study and how 
asking a question in a certain way then invokes a response from that category of 
language.  The researcher is aware that although the responses may differ between 
individuals, the language used in their reply stems from the language used in the question 
posed by the researcher.  This was an important part in choosing the word madness, as 
opposed to mental health, mental illness or wellbeing.  An awareness of the researcher’s own 
assumptions before interviewing and analysis was therefore fundamental to the study in being 
able to capture the constructions of the participants within their specific context. 
 
2.2.13 Personal reflexivity  
The study involves participants recruited from a community in which the location of 
secondary care was once referred to as the County Lunatic Asylum.  As such I thought that 
language around local area may refer to locally available discourses surrounding an iconic 
building and it’s infamous history.  My choice of using the term madness for the study was 
brought about following a period of personal thresholds infinitely raised (to the point of 
questioning the existence) on what is considered to be ‘madness’, though without the explicit 
term being brought to mind.  My own understanding of the term was not fully formed, 
perhaps something to do with some kind of break from reality.  My half formed ideas had not 
 46 
come from any training but from movies, derogatory terms used in social groups, playful 
descriptions of eccentric people and in ways to describe management or political decisions 
that were perceived as reckless.  In searching for a definition and trying to employ a means 
of searching I would use for other words – Google.  From dictionary.com I was presented 
with the following: 
1. the state of being mad; insanity. 
2. senseless folly: It is sheer madness to speak as you do. 
3. frenzy; rage. 
4. intense excitement or enthusiasm.  
Working with patients with psychosis and who psychiatrics would describe as ‘floridly 
psychotic’ initially seemed to fit my half formed idea of the term, matching the dictionary 
term of ‘insanity’, which although I would previously thought to be an out-dated term, it 
appears as no.1 at this time of writing6. However, I then found that the meaning behind the 
client’s narrative within the majority of cases and the function of the ‘delusion’ became 
apparent.  The perception of having to attend an appointment based at ‘an asylum’ then 
became part of my contextual understanding of such narratives.  I then became aware of 
situation which were previously routine in my clinical setting; being contacted by a staff 
member from a ‘mental health service’, was sometimes met with resistance by people, who 
would ‘become’ service users by the mere act of a phone call, sometimes resulting in a 
breakdown in service provision.  The need to explore assumptions, expectations and functions 
of mental health discourses was therefore motivated by such examples.  As explained the in 
the introduction, the choice of the word madness being used was due to the fact it seems to 
have stuck around, though ideas around it from the service users perspective have not stuck 
to anything I was able to find in the empirical sense.  Certainly, throughout the duration of 
the study, the term seemed to appear on television, newspapers and other media, for a variety 
of reasons/functions. 
Other assumptions/reflections from the researcher:  
• People hold an idea of what madness means for them, even if thought not to exist.  
• The term madness is familiar though the origins perhaps not knowingly sourced.  
                                                          
6
 Madness. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged. Retrieved August 02, 2013, from 
Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/madness 
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• Although in his late 20s the researcher is sometimes described by others as notably 
young looking. 
• The researcher coming from a western, British, psychology background, though with 
a critical viewpoint of each of these institutions 
• The researcher assumes no psychologically mindedness necessary for the study. 
• Participants will have the capacity to understand the purpose of the study and share 
their experiences.  
• Patients may limit the totality of their experiences if it is seem to reflect an image of 
them that may have repercussion for their career or mental health status.  
• The researcher has an idea of what the answer to the study question is from his own 
experiences (in personal reflexivity section) which does not need to be  ‘bracketed’ 
before interviewing but aware of beforehand and especially when beginning analysis 
of the data.   
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1  Research Questions 
The aim of the paper is to explore the construction of madness, and the function of 
those constructions from the perspective of mental health service users.  In order that the 
interviewer does not restrict the diversity of participants accounting practices, a themes 
interview schedule was constructed, based on the research question.  This enabled a 
systematic range of topics to be explored within an open-ended framework.  A pilot interview 
was conducted with a colleague who identifies with having a past experience of mental health 
problems. The pilot enabled any issues not foreseen in the proposal to be addressed before the 
actual study and ensured the research questions are suitable for exploration within the context 
of the participants. Based on the initial themes for discussion on pilot interview the following 
ideas were proposed for the actual study: 
1. How is the word madness defined today?  
2. In what way is the word used?  
3. In what context does it have meaning?  
4. What are the implications of these meanings?  
5. What effects may they have?  
 The final version of the interview themes can be found in the Interview Schedule in 
Appendix D.   
 48 
 
2.3.2 Ethics 
The participants will be given an information sheet beforehand7 (read to them to 
confirm), detailing the research and providing sufficient information to inform their decision 
to participate or decline.  At this point they will be informed about how their data will be 
used, how it will be stored and destroyed (on successful completion of the thesis).  From the 
outset, it will be made clear that the participants have the right to withdraw from the study 
and their data removed, should they wish to.  Contact details of local support service will be 
made available should any participant require it.  
 Following the interview process the participants will be de-briefed on the study in 
order that they can have any queries answered and given the opportunity to withdraw their 
consent for their data to be used if they wish.  They will also be given a de-brief letter8 to 
keep, with the contact details of the researcher’s department.  An opportunity for the findings 
of the research to be forwarded to participants will also be made available. 
 However minimal, there is also a risk of the term madness bringing up negative 
associations for the participant and causing some distress.  Although unlikely given the focus 
is on language rather than experience, I planned to address this by informing the individual's 
care coordinator and follow the local department’s procedures on need for review or referral 
to specific services.   
 Ethical approval was gained from the City University Ethics Committee9.  Ethical 
approval was also obtained from National Research Ethics Service (NRES) -Camden and 
Islington NHS Trust Ethical Board: REC reference number 12/LO/1390), due to the use of 
NHS participants.   
2.3.3 Sampling and Participants   
As mentioned in the introduction, the current research into the exploration of the 
understandings of the term madness is limited to the view from ‘the expert’.  Accounts from 
service users are limited to case descriptions.  Therefore service users of mental health 
services were targeted for recruitment.  The researcher would not be so patronising as to 
suggest he is giving ‘a voice’ to the service users by inviting them to be participants, but 
rather opening up the platform for the voices to be heard.  It is the researcher’s view that the 
                                                          
7
 See Appendix B 
8
 See Appendix F 
9
 See appendix E 
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process of the study itself will have an empowering effect in opening up currently closed or 
limited discourses.  
An opportunistic sampling method was used in order to select those who were able to 
fit the minimum criteria at the time of recruitment.  The current study recruited participants 
who matched the following inclusion criteria: 1) Aged over 18 years at the time of 
recruitment; 2) Identified themselves as a service user of mental health services.   The two 
exclusion criteria were: (A) participants who feel they may not be sit for up to 60 minutes to 
discuss mental health terminology without undue distress; and (B) anyone who feels they do 
not have a good enough level of English language proficiency to engage in an interview/focus 
group for up to 60 minutes.   
 
2.3.4 Recruitment.   
Facilitators of local service-user involvement forums were contacted with a general 
letter outlining the purpose of the study, along with a flyer (Appendix A), and information 
sheet (Appendix B), proposed interview questions (Appendix D) and the university letter of 
support (Appendix E).  The researcher attended a local meeting with Loud and Clear, to 
provide more information and to explain the details of participation and consent.  Formal 
consent (Appendix C) was taken prior to the actual participation of the study.  
The researcher joined a West London based Service User Involvement forum  in order to 
advertise the study.  It was thought that as these potential recruits were used to talking with 
each other on various topics surrounding the local mental health services and terminology 
used in the local NHS literature (e.g. Old Age Psychiatry Service versus Older Adults 
Service).   The service users volunteer to attend such meetings for 2-3 hours and therefore 
some degree of caution was reduced when contemplating risk associated with discussing 
potentially emotive topics. 
The total number of participants was 3 for individual interviews and then approximately 4 
individuals for a group discussion/interview.  Although not noted as an area of exploration 
for the study, the following demographics were obtained10: 
 
 
                                                          
10
 N.B. The age ranges have purposefully spanned 20 years in order to further protect identifiable features of 
the participants. 
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Table B1   
Participant Demographics 
Individual interview  
x1 Caucasian British Male, aged 60-80 
x1 Caucasian British Male, aged 20-40 
x1 Causation Northern Irish Female,  aged 50-70 
Group Discussion 
x1 Caucasian British Female, aged, 30-50 
x1 Caucasian British Female, aged, 50-70 
x1 Caucasian British Male, aged 50-70 
x1 Asian British Male, aged 50-70. 
 
 
2.3.5 Procedure.   
After gaining formal written consent, the individual interviews were conducted before 
the group due to availability of participants.  The interviews were held in a meeting room 
which the participants sometimes use for forum discussions.  The interviews were semi-
structures and recorded on a digital recording device.  The interview schedule (Appendix D) 
was used as a guide to the topics to be discussed.  The interviews lasted between 50 minutes 
to just over an hour.  The participants were made aware that the session would last from 
around 20 – 60 minutes, as per the flyer (Appendix A). In the group session, one of 
participants voiced their feeling of fatigue and the group mutually agreed we had reached a 
conclusion.  All participants were then given a de-brief sheet (Appendix F), followed by a 
verbal explanation of the study purpose and possible outcome, and were encouraged ask any 
further questions.   
2.3.6 Data handling, coding and analysis. 
 Data handling.  Maintaining confidentiality throughout the study was considered at 
every part of the research process.  Documents relating to the participants were kept in a 
secure place, accessible only to the researcher.  The recordings were moved from the digital 
recorder to a password-protected folder on the researcher’s personal computer alongside a 
second back-up copy.  There was no need to keep identifiable information on participants 
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outside of the consent form, therefore all other documents (e.g. transcript) used a short code 
(e.g. R1, or GR1) to indicate order of interview, rather than to identify participants. 
 Transcription /coding.  The recordings were then transcribed using Jefferson Lite 
(Parker 2005).  A full account of the transcription convention used can be found in Appendix 
G.  A sample of the transcript itself can be found in Appendix H.    This convention 
facilitated readability whilst also allowing me to capture more fine-grained features of the 
talk-in-interaction, such as overlap, emphasis, pauses, and contextual information. All 
identifying details were altered or omitted to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. 
 The transcription process required a substantial period of time to reach completion.  
For a usual ‘script’ Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest a ratio of 1:10, which corresponds to 
a one-hour session requiring 10 hours to undertake.  They add that the ratio increases to 1:20 
for full Jefferson style conventions.  As the researcher was new to this formatting, although 
using the Jefferson Lite style (Parker, 2005), the time requires an approximate ration of 1:15. 
The analytic procedure follows the recommendations of Willig (2008, p.98-106) as they take 
account of how to undertake a discourse analysis, remaining true to the traditions of 
discursive psychology, rather than following a rigid recipe.  There is overlap with some of the 
10 stage recommendations from Potter and Whetherell (1987, p,160-176), and thus an 
immersion in both texts facilitated the current analytic procedure for the current study: 
 Working through the transcript.  This loosely follows stage 5 of Potter and 
Wetherell’s (1987) 10-stage procedure.  As such the researcher was aware of the role to make 
clear decisions about what was actually being said from the interviews and to attempt to 
capture the environment through the inclusion of non-verbal clues.  This stage involved a re-
immersion in the interview itself from the viewpoint of the researcher and thus forms the 
initial stage of the analytic procedure. 
 Intermission.  A brief period of sitting and reflecting on the data was taken as 
encouraged by stage 6 of Potter and Whetherell.  This would facilitate the coding stage to 
follow. 
Coding.  Before coding, a full read-though of the transcripts was taken as Willig 
(2008) suggests.  As recommended by Potter and Wetherell, the first ‘sift’ of coding was as 
inclusive as possible, including any reference to the term madness, similar terms or implicit 
constructions of either.  The researcher highlighted every reference within the transcripts.  
Re-reading through these passages, the researcher then used a notebook to log the included 
points so that the analysis could take account of each reference point in the next stage. 
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 Analysis of coded data.  As Potter and Wetherell (1987) state ‘there is no mechanical 
procedure for producing findings from an archive of transcript’ (p.168).  As such, the 
notebook logs were expanded to include the added suggestion from Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) to question ‘why am I reading a passage in this way? What features produce this 
reading?’ (p.168).  This helped to produce patterns in the data in terms of variability11, 
consistency12 and identification of interpretative repertoires13.   The use of different 
repertoires was then outlined within the the context in which the speaker was deploying the 
action.  This includes the interviewer as well as the participants. 
 A list of interpretive themes were then created, looking back through Potter and 
Wetherell’s (1987) recommendations in regard to validation, especially in taking stock of the 
particpants orientations, the use of language to perform social actions and problems arising in 
the discourse.   
 Ending the analysis.  Potter and Wetherell (1987) call the final stage of validation 
‘fruitfulness’.  It was this criteria that helped to indicate the end point to the analytic 
procedure.  In practical terms, the researcher was able to identify a point at which no new 
problems or interpretative themes were generated.  In re-engaging in the validation process, 
this also indicated whether certain themes were evidenced enough within the transcript to be 
included on their own, to integrate into another repertoire or to be left out of the analysis.  
2.3.7 Limitations to generalizability.   
As summarised in earlier sections regarding qualitative research in general, the 
current study does not aim to be able to generalise from the recruited participants.  The main 
assumption within this method is that individuals use their language to ‘construct’ versions of 
their social world.  For Potter and Wetherell, ‘the principle tenant of discourse analysis is that 
function involves construction of versions, and is dominated by language variation’ (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987, p.33).  Using this method, the researcher acknowledges that the data 
collected cannot reflect an unbiased account of opinions/beliefs of service users in terms of it 
being an ‘accurate’ reflection of similar individuals within society in general or even accurate 
of the participants at the time of interview.  Instead, and in-keeping with social 
constructionism epistemology, the study aims to be able to provide a way of exploring the 
constructed discourses rather than simply reflecting true realities.  However, it is hoped that 
                                                          
11
 Variablity: ‘differences in the content of form of accounts’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p.168) 
12
 Consistency: ‘the identification of features by shared accounts’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p.168) 
13
 Interpretative repertoires are ‘recurrently used systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating 
actions, events and other phenomena’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p.149) 
 53 
the ‘active participant’ role of the interviewer will allow diversity in the discourse in order 
that participants’ variations within the context are allowed to emerge as they try to make 
sense of the ‘phenomena’ of study – what do we mean by madness; how and where is it used 
today?  
 
      
  
 54 
Chapter 3 - Analysis 
3.1  Setting the scene 
 The use of the transcript in this analysis is to facilitate the reader in seeing the 
discursive themes and constructions and how they emerge in the text.  The researcher has 
included extracts that show both common interpretive repertoires and discursive positions, as 
well as ones that are somehow the exception.  The researcher’s speech has been included and 
not shortened in any way.  This allows for the researcher’s influence to be considered as part 
of the analysis.   
 The style of this analysis section reflects some deliberate choices from the researcher, 
intended to aid the reader in digesting the overall breadth of the analysis whilst attempting 
keeping the context of the interview intact, enabling a deeper, yet still readable look into the 
underlying discourses between all parties.  The first of these choices is to refer to the 
researcher in the first person.  This is to allow my own part in the dynamic interplay of the 
discourse to be acknowledged and analysed.  I also refer to the participants as ‘respondents’ 
and acknowledge whether they were male or female.  This decision was not made to suggest 
there is any significance to their sex or gender, but to preserve the humanness of the 
interaction whilst allowing the reader to have a male or female voice in mind, all the while 
preserving the respondent’s anonymity. 
3.1.2:  Summary Findings   
The analysis overall indicates that the term ‘madness’ can be placed within a 
continuum of similar terminology such as insane or crazy but the use of the term has varied 
functions: 1) Flippant non-offensive or labelling term; 2) Labelling and harmful, with or 
without intention to do so; 3) An accurate description of ‘an experience’ and; 4) Something 
labelling but positive, indicating creativity and uniqueness. 
 The analysis will undoubtedly be filtered by context as seen by the researcher, before 
going into the overall themes that could be seen.  Therefore some time will be taken to 
explain the context, as seen by the researcher.  Furthermore, as with any Doctoral Thesis, the 
list of themes do not represent the entirety of what could potentially be analysed.  However, 
opportunities for further exploration will be suggested in the discussion section. 
Transcription Key:  I=Interviewer; R1=Respondent 1; GR1=Group Respondent 1 
Text in italics = emphasize particular words within a quote.  
.. = continued speech/Extract taken part-way through a speech extract.  
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3.2   Orientating to the subject positions 
 As stated within the methodology section, the use of Discourse Analysis does not 
provide a record from the participants that are generalizable to the wider population.  The 
data and interpretations thereafter are situated - and limited to - the context of the interviews 
themselves.  Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge that this is not the only possible 
reading of the data collected. There may be other ways in which these discourses could be 
interpreted.  As a result, in order to allow the reader to understand why the data is being read 
in this particular way, I will go beyond the methodology level of context description and 
attempt to explicate the context perceived within the discourse itself.  This includes the 
different subject positions taken on by the respondents (e.g. expert, learner, (ex) mental 
health patient, member of public, voice of reason versus voice of unreason), as well as the 
positions taken on by myself (eg. Expert, knowledge facilitator, the neutral researcher, the 
mental health professional in-training and even a comrade-in-arms).  I will also attempt to 
give extracts of the discursive manoeuvres which may lead different speakers to be 
positioned in these different roles, rather than freely choosing them.  The hope is that this will 
make the micro-dynamics within the discourse easier to refer to, whilst keeping the theme of 
the overall discourses explored, in reference to the research question.  Again this is to 
highlight the lens through which this data has been read by this researcher, at the time of the 
analysis.   
 In order to find a place to begin, the supposed roles identified were ‘interviewer’ and 
‘interviewee’.  The assumption here is that the interviewee would know something about the 
topic being proposed and be able to draw from their internal resources to give a response.  
Initially, this appears to be the case and there were different positions the interviewee took in 
relaying this information.  However, at times, I was met with a denial of any knowledge on 
the topic.   
 To understand the use of different subject positions, I have used titles that describe the 
function of the positions taken.  This also indicates the stake the individual holds in the 
context of the interview.  The two main positions that appeared to be taken by the 
respondents were that of the knowledge denier, the other or the expert. The knowledge denier 
role enabled respondents to relinquish identity, responsibility, opinion or attribution to all 
things mentally ill. The expert position could be seen to serve a number of functions, which 
are outlined in detail below (3.2.2).  This expert position was enabled through talk as a 
veteran or survivor of mental health services.  On initial reading, I believed these roles 
presented only from the respondents.  However, I could see that I also took on both roles:  
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The knowledge denier in order to maintain a neutral researcher position; the expert role was 
one I then became positioned as by the respondents, perhaps due to my attempt at 
maintaining neutrality. 
 The analysis begins by highlighting these various subject positions in their most 
obvious form, so that their function in later contexts can be better understood.  The uses of 
the titles in the extracts facilitate the reader in identifying the discursive patterns at play.  
These may be in the form of interpretive repertoires, highlighting discursive manoeuvres, 
discursive themes or conflicts of construction. 
3.2.1:  I know nothing – The knowledge denier.   
In order for the process of what is being done with the use of discourse, the analysis 
begins by demonstrating the subject positions taken by all the speakers.  The first is the 
aforementioned role of the knowledge denier. 
Extract 1 <lines 1200-1208> 
R2   Madness is a very-old term isn’t it?= 
I:  =Okay. 
R2  It goes back a long:: long:: time, I THINK!  
I:  Yeah. 
R2  I’ve seen films where=>old old old< films .h set-back centuries ago:, where they 
 used the term madness, .h you know sort of a (.) probably  the term insanity is 
 NEWER than what the term MADness is.   
I:  Okay.= 
R2  =>I think< I THINK so, but I don’t know that. 
 
 Respondent 2 showed the strongest manoeuvring into the role of what I have come to 
call the ‘knowledge denier’.  Extract 1 shows this position emerge in a subtle, yet rapid 
manner.  Following my lack of explicit agreement, instead offering an acknowledgement in 
the second line, he disclaims his presumption that the origins madness has roots in the distant 
past.  ‘I THINK’ serves as a disclaimer to this aspect of knowledge, despite painting a picture 
of where this assumption comes from.  Therefore he occupies both a position of knowledge 
holder and knowledge denier.  His use of volume and lack of pause between our exchanges 
allows him to emphasize the latter position, over the former. 
Extract 2 <line 1286>  
R2    Mad hatter, (that’s a) it’s a bit silly ((smiling)) wasn’t it? 
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 In Extract 2 the clarification used by the participant was felt to represent a ‘checking-
in’ with me as a fellow member of the public.  My own positioning, attempting to be neutral 
meant that I tried to deflect knowledge, even if it was something I may know as a member of 
the public , in order to refrain from leading and being the expert, so in a sense I refuted public 
knowledge in the same way the participant refuted expert knowledge with him being a client.  
I did not want to give knowledge but instead encourage available discourses from the 
participant. 
 In my attempt to assume the position of the neutral interviewer, it is possible that I in 
fact also produced a discourse that limited my openness about my own access to knowledge. 
Extract 3 indicates that the respondent may deny my ability to be neutral, and instead 
positions me as the expert, within the mental health field: 
Extract 3 <lines 1368-1385> 
R2  I says, (.) well I don’t- I don’t know how it fee::ls to be mentally  ill, REA::LLY= 
I: =Yeah. 
R2 ..I I DON’T,(0.1) consider myself to be MENtal.   
I:  Yeah. 
R2  But whether YOU: do or not, >I don’t know<. 
I:  Oh-okay. 
R2   Because IT IS officially a mental ILLness. 
I:  So depression is a mental illness? 
R2  Is it or isn’t it, I’m asking you now. 
I:  So: (0.2) it’s a description perhaps of a mental illness (.) to label  perhaps? 
R2 Yes, but IS IT A- It is a mental illness isn’t it? Mental illness,  depression. 
I:  Depression? 
R2  Yes= 
I:  =It’s a diagnostic label 
R2 Yes, yes yes ((whisper into a mutter)) 
 
 
 There are instances within the context of the  interview that show the positioning and 
re-positioning of the respondent based on their discursive manoeuvres.  In the first instance, 
the respondent positions themselves away from knowledge of how it could actually feel to 
‘be mentally ill’, and yet identifies themselves within a mental health label of depression.  
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The tension in Extract 3 is not seen in other interviews, nor in the group discussion.  The 
intensity is magnified by the choice of phrases which evoke strong connotations.  Distancing 
himself from the word 'mental', whilst querying my own, mental health expert judgement 
upon him led to his confrontation with my neutral positioning, forcing me to take a pseudo-
expert position and vocalise it.  My response also appeared to deflect my own opinion and 
instead appeared to succeed in deferring to an established psychiatric/medical discourse to 
which the respondent appeared to be drawing his suggestions from. However, the discursive 
manoeuvre of either asking for my opinion directly or assuming that certain, otherwise 
'neutral' statements, or absence of response, appeared to be received by the respondent as ‘the 
voice of a mental health professional’.   
 When referring to the themes of the overall discursive themes in this analysis, it 
should be in the reader's view that my analysis in reference to this respondent was with this 
discursive dynamic in mind. 
 Although the rest of the interview with respondent 2 was able to explore a range of 
areas, the use of discursive manoeuvres to position himself as the ‘knowledge denier’ and 
myself as the ‘expert’ persisted.  As seen in Extract 3, this carefulness to remove himself 
from being seen as even guessing what mental health professionals might discuss shows he 
may be drawing upon specific interpretive repertoires, due to how he positioned me.  From 
this understanding it may be the case that he may offer a different view (or repertoire) with 
someone else: 
Extract 4 <lines 1796-1808> 
I: SO: (.) em::- For some reason in-in TV and fil:m, (.) when we look  back, it 
 seems to have been- in THAT context- that it was used >to  describe< s-s:evere 
 mental illness- like you sa:y. (0.1) Em:, do you  think that it WAS used, (.) in 
the  em TRUE WAY? Em:: (.) at that  ti:me, as well? (0.1) SO do you think- 
R2 OH yes::. They have used it in the true way as well. 
I: Okay. 
R2 But I don’t know if they still DO. 
I: Yeah. 
R2 I DON’T know the workings of the mental health service. 
I: Yeah. 
R2 Mental health professionals or what terms they use. I have >NO idea<. 
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3.2.2:  Experts in the field.   
Contrary to this not-knowing discursive position, other respondents would explain 
that they did have an idea, to varying degrees.  The following Extract shows the contrast to 
the previous Extracts, in that the respondent states his opinion as ‘fact-like’.  His arguments 
are succinct and offer number of seemingly informed statements as opposed to a suggestive 
style offered by others.  The style of discourse offered by this respondent (GR3) matched 
other respondents in terms of taking the position of a veteran and or comrade (in the group 
discussion), though with little or no room to be challenged: 
Extract 5 <lines 3216-3241> 
GR3: It is essentially a negative term.= 
GR4: =YES! 
I Okay. 
GR3: ..And EVEN >for people who< would be DEEMED to be ma::d (.) to use  the word 
 about themselves is kind of negative. 
G: >YEah<. 
GR3:  ..I mean if you wanted to be more positive or more light-hearted >you'd say 
 “You’re bonkers”< or:, er:, possibly CRAZ:zy,  
I: Oka:y. 
GR3: ..but because >madness is< (.) sort-of linked very closely with  craziness and 
SO  are >the abnormalities we talked about<, of-of  behaviour,(0.1) er- they 
 wouldn't– they're not necessarily uh-er  logical (.) and-and, um, THOUGHT 
 OUT, 
I: Yeah. 
GR3: ..-thought out actions and things you sa::y when-when you ARE-ma:d or  (.) 
 >whatever you want to call it<, erm (.), and therefore that  would, that would 
thro:w  other people who em:: (.) >DON’T suffer in  the same wa:y< because they wouldn't 
be  able to underSTAND you (.)  an:d they wouldn't be able to follow what you– what-
 what you're on  about, and you might go off in (.) wonderful flights of fancy 
 about  >one thing or another< and-and (.) ACTUALLY be perfectly SA::NE but, 
 um,  (.) >because other people wouldn't be able to< (.) follow your train of 
thought, 
I: Ye:ah. 
GR3: ..em:: you'd (.) be deemed to be ‘bonkers’, ‘ma:d’, ‘crazy’-whatever. 
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 Extract 5 above, summarises some of the general assumptions initially held by other 
respondents, that the term madness is negative, no matter who uses it.  The role of my own 
speech here seems to be to serve as a source of facilitation and encouragement.  However, the 
action orientation of GR3’s speech appeared strong, taking an expert position against those 
who ‘deem’ people as ‘mad’.  This enabled statements that would inform the listener of how 
a person would be judged/misjudged by the deemers of madness.  This matched some of the 
discourses conveyed in varying degrees by other respondents, though the style of GR3’s 
discourse, orientating himself as the expert against the deemers of madness, at times served 
as a barrier to certain constructions being de-constructed and re-constructed by the group.  
However, as can be seen in the later sections of the analysis, the attempts to rebel, and de-
construct established discourses are still attempted by the other members of the group.  Some 
of these attempts re-position the term madness out of its previously negative-only space. 
 
3.2.3 Individual versus Group Discourses.  
The discursive resources differed between each respondent, whether interviewed 
individually or as part of the of the group discussion. Some took on the position of a veteran, 
some as comrades or as experts.  The respondent GR3 appeared employ similar expert-like 
discursive practices to R1 in the individual interviews.  The major difference was that GR3 
appeared to promote the idea that there ‘are’ answers to be had if ‘reason’ is used, from 
established discourses.  This differed to R1 and other respondents who shared their own 
personal experiences, interweaved into their comments on how societal ideas of madness 
could be perceived in the present as well as changed in the future. This provided the ability to 
shift between expert-veteran-comrade positions.  R1 was the only respondent who felt he had 
experienced madness himself.  This provided a unique subjective position and the use of 
interpretive repertoire(s) not seen in other interviews.   
 Overall the respondents differed in the degree to which they found more room for 
curiosity and re-evaluation after hearing each other’s opinions and personal stories. The 
positioning of the respondents in the group interview also appeared to be able to change 
throughout the discussion which was noticed less in the individual interviews.  This does not 
provide ‘evidence’ that the respondents in the individual setting were stifled in their 
responses due to my presence but rather it does show that within the context of this piece of 
research, that a broader range of different discursive resources and positions were able to be 
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observed in the group setting as opposed to the individual.  As a result, there will inevitably 
be more Extracts from the group discussion in this analysis. 
 
3.3  Types of Madness: From Wonderland to the Unimaginable 
 The first theme begins to explore the extent to which the term madness could be seen 
as something positive, from a ‘land of fantasy’, in order to be frivolous, out of the ordinary 
and purposefully exert ‘difference’ on the one hand, whilst seen as something terrifying, 
ominous and something to distance oneself from, on the other. 
3.3.1 Wonderland.   
For some the term madness was described in a number of guises.  One of the 
constructions that persisted was from a broad social discourse, understood by all, that 
madness could be used in reference to something light, non-offensive.  The individuals 
interviewed made reference   to The Mad Hatter from Alice in Wonderland.  The phrase ‘mad 
as a hatter’ was used in individual interviews (R2 and R3) and came out by one of the 
speakers during the group discussion (GR2).   
 The function of these discourses appeared to be different in the way they were used in 
each context.  For one respondent, this particular phrase appeared to be one of many ways in 
which to evidence that the term madness is used today in a light and flippant way: 
Extract 6 <lines 1284-1292> 
R2  -Mad as a hatter. 
I:  OK:ay. 
R2  Mad hatter, (that’s a) it’s a bit silly ((smiling)) wasn’t it. 
I:  Okay ((smiling back)). SO- 
R2  -The hatter in Alice In Wonderland, he was the silliest person Ever  you know? And 
 that’s why the called him the mad hatter you know?  ((croaky towards end 
I:  Yeah. 
R2  You know? ((whisper quiet)) 
 
 
  
As can be seen from the choice of transcription format, there are details revealed 
about my interpretation of what the respondent is trying to say and the position I am 
attempting to take, as the ‘un-knower’, the source of no knowledge.  The respondent asks 
‘wasn’t it’, and I decided on the a full stop as opposed to question mark as I felt this was 
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rhetorical, though my smile in response to his perhaps communicated an acknowledgement at 
some level.  However, on line 1284 and 1287 he re-attempts to confirm that I know what he 
is describing using the ‘you know?’ action.   
 My own dispreference utterances that would otherwise serve to confirm the 
respondent’s knowledge appeared to have two different discursive effects.  The first appears 
to have the consequence of the respondent refusing to have any further knowledge and asking 
for his discourses to be ‘qualified by me’.   
 The second, shown below appears to have the converse function, serving as a means 
to encourage further information to be revealed, attempting to position myself as the learner 
and the respondent as the veteran of such knowledge: 
Extract 7 <lines 1299-1309> 
R2:  [YES! (.) Yes yes] yes, and ALSO  of course (.) there was also in Hollywood in 
the  1920’s and 30’s one  of the the biggest critics >of FILMS<, all the stars were in 
.hh  (.)  real FEAR of her, was a woman called hhHedda Harper=she had columns 
 in  all the (.) film magazines and that, they (called) Hedda Harper,  the Mad 
 Hatter, because [she wore] insane hats.= 
I:     [Okay]                 =OH right. 
R2  These outrageous hats (.) and her nickname was the:: The Mad Hatter I:  So in 
 THAT wa::y (.) it’s almost like the objects could be:: (.)  ‘insane hats’ >it’s like 
an  object< could be this thing as well? 
R2:  Yes, of COURSE! Yeah yeah yeah ((becoming quieter)) 
 ((laughs)).  
I:  ((smiling))>And her nickname was the Mad Hatter and it was because of  the 
 description of::< as you said ‘in-insane hats’? 
R2:  Yeah that’s right. 
 
 
 Here the function of encouraging ‘veteran’-talk can be seen in the breadth of 
information given by the respondent and by the ease of which this information flowed, 
without any caution or ‘self-disqualification’ seen elsewhere. In this particular passage, the 
respondent offered an example to show the idea of madness as a ‘descriptive term’ spreading 
to an object ‘worn’.  This object, in this case a hat, was labelled as ‘insane’ itself, which the 
respondent suggests then endowed the wearer with the label ‘mad’, in the form of a given 
title.  The suggestion from the respondent was that this public figure had a position of power, 
provoking fear in her professional field.  In the way the respondent appears to position this 
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person, it suggests that although the title ‘mad’ was given, this public figure chose to exude a 
type of identity that others would see as different and feared, as well and a commanding 
respect.  This extract of a person choosing to embody an object that exudes difference and 
perhaps encourages a title of ‘Mad’ to their own advantage, is the only one mentioned in any 
of the interviews.  In this sense the person being spoken about chose to wear the title. There 
are further examples of attempts to change the meaning of madness into a positive, self-
determined meaning that will be explicated in the ‘re-claiming madness’ section of this 
analysis.  
 
3.3.2 Madness is (not) Mental Health.   
The use of the term today appears to vary from its actual use in the context of 
everyday social language versus what it is thought to actually mean.  In Extract 8 (below), 
with the idea that ‘anybody can be a bit mad’ being stated, rather than proposed or 
questioned, R1 assumes that this is something that I, as the interviewer, would know to be 
true also: 
Extract 8 <lines 58-62> 
R1: =as mad as a kind of (er) >anyone could be a bit mad you know today I’m feeling a 
 bit mad or was a bit mad about you know it works in language< in (0.1) in it’s     
            context it doesn’t .h describe somebody with a difficulty you know having had   
            problems with their mental health. 
 
  
The respondent draws his statement from his understanding of discourses in within 
social language.  Stating that ‘it works in language’, seems to allow him to make these 
assumptions.  By using Extracts that are prefaced using the pronoun ‘bit’ it suggests an 
informal, small amount of the proceeding term madness.  Both Extracts given suggests ‘a bit 
of madness’ can be used in everyday language, without referring to mental health.  However, 
this assumption was not overtly verified by myself as the Interviewer (see Extract 9 below).  
Whether I was being positioned as a peer (general member of the public) or as a mental 
health professional, is unclear.  However, with lack of verification from my side, following 
these general assumptions on language usage led to the inclusion of madness in context of 
mental health patients: 
Extract 9 <lines 63-69> 
I: Ok ((tone shift to curiosity)) 
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R1: So I think y-you worried that you know that an initially somebody (0.2) who would 
 single you out or set you apart  
I: mkay= 
R1: =From the rest of (0.2) us because you have “mental health issues” because you’re 
 “mentally ill”, I think madness perhaps conjures a different image of that, illness.   
  
 
 The consequences of this connection to mental health, for those with a mental health 
label, appears to be perceived as being met with negative attention and isolation from general 
society.  The idea of how madness fits into this association appears somehow different, 
although the term ‘conjures’ is particularly interesting as we will see throughout the analysis 
that perceived meaning and consequence of madness does indeed have to be ‘conjured’ or 
constructed.  However, for other respondents, the modern day usage of the term of madness 
is not connected with mental illness: 
Extract 10 <lines 1774-1777> 
R2 No:: (.)>I think< that the term madness these days: (.), it’s just SO: (.) fa:r away from     
            (.)- everyday use- its SO fa:r away from (.) mental illness. That: (.) it doesn’t really  
            MEAN (.) >severe mental illness< anymore:e.    
  
Unlike previous statements that appeared to be in relation to the use of the term by 
‘general society’ or mental health professionals, this blanket declaration seems to contradict 
the accounts from other respondents  - that the term is used in the both a light and ‘true 
meaning’, which is seen in a derogatory and controversial manner.  However, even for this 
particular participant, the use of the term ‘insane’ could be used, as way to identify someone 
with mental health difficulties (in ‘extreme’ cases): 
Extract 11 <lines 1815-1818> 
R2 Yeah. >An EXTREME form< of mental illness. 
I: So:-but WHO do you think it still means >an extreme form of mental illness< for? (.) 
Do you think? ((becoming very quiet)). (0.1) For:- 
R2 And the ULTRA extreme is the CRIMINAL- CRIMINally insa:ne. 
 
 
 65 
The association of madness with mental health appeared to evoke an accusation that I 
was asking if R2 thought mental health professionals used the term.  This may have had an 
impact on the choice of phrase he used with me.  The respondent was however able to offer 
an opinion when filtered through the viewpoint of a ‘general health patient’.  In Extract 12, 
respondent 2 offers a particular use of madness ‘in the medical field’.  This choice of this 
Extract from this respondent serves to deflect away from what mental health professionals 
may use and instead changes the focus to the use of the ‘lighter’ version of madness being 
used by ‘general’ medical professionals: 
Extract 12 <line 1648-1657> 
R2 I spoke to a senior nurse about that many years ago.  .hh>and she said, yeah. ‘Stops 
US (.) from going mad.’ 
I: OH Oka:y? 
R2 Y’know? You know because they have to (0.1) DO IT lightheartedly. 
I: Yeah. 
R2 They mean it VERY seriously, (.)>but they speak< light-heartedly. 
I: SO:: (.) In that exampl:e,(.) The:: >the staff< said that used  flippant way of speaking, 
to prevent themselves[:: (.) from going  mad?] 
R2:         [Y::es]. 
 
Speaking as a general health patient, respondent 2 gives a recollection whereby the 
‘senior nurse’ excused her use of language in order to prevent what the she calls ‘madness’.  
The participant appears to have understood that the intention of the ‘senior professional’ is to 
be able to account for the use of light-hearted language in the work-place in order to stave off 
madness.  Interestingly the use of the term madness here is also referred to in a light-hearted 
manner and yet seems to be understood by the speaker and the nurse to ‘mean’ something 
more.   The tone between the two parties here appears also to be ‘light’ in the way their use of 
talk allows both to talk about ‘serious’ matters without letting it apparently effect their 
‘emotional wellbeing’.  The nurse is also suggesting perhaps that if staff did speak in the 
serious way, they may end up ‘mad’.  The use of ‘light-hearted’ language  is understood, 
without explanation to the patient (Respondent 2). 
On the far extreme of this position,  madness could again be seen as marking a sense 
of difference from the norm, however, this time without it being the intention of the person 
involved.  The consensus across all respondents was that this end of the definition was not 
something to be desired.  The contexts in which this ‘extreme end’ manifested varied from 
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personal experiences, film and television to imagined contexts of the past.  However, the 
respondents varied with the freeness at which they would be able to acknowledge this other, 
non-flippant side.  Initially, Respondent 2 presented the flippant side as the only use of the 
term for most of the interview:   
Extract 13  <lines 1141-1144> 
R2  Well these-days when people talk about things, being a bit  outra::geous or something 
(.) >anything like that< (or just) rea::lly  silly, they’ll say OH that’s ma::d, >that’s 
mad< it’s got nothing to  do with the true meaning of madness.   
 
Describing the contexts of those who use the term in the flippant, light way, was 
expanded to ‘everyone’.  In this extract he alludes to other words that suggest the same thing, 
being used for the same purpose, for Extract stating ‘anything like that’ but speaking so 
quickly that it left no room for him to have to explore what ‘anything’ was or to confirm the 
word ‘that’ meant madness.  This respondent maintained his argument that this light-use of 
madness is the only side used in everyday discourse throughout the interview.  However, 
even at the beginning he described something that no other respondent did, that there is an 
alternative, a ‘true meaning of madness’: 
Extract 14 <lines 1157-1167> 
I:     [Okay] So em:: >anytime people can use it< as:: as an 
 expression? 
R2  I think so, they do, >whether they should or not<, 
I: Yeah 
R2 ..but they do yes. 
I:  So:: >whether they should or not<, eh:: does that mean that this  perhap[s:: 
occasions when,] 
R2  [(well it’s em::)] 
R2     Well i-it’s not fair to insane-people is it? (Well y’know sort of) really, TRULY mad 
people, y’know? >Is that< I don’t whether the term  is MAD is still u:sed in medical 
terms:: >by officials:< in CARE. 
 
In Extract 14 above, the respondent adds to his notion that there is a true meaning of 
madness by stating that there are also ‘TRULY mad people’.  Linked to the previous extract 
from this respondent (Extract 13), he states that people do use the term madness, in its 
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flippant sense, but is cautious as to whether it ‘should’ be used.  Given the purposefully 
tentative tone in which my own discursive utterances are presented, the use of ‘should’ by the 
respondent alludes to an orientation towards a moral debate between the respondent and I.   
Only the fact that this is brought up within the context of this interview can be 
commented on, however, as the respondent queries the use of the term in medical contexts 
and attempts repeated confirmations from myself through the use of ‘y’know’, my own 
position in this moral debate was perhaps questioned.  Although I never invited a debate into 
the morality of the use of the term, or queried the use in medical contexts, the respondent 
appears to be establishing or re-establishing his own position in this moral debate, whilst 
information-seeking from my side.  The position sought by the respondent is one in which he 
is sane, and from this position he is telling me, positioned as the mental health professional 
that the use of the term by everyday people may be morally ambiguous, given that there are 
truly mad people out there, and therefore the flippant usage may not be free from negative 
connotation as there is a true kind of madness that exists.  This contrasts with his earlier 
declaration that the term madness is only used in the flippant sense in current everyday 
language use. 
 
3.3.4 Society’s (mis)perception of (ab)normality.   
In the other interviews, the rest of the respondents began by describing madness as 
something that could be seen as a societal difference from the ‘norm’: 
Extract 15 <lines 2153-2163> 
I: We can start off with madness in general.   
R3: Madness:: – the word madness I would relate to somebody that's  mentally:: 
unstable? 
I: Mkay. 
R3: Umm:: 
I: What - what does that mean? 
R3: .hhh Somebody that's not their usual:: – what w-we describe as normal::.  Erm, you've 
>normal people< and then:: you have people that ar::e not normal so:: if:: >you say< 
madness you think there's some either chemical imbalance? or:: there’s >some family 
history::< of like, say, the word insane? 
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On the surface of Extract 15, respondent 3 offers a biomedical discourse as a 
proposed definition of madness.  This biomedical discourse appears to be offered in order to 
explain the causes of madness within a person, following a question posed by me in relation 
to personal meaning. Instead of giving an idea of what madness may mean, the respondent 
describes what or ‘who’ the term relates to.  The term madness itself is instead labelled as 
something that is perceived to relate to a type of person. ‘Not normal’, chemical imbalance’ 
or ‘family history’ are terms drawn upon to explain this person – this phenomenon.  After this 
the sources of explanation appears to end, this phenomenon is repositioned to another term, 
‘insane’.   
However, in looking more closely at the discursive manoeuvres employed by 
respondent 3 in Extract 15, we can see a number of different functions, through spoken and  
almost spoken discourse, in response to the interviewer.  In her first attempt to convey her 
understanding of the madness (line 2155), she appears to be searching for a term, which will 
attach to ‘mentally’ (with an elongated ‘y’) and offers ‘unstable’ as a suggestion.  The 
response from my side appears to infer that I was responding to a social discourse that 
respondent 3 was describing, though my response also served to warrant more than a general 
discourse.  This is seen in the respondent’s search for something more to say (‘Umm::’), 
perhaps looking for the ‘correct’ response or the response I was looking for.  Following my 
challenge to the term ‘mentally unstable’, the respondent begins to say a person might not be 
there usual self, though the term ‘self’ is omitted and instead the idea of ‘normal’ is offered in 
its place.   
Furthermore, the respondent switches from her own ideas on the matter to ‘we’, 
implicating both a wider discourse on what people in general would ‘describe as normal’.  At 
this point the idea of who ‘we’ might encompass is not made clear, though it may relate to my 
own ‘we can start off with madness in general’ in line 2153, and the respondent it returning to 
a joint, shared discourse.  
The term chemical imbalance and other biomedical discourse, genetics, are also 
offered as an explanation of ‘cause’ in the group interview when GR3, recalls her father’s 
search for a reason within a ‘common discourse’ for her mental health difficulty.  The general 
biomedical discourse is feely recited back by her peers.  This common discourse may relate 
to the societal ‘we’, seen by respondent 3 in Extract 15, that constructs a societal discourse 
necessitates a search for ‘cause’:   
Extract 16 <lines 3478-3483> 
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GR2.. was acc:epted (.) and my Daddy worried a lot that maybe HED HAD cau::sed (.) OR 
WHATEVER, er- the gene::s, e- who knows::, (.)  GENETIC, or CHEMICAL– 
((looks around group, lower tone))er:: >what is  it?– chemical something< can 
cau:se it. 
GR3: [Imbalance.] 
GR4: [ImBALANCE.] 
 
 (ab)normal Behaviour.  The theme of normality is widespread in the individual 
interviews as well as in the group discussion. The utterances used included stability, 
normality and difference, all in comparison to ‘the alter’ – those who are categorised as 
‘mad’:  
Extract 17 <lines 3159-3170> 
GR1: I mean, ma:d madness for me::, er, >you know<, it can ha:ve  >different meanings<, 
but er: (.) BASICally:: something that you  don't understand.   
I:  Okay. 
GR1: Some people might– you kno::w – and you behave in a:: (.) different wa:y from 
everybody else=Some people might define that as madness. (.)  >You know<, you're 
not confor::ming to the: >norm< enough.  To some people that might be. 
I: Okay (.) so there's something abou:t em (.) >something that's< nor:mal or norm and 
then if it's something that seems very different from that then that's what this term 
might be about? 
GR1: >Ye-ah!< 
 
The above extract again uses the utterance ‘you know’, though the function here 
seems to serve two purposes.  On the one hand, it follows ‘madness for me’, indicating the 
ideas may not relate to a general discourse or ‘fact’. This is given further ‘disclaimer status’ 
by quickly adding madness can have ‘>different meanings<’.  On the other side, the use of 
‘you know’ may also, despite his disclaimer, be a request for me to acknowledge a discourse 
that I am familiar with.   The latter function appears to re-surface when he uses ‘you’ in 
‘something that you don’t understand’ which may serve to refer to a generally accessible 
knowledge/discourse.  
 The way in which he situates his words deflects attention away from the ‘different 
meanings’ of madness, by stating this quickly, placing more emphasis on the more 
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fundamental meaning, which he seems to suggest I would be familiar with.  My response 
appears to serve as an agreement, which then invites him to continue, again using ‘you 
know’, though in this attempt, perhaps due to the previous statement, it invites me to almost 
guess what he is about to say, as if I would already know the lines of discourse he is about to 
unveil before he does.  The idea he presents fits with a general discourse seen throughout the 
interviews in which a person ‘behaving’ in a certain, way, outside of ‘normal’ social 
standards, could be defined as mad.  The use of ‘some’, in explanation of who might ‘define’ 
this behaviour as that of a mad person, implies that this behaviour may not be seen or deemed 
this way by everyone.  In the ‘reclaiming madness’ chapter of this analysis there are Extracts 
of how this abnormal behaviour can and has been re-framed. 
 
 (ab)normality of the mind?  The discourse surrounding madness as being something 
‘mental’ or something to do with a ‘state of mind’ is also seen throughout the interviews.  
The respondents differed only in the extent to which this was described and in what guise 
they were speaking from (i.e. as seen from the view of self, from a general discourse on 
madness, or through the lens of a biomedical discourse):   
Extract 18 <lines 336-347> 
R1:  And I think if you use madness it’s much more serious.  I think it-it em is a state of 
mind isn’t it? And if somebody who’s, y’know (.)perhaps doing something which   
            they shouldn’t or doing something which does not em (.) fit within the normal 
boundaries, 
I:  Mkay. 
R1:  ..Th’t-that at society ((over annunciation)) expected, so that’s what madness can come 
to mean. 
I:  Okay. So and it, with other people outside of having a mental health problem, would 
they be able to understand it in that meaning? 
R1:  Oh yeah (light high tone)), definitely. 
I:  Okay  
R1:  Yeah, absolutely. 
 
An alternative explanation of madness in Extract 18 appears in the early part of the 
interview with Respondent 1.  On the one hand he suggests that this ‘state of mind’ is what is 
thought of to represent madness, using ‘isn’t it’ as a rhetorical term to confirm this generally 
understood discourse.  The construction of normality is brought into play again.  The idea of 
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normality versus abnormality is also thought to be something that is a recognisable discourse 
both in and outside of the mental health world.  Respondent (R1) above offers an opinion 
which he firstly prefaces by stating it is what he thinks, though expands this to a knowledge 
base I would be familiar with, by using ‘isn’t it?’  The function of the discursive manoeuvre 
of ‘y’ know’ again serves to invite me to guess what he is about to say, perhaps from a shared 
general discourse, before he pauses.  This pause reveals that he may have altered the 
interpretive repertoire that was actually voiced.     
From Extract 18, the emphasis on another construction - ‘society’ - appears to 
describe those who do fit within boundaries of normality and can see those whose state of 
mind does not conform to the expected standards of their group.  Linking this to the example 
used in Extract 17 and other examples describing behaviour as the ‘sign of madness’ (e.g. 
Extract 19), there is a discourse whereby to ‘society’, the expression (though observed 
behaviour) of a state of mind that does not fit in with societal standards indicates ‘madness’.  
 This appears to create a simplified discourse of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.  Throughout the 
interviews, the respondents position themselves as both parties through the different use of 
‘we’: 
Extract 19 <lines 2170-2175> 
R3:      ..– if somebody said “what do you think 
madness is?” just em – just-just people aren't behaving normally, they aren't >within 
what< we would assum::e (.) we're  expected in today's society to be – y::ou >have 
somebody that's  normal< and somebody's ma::d. Em:::: that (.) ((shrugs 
shoulders)) 
 
‘They aren’t behaving normally’ or not ‘within’ normal expectations of society 
provides the extent to which the general use of the term madness comes to be understood.  In 
the above Extract respondent 3 struggles to provide another means of understanding the term, 
other than these pre-defined roles. 
 
 Madness of the soul.  In Extract 20, from the group discussion, the entire group 
appear to agree to the statement from GR3 that there is confusion over the interpretation of 
madness as sourced from general literature, mis-identifying madness with possession.   
Extract 20 <lines 3366-3380> 
GR3:           Yes    [Possessed, yes] 
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GR2: Yes::, YE::s:. 
GR3: And AGAIN it's negative, [TOTALLY] negative, but um: (.) you can see  how that 
GR4:           [Yeah] 
GR3 .. THAT >sort of<– because their::– the-THE outcome >of the person who IS 
possessed< is (.) NOW >easily comprehensible< then you could  say, “Well you 
kno::w (.) it's a devil that entered them,”  
I: Yeah 
GR3: ..because they're confu:sing them and .hh, and >the-the old thing< as well, >the-the 
Latin thing em<, “Who:m the Gods would destroy they fir:st make ma:d,” and um: (.) 
so it-it-it's sort of >if you like< can be a step towar:ds destruction or obliteration or 
whatever.   ((quietly)) just, 
GP: ((all nodding)) 
 
 
The use of discourses from literature adds to the discourse of what a person labelled 
as mad might be seen as ‘by others’ in the 1800s.  It also draws the discourse into the present, 
deeming that being mad ‘can be a step towards destruction or obliteration’.  Although the 
respondents in the group interviews agree they have been given mental health labels in the 
past, only respondent 1 (individual interview) identifies with having a personal experience of 
madness.  Therefore the chosen position from the other respondents is based on their 
‘perception’ of what madness would look like to others.   The part(s) of the GR3’s they are 
agreeing to is not evident.  However, after GR3 stated, ‘the outcome’ of the person being 
misperceived as being possessed is ‘comprehensible’, the respondents then led to personal 
experiences of the negative consequences of being seen as mad to be provoked.  Therefore 
discussing the meaning or (mis)understanding of madness provoked a discourse of the 
outcome of (mis)perception of madness.  The certainty of GR3’s statement which described a 
person who ‘is possessed’, backed up by his peers in the group, points to the possibility that 
these ideas on madness are understood by all.  However it also suggests that society’s idea(s) 
of madness is misplaced.    
 
3.3.5  The Continuum: How mad can the term madness be?   
This idea of society’s perception of madness appears to interweave with the 
perception of the medicalised view of madness.  This view appears to provide a resource to 
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which general society can use.  In the Extract below, the use of the phrase ‘1 in 4’, indicates 
the idea that mental health applies to some people in ‘society’.  However, for the respondents, 
this view of mental health is synonymous with a view of mad people.  Furthermore, the 
respondents indicated that the ‘deemers’ of madness can be both ‘mental health 
professionals’ as well as wider ‘society’, which perhaps lends to the idea of societal stigma 
through labelling: 
Extract 21 <lines 3210-3223> 
I: Yeah. (0.1) So– SO with there being this one of four you're saying  >there's something 
about< em: (.) cer-certain people are saying the  term “madness” in a negative 
way towar:ds people [(.) that have  mental] health problems? 
GR1          ((quiet))      [Yes, yes:: it is] 
GR2: Yes, in a ((frustrated)) judgemental (.) derogatory way! 
GR3: It is essentially a negative term.= 
GR4: =YES! 
I: Okay. 
GR3: ..And EVEN >for people who< would be DEEMED to be ma::d (.) to use  the word 
about themselves is kind of negative. 
G: >YEah<. 
GR3:  ..I mean if you wanted to be more positive or more light- hearted  >you'd say 
“You’re bonkers”< or:, er:, possibly CRAZ:zy,  
  
This Extract also shows a difference in the use of other terminology, with ‘bonkers’ or 
‘crazy’ apparently being deemed ‘lighter’ than the term madness.  Indeed others described 
madness as a ‘strong’ term. Respondent 3 struggles to explain her own reaction to the term 
madness, using an emotional phase, ‘uncomfortable’ to respond personally: 
Extract 22 <lines 2207-2224> 
R3: I'd think, “Oh::, ok:::ay, >I don't like that< because it makes me feel uncomfortable?” 
((upward questioning inflection)) >because it's outside the realm of< ho:w I would 
want to be or how I’d expect other people to be.  So I would just fee::l madness is erm 
(0.1) er:::::m  >it's hard to define< really, because  ((cough)) it comes within – to  me 
it comes within the sphere of ‘madness, insane, cra:zy’ (.) or ‘abnormal’, >so to me< 
madness is abnormal.  I would describe madness(.) as abnormal= 
I: =Okay so:: you seem to >kind of separate it< to say it's a type of  BEHA::VIOUR 
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someone might have, >so you say< there's this nor:mal way of bein:g >and then< all 
these other terms are about ANYTHING OTHER  than that (.) so:, if someone's, the 
term crazy, insane, or:: the term madness is used, it's anything that's outside, outside 
what's  seemed normal= 
R3: =What's seen to be normal- 
I:      -[yeah] 
R3:       [..in society], today's society, what do  you expect 
it to be?= ((upward questioning inflection)) 
 
The extract above asked respondent 3 to say how she sees madness in comparison to 
apparently similar words, such as insane.  Respondent 3 chose to speak from her own 
personal viewpoint in her reply.  The use of the position of ‘self’ brings in some of the ideas 
expressed by other respondents in acknowledgment of societal norms, though in this instance, 
this particular respondent speaks from the first person, looking out at these norms which 
appear to cluster madness with any words that describe ‘abnormality’.  For this respondent, 
the function of this chosen social discourse appears to be to distance herself from any such 
terminology, not wishing to be seen as ‘what’s seen to be normal’.  The later use of ‘self’ in 
this passage (e.g. ‘I would describe madness as abnormal) serves to ally the respondent with 
this social discourse, and thus removing her from the position that would identify or be 
identified within the realm of abnormal.  This effectively evades an ‘uncomfortable’ 
discourse, and instead allows her to speak from the more objective, societal, safe position.  In 
the last 2 lines, the respondent does still qualify her own remarks to the possibility that these 
ideas are societal ideas, and perhaps a construct of ‘society’, and ‘today’s society’, to be 
specific.  In this way she is able to question this construction, whilst maintaining her position 
outside of that of ‘madness’ or ‘abnormality.  
 
The idea introduced by respondent 3 taps into another broad discursive theme seen by the 
other respondents.  On the one hand, as seen by the previous extracts (e.g. Extracts 19-22), 
any term that ‘society’ would position a person as ‘abnormal’ are clustered together to 
embody the message of someone, or someone’s behaviour existing outside of ‘normality’.  
However, for some respondents, including respondent 3, there is a difference in terms of how 
normal or abnormal these terms position someone.  Madness, as otherwise positioned as the 
polar opposite of normal (see Extract 27), is not always the ‘extreme’ opposite of normal, 
though there are terms which, to some, do fit this positioning.  When removing themselves 
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from attachment to the term madness, respondents offered up a view of madness within a 
continuum of how ‘severely ill’ a person is judged to be.  At the far end of this continuum 
lay the term ‘criminally insane’: 
Extract 23 <1818-1834>  
R2 And the ULTRA extreme is the CRIMINAL- CRIMINally insa:ne. 
I: OKA:Y. 
R2 You kno:w:. That’s that’s the- as extreme as you can GO:! 
I: Is that PAST madness?  
 (0.2) 
I: Or is it different?  
 (0.2) 
R2 Criminally insa:ne (0.1), ‘mad ma:n’. >Oh it’s< beYOND madness isn’t  it? 
I: Okay. 
R2 OR can you get CRIMINALLY insane mad ((smiling)) people as well? 
 ((laughing)). I: don’t kno:w. 
I: So:- well it’s INTERESTING >because you have< the:- the term- say madness::, and 
it’s em- you’re saying that it mean:s, severely mentally ill::? (.) And then 
>CRIMINALLY insa:ne is< (.) even beyond  that? 
R2 Yeah. 
 
Within this construction of ‘insane’ being the term that is used only for mental health 
description comes something apparently even stronger (for respondent 2).   ‘As extreme as 
you can go’ positions this term as something that would be beyond any of the clustered terms 
of mental health.  The rhetorical use of ‘isn’t it’ here appears to suggest I am aware and 
perhaps agree with the discourse whereby ‘criminally insane’ is seen as ‘beyond madness’.  
Some of the respondents agree that the word ‘insane’ is an extreme term attached to someone 
who is labelled ‘mentally ill’, though not all describe ‘criminally insane’ as the ‘ultra 
extreme’ of these terms: 
Extract 24 <lines 2226-2242> 
R3:      -..I probably:: – ma:ybe >I can reflect back and say< em yes I would yes 
incorporate ‘madness’, ‘insanity’, and ‘cra::zy’ in that al::-altogether, ((upward 
questioning inflection))  but: (.) you have  madness >which is< just slightly outside 
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the realm of normality, >then you have cra::zy< which is slightly worse than ma::d, 
I: OK= 
R3: =..then you have insane which is:: >totally just beyo::nd< any sort’f >normality what-
so-EVER3::<.  It’s:: em:: it's the ultimate end of:: the sphere of madness, crazy, 
insa::ne (.) >insane is like you're  totally< not in control of anything ((upward 
questioning  inflection))(.) ((hard swallow followed by exhale)) hhh >whereas 
madness can be< – madness is:: – it's quite a hard, er:: (.) word to:: –what we're 
expected, what we're to::ld by people ((upward questioning inflection)) Madness is:: 
you can be mad AS-in (.) ‘mad as a hatter’ or:: >as I just said like< y’know? you're 
beha:ving ‘abno:rmal’, ‘abnormally’, >because society tells us< that's not the way we 
should behave ((softer upward questioning inflection))?= 
 
In the above extract we can see that respondent 3 appears describe a ‘sphere’ (which 
she later calls ‘spectrum’) within this bubble of mental health terminology.  Within this 
‘sphere’ is a clear continuum in which mad, crazy and insane are positioned respectively.  
The term ‘insane’ is not only positioned at the far end of this continuum, but also described as 
an entity that defies description, ‘beyond any sort’f normality what-so-EVER’.  The way in 
which the term insane is positioned here appears similar to what ‘criminally insane’ is 
positioned as for respondent 2.  The commonality between the two is that the idea of what 
these terms may mean appear to be constructed without any clear basis for their choice of 
placement within this ‘continuum’.  There is no reported example from their own personal 
experience or that which they have observed in others.  The difference is that for respondent 
2, the idea of ‘true’ madness appears to be constructed, outside of his own experience, 
whereas respondent 3’s discourse appears ‘closer’ to the term madness, understood by 
something outside of how ‘society tells us’ ‘how we should behave’.     
For these respondents, the term madness is one of many that describe someone that is 
different, or mentally ill, or both.  Both respondents do not position madness as the extreme 
end of this constructed continuum.  In other examples there are certainly terms that are also 
less extreme that madness, (e.g. lines 3222-3223, Extract 21) however, there isn’t agreement 
between respondents on the ordering and perceived severity of these terms.  Therefore we 
may assume that the term madness might be lost in the mix of these terms.  However, it 
seems the idea of a true meaning of madness persists between respondents. 
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3.4  Sourcing the ‘true’ meaning of madness.   
Within the discourses expressed through the interviews, the ideas around madness appear to 
come from a variety of sources.  As you can see from Extract 25 below, the sources of this 
social knowledge stem from early childhood, through a variety of mediums.  From these 
sources there are discourses that appear to continue to have meaning and be recognisable. 
The idea that there is a ‘true’ meaning of madness makes an appearance within these 
discourses: 
 
Extract 25 <lines 1469-1482> 
R2  I haven’t (known anybody.  I mean) and I have only (seen  interpretations of it) on 
TV, films, and books. Things like that. 
I:  Okay. 
I:  And eh, I’m not quite sure (how I should answer this then) ((quiet)) 
I:  THAY sounds it was pretty honest, (.) so em: (.) this:: this sounds         like it comes 
from say TV and a fil::m maybe, 
R2 Yes::. 
I: ..that image of a person who is >as you say<  >as you say< sick and that word mad 
fits somehow with that em::. And how about, 
R2 It’s very very sad. It’s the sa:ddest thing in the world (.) >insane people< (they’ve) got 
no voice:: they’ve got no choi:ce:: (.) they can’t have fu:n, they can’t do things, they 
can’t choo::se::. They’ve got- it must be the saddest thing in the world.  It must be (.) 
terrible (.) terrible, terrible, you know? 
 
Interestingly, the respondent in the above extract, sources his idea of madness from 
external mediums and states they show ‘interpretations of it’.  We can assume ‘it’ refers to 
madness from the context of this part of the discussion.  However, this interpretation 
provides a strong reaction, as respondent 2 orientates himself towards a position of strong 
pity for those who are ‘truly’ mad, despite the previous acknowledgement that his idea of 
madness is from interpretations seen by external sources.   
Instead of finding new answers, respondent 2 draws from a different repertoire, using 
terms such as ‘they have no voice’ appears to further bolster his reaction, and invites me to 
agree with his own reactive interpretation.  This appears to be in the guise of a presented 
‘fact’ whilst manoeuvring me into a discourse where ‘we’ should feel sorry for these ‘truly 
mad’ individuals.  As a result of this manoeuvre, the previous acknowledgement that 
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discourse has been based on assumptions from media interpretation (line 1470, Extract 25) 
seems to be back-grounded. 
3.4.1 The true (media) meaning of madness.   
An Extract of the type of media that has become a go-to source of knowledge and 
reaction of the term madness is shown below: 
Extract 26 <1319-1322>   
R2:  Well-well I I remember that (specific scene, they were walking down the staircase at 
the time) at the time in a very grand house (.) .hh this very (.) this thing which Doctors 
had confused young relatives. “Is there a na::me for this?” “Yes::, MADNESS!” 
Y’know?  
 
In Extract 26 above, the construction of madness appears to be brought into existence.  
The setting of the usage was apparently sourced from general media, when recalling times 
when the respondent has heard the term madness used.  One of these settings in which a 
doctor was thought to use the term was in film.  The respondent described a particular scene 
in a movie that conjured an image of what the term could mean.  The use of the phrase ‘this 
thing’ appears to imply that madness has not been conceptualised.  This fits with the general 
discourse of most of the respondents where a description of madness, other than ‘difference 
to’ or ‘consequence of’ are difficult to vocalise.  In reference to this film, the ‘thing’ remains 
a source of confusion until the ‘doctor’ gave a name to it – ‘madness’ was born.  Respondent 
2 recalled the film and used the ‘y’know’ utterance. This function of this utterance in this 
context appears to be to facilitate the positioning the ‘film reference of madness’ as a familiar 
reference point.  This may assume that I, as a member of the public, would be familiar with.  
It may also serve for me to disconfirm this reference point of madness, or to query if the 
image I hold is the same as the image that is seen in this film and hence by the participant.
 This particular example appeared to be the only direct connection any respondents 
had to their own ‘sourcing of knowledge’ of the term madness.  Other respondents were able 
to draw upon general sources, though mainly dismissed them as mis-conceptions.   
However, respondent 1 offered the view that these ‘general discourses’ actually 
provided a real source of understanding in his life:  
 
Extract 27 <lines 1043-1064>    
I:   And is that something about (.) you said it’s a word you picked up a long time ago?= 
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R1:  =Yeah, because again this time-line is very strong in my mind and I think about 
madness being something which initiall::y I came across the TERM madness, you 
know and used it and was comfortable using it, probably quite early on in childhood 
and I probably thou::ght to myself, in terms of how I’m doing (0.2) sounds fantastic 
you know that my brain works this way but ((slight laugh)) em that, perhaps madness 
eh, >is the opposite of normal<. 
I:  Mmkay. 
R1:  So:: >psychologically< you are using it from a very early age and understand that, 
there is another (0.2) there is another way your brain can woR1::k, >if you like< or 
another context which your brain sits in? 
I:  Yeah. 
R1:  Which is contextualised by the words madness and sanity?  So you’ve got those two 
opposing polar opposites, if you like and I think that it just works into the whole idea 
of (.) understanding people, understanding yourself, >you know<, what’s acceptabl::e, 
what’s  norma::l, what’s ab:normal::l >whatever<. And I think madness would be one 
of the terms which you could, you could tell a chi::ld and they would understand what 
they were talking about. 
 
 
The age at which a person comes to know about the term madness comes to the 
forefront in this extract.  Here respondent 1 begins to explain his ‘acquisition’ of the term 
madness.  Although he fails to place an obvious source from which to place the moment of 
learning about the term, he explains it must be from ‘early childhood’.  His recollection 
appears to blur between past and present, towards an objective way of viewing himself and 
the term.  There is a subtle shift in his discursive positioning from a personal childhood 
recollection to the objective scientific point of view that hypothesises what this term can 
mean in language and how it fits into developmental learning.  The child viewpoint seems to 
be loaded with curiosity, without judgement.  The term is part of language, without stigma or 
negativity.   
The contrasting scientific discourse also positions what I would expect to hear and the 
way in which I am cued to respond, using ‘psychologically’ to indicate a the proceeding 
information is going to be within the realm of ‘science’.  This may have been caused by my 
shift from my usual supportive or encouraging tones of ‘okay’, or ‘yeah’, to a more curious 
‘mmkay’, indicating I perhaps saw something new and wanted to know more.  The 
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respondent then re-directs his discourse to a scientific one.  This enables the respondent to 
generalise his understanding to theories of ‘developmental learning’ and create ‘hypotheses’ 
about the ‘social dynamics’ involved as a consequence.  In this case it presumes a child 
would understand the term madness within opposing positions of normal functioning 
brain/different functioning brain, given further language such as madness and sanity.   
The respondent also alludes to the idea of what is ‘acceptable’ within a theme of 
identity: self versus others (or ‘people’).  In using the discursive position of an objective, 
scientific viewpoint, as shared by GR3 in the group discussion, the use of strong statements is 
enabled, without having to argue their position solely from personal experiences.  In this 
case, he does not state whether he identify himself within either normal/abnormal camp.   
Instead, respondent 1 foregrounds the idea that the term madness is learnt from early 
childhood, that it would be a term a young person would have an idea about, without having 
to have a more developed vocabulary, or direct experience of the phenomenon of madness 
itself.    Respondent 1 therefore somehow establishes the beginnings of a learned discourse of 
us/them normal/abnormal.  However, in the adult world, this construction, whether there is a 
‘true’ madness or not, appears to have ‘true’, real-world consequences. 
 
3.5 Consequences of madness: 
Extract 28 <3392-3402>  
GR4: ..afte:r >my child was born< and my FA:Mily were very supporti::ve >before that<- 
very close family- and then ONCE I star:ted to do things (.) >that were a little< 
strange .hhh, (.) the MOment I got  seen by a psychiatrist I WAS (.) >deemed as< 
MA:D, 
I: Okay? 
GR4: ..fro:m THAT day to this day, (.) they've had no con– apar:t from– my PARENTS or 
my children– >none of the fa:mily< have any contact because ‘I’m the ma:d one (.) in 
the family’[, (0.1)]and it's just – it's been 
GR2:  [((tuts))] 
GR4: >22 years< ((angrily)). 
In the above extract, respondent GR4 describes being shunned from the rest of her 
family, due to the attachment of a mental health label.  This label appears to be translated by 
her family to mean madness.  This mirrors with respondent 1’s viewpoints that being attached 
to psychiatric services is akin to being deemed mad.: 
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Extract 29 <232-233> 
R1: ..and somebody who has been through ((audible swallow))  psychiatric services, is 
somebody who is a ‘mad person’. 
 
It also mimics the discourse seen by the other respondents where behaviour ‘outside of 
normality’ warrants a label of madness.  However, respondent GR4 refined this construct 
further to state that the act of being seen by a psychiatrist invoked a label of madness 
instantaneously. The consequence of this ‘attachment’ for respondent GR4 was an act of 
shunning from her family.  This act apparently extended to her children by association.  In 
this sense, it appears as though the label of madness, and especially its consequence then 
encompasses more that the person being deemed.:  
Extract 30 <3406-3413>    
I   [->And that<]- >I mean< ther::e (.) it's >really specific< what happened ther::e that it 
was this experience that you ha:d (.) and where, as soo:n as you saw a 
psyCHIATRIST the::n (.) then this label was there. 
GR4: Yes, and it was kind of “SHE's got- [SHE’s] got the LUR::GY, stay  away 
GR3:   ((quiet soft tone))      [yeah ] 
GR4: ..from her, it’s contagious” [or [[something]]. 
 
The discourse of being tainted is then foregrounded by the respondent GR4, with 
words used to give a sense of being both infected and having something that can be 
transmitted.  Interestingly, this discourse is recognised by her peers, acknowledging the 
existence of this discourse before GR4 had even completed her sentence.  The choice of the 
word ‘lurgy’ is something that casts further mystery into the perceived impact of madness, 
with the term ‘lurgy’ being a fictitious, yet highly infectious disease, and the ‘true’ madness 
not able to be articulated by most of the respondents.  In this way both ‘true’ madness and its 
consequence are social constructs.  However, it is not clear whether the respondent denies the 
existence of true madness, but rather, that it is perceived consequences, whether via a 
construct or not, have real-world implications for her and those who surround her due to the 
attachment of this label. 
Extract 31 <lines 4167-4186> 
GR2: I maybe – >I think maybe people< are sca::red (.) where in the odd case, maybe >I 
don't know<, paranoid schizophrenic or NUTTER kills  someone or HURTS A 
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CHILD, 
GR3: Yes. 
GR2: ..>or any of that<.  It is all kind of lumped into one- mental  health- and it's all so very 
different. 
I: It SOUNDS it, in the way you say it.  So there was these labels  somehow and the 
labels are- 
GR2: And many differentialities within (.) ONE label. 
GR3: And a lot of damage is done to the mentally ill when there is – like  recently there was 
a famous case of-of-of someone who IS mentally ill >committing a terrible CRIME, 
(.) like MURDER or whatever.   
GR4: YEAH. 
GR3: And then that reflects VERY MUCH back-on all people who are mentally  ILL::,- so 
that-that sort of adds to the STIGMA (0.1) if only for a period of time, ((recedes to 
quiet tone)) but it DOE:S.  
GR4: It TAKES the HEADLINE, doesn't it? 
GR3: Yes, exactly. 
GR4: It’s that WHATEVER ILLness or whatever PROBLEM they had- 
GR3: THAT'S what caused them to be:: em murderers 
 
In the above Extract the respondent (GR2) seems to speak against the predominant 
social discourse that the construction of ‘abnormal’.  In this case she states that medical terms 
such as ‘paranoid schizophrenic’ and lay-terms like ‘nutter’ are deemed synonymous with 
one another.  The context in which this discourse has been described lies within the media.  
‘Or any of that’, used in a quicker pace of speech serves to re-affirm her assertion that there is 
a disregard for difference in the use of terminology which she states is ‘lumped’ together and 
yet argues that these terms are in fact ‘very different’ from one another.  The next respondent 
(GR3), replies as a peer, then asserts that the consequence of this ‘lumping together’ has a 
direct effect on those with mental health problems – terms which are clustered to become 
synonymous, are then effected by anyone who’s label is encompassed by the synonymous 
terms. Interestingly, the way in which Gr3 frames the repercussions of media labelling to 
those with mental health labels is that it ‘reflects, VERY MUCH’ back, ‘adds to the 
STIGMA’, and does ‘damage’.  In this way GR3 does not position himself as the one being 
reflected back on (still making reference to ‘them’) but emphasises a number of assumptions: 
that there is already stigma against people with mental health issues; that the media’s 
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synonymous use of terminology foregrounds these issues as the problem in criminal headline 
stories; the apparent effect is a temporary increase in the perceived spotlight (or stigma) that 
was already focussed on those with the label of a mental health diagnosis.  
Extract 32 <lines 1890-1906> 
I: Madness might always mean something a bit mo::re (0.1)- >a bit more serious?< (0.1) 
If you used the term madness? 
R2 Em:: (0.1). NOT the- Not these days, the general (.) [public.] NO. 
I:                   [Okay]       So: the general public 
using it, it’s still:: (.) that kind of- 
R2 INSANE is still INSANE. But not many people use the word flippantly,  insane. 
Insane is still insane, I think. 
I: Okay. (0.1) So that still mean:s something quite ST:RO:NG? 
R2 Yeah, yes. 
I: Em: a::nd- Is it NEGAtive? The word insane? 
 (0.2) 
R2 A negative word?=No! It-its j::ust a description, a MEDCIAL em  [description.] As 
far as I’M concerned. 
I:          [Okay        ]   
             So it’s neutral somehow? 
R2 Of COURSE it’s NEGATI:VE, it’s not GOO:D. [((laughter))Y’kno::w?] 
I:             [((laughter))] 
R2 But em: (.) you CAN’T describe it >as a< negative wor:d. 
 
 
For some, the use of terms such as madness still lies outside of the ‘cluster’ of mental 
health synonyms, and are instead used in the ‘flippant’, ‘light-hearted’ fashion amongst the 
general public, without any connection to mental health.  Other respondents described other 
uses of the term madness, such as to describe anger or an ill-thought out idea, however, they 
felt it still had a presence within the mental health ‘cluster’.  Respondent 2 previously 
suggests there is a ‘true meaning of madness’.  Respondent 2 goes further to suggest that on 
the one hand the term insane is ‘strong’ (agreeing with my own suggestion) and is negative, 
though is not allowed to be described as negative within discourse, due to it ‘just’ being a 
‘medical description’.   
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My own attempt at clarification by suggesting the term is seen as ‘neutral’, due to 
R2’s previous respondent’s medically emphasized discourse, then established a brief switch 
in R2’s interpretive repertoire, outside of the suggestion of a medical neutrality, though he 
then re-positions it back towards this position of neutrality after this moment of lapse, in talk 
of ‘acceptable’ discourse.  Here the use of ‘y’know’ appears to suggest I was aware of the 
alternative discourse, of it being negative, whilst the respondent was attempting to  maintain 
the guise of the medical, neutral, descriptive position. 
 
3.5.1 The healing power of madness.   
The construction of madness is not seen as completely negative by all the 
respondents.  Respondent 1 provides the strongest voice to create a new window into 
discourses surrounding madness.  In particular, through the use of de-construction of the 
term, and detaching the term from sole use of the ‘normal society’, against those deemed 
‘abnormal’: 
Extract 33 <lines 118-123> 
R1: =by that I mean you know seeing the psychiatrist or a care  coordinator.  You know 
it’s just gotten to me now and if somebody came back with the idea of perhaps it was 
“just a bit of  madness” ((croaky jokish tone)) 
I: Yeah?- 
R1: -..And it can happen to anyone, it can be normal,   
 
The function of the term madness appears to change again when used by mental 
health professionals to attempt to explain a particular mental health experience.  On this 
attempt, the term can be used to relate to something that both the mental health worker and 
the patient, can understand.  In Extract 33 the mental health professional is tentatively putting 
the idea to the patient that their experience could be this ‘thing’ they both would be aware of, 
this ‘thing’ called madness. 
The idea of ‘normal’ is re-introduced.  Here the respondent, whilst identifying himself 
in the role as a NHS patient, speaks with hindsight, and imagines a scenario whereby the use 
of the word madness can be both minimizing to the ‘experience’ of mental health concern, 
but also ‘normalising’.  In this sense the function appears to be to allow the ‘professional’ to 
both reduce the intensity of the experience but also to allow it to fall within the realms of 
what can be considered to be ‘normal’.  The tone of humour adds another dimension to this 
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function by possible allowing the experience to be ‘dismissed as madness’.  Here we do not 
know the ‘type of madness’ being spoken about but appears able to be laughed about – 
allowing a mutual reference point where both parties are able to identify through humour.  
This runs in contrast to the function perceived earlier in the analysis whereby the 
person identified as being mad would be ‘singled out or seen as different’.  Perhaps it is 
because in this extract, the person’s identity is not being positioned as ‘mad’, but instead an 
‘experience of madness’ is offered, allowing the respondent to be included as member of the 
‘normals’. This enables the respondent to make use of a term that is not a construction within 
the ‘clinical’ world of mental health professional:  
Extract 34 <lines 766-780> 
I:  So there is a clinical term ve::rsus (.) the term that seems to  hav::e maybe not more 
meaning, but it gets, >gets it a bit more?< 
R1:  (0.1) >Yeah perhaps< its perhaps it’s a bit closer to the bone,  perhaps we we 
all:: .h have an understanding of how day to day lives  can be affected by 
madness. 
I:  Yea::h. 
R1:  Em:: (.) and it goes a bit beyond that as well (.) for ME (.) having  an experience of 
psychosis and ‘delusional beliefs  y’know’((whisper)) THAT sort of thi::ng em (.) 
it goes a long way to  describing what that, what those feelings are like and and how 
that  situation em, can evolve y’know? because it’ closer to em:: (.) using what is a 
more understandable way of of em (0.1) of diagnosing myself >if you like< if I used 
if I say I’m I’m you know if somebody who has experienced a psychotic 
BREAKdown and that’s all to do with (0.1)  madness. 
 
In the extract above, the respondent agrees with part of my suggestion, though directs 
it more towards the idea that the term can be more tangible.  In suggesting that by offering 
the phrase as something to consider when thinking through a mental health experience, the 
respondent suggest it could be ‘closer to the bone’.  Respondent 1 then expands this closer 
understanding to include everyone, with the omission of my/your/our in ‘how day to day lives 
can be affected by madness’.  
When compared with the other respondents, this suggestion further emphasizes the 
particular discourse respondent 1 uses, in allowing the term madness to be described and 
investigated ‘closer’, rather than keeping it at a distance, as the per the position other 
respondents tend to take. 
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Respondent 1 takes this discursive manoeuvre further and manages to re-claim the 
function of the term madness for his own use.  In this way, despite explaining his role in the 
position of a patient, he is able to self-diagnose, instead of being diagnosed.  At the same time 
he acknowledges the clinical ‘given’ terms used to label his mental health difficulties, though 
feels his own use of madness can ‘closer to’ and a more understandable way of’ self-
diagnosis and moves this understanding to the foreground.  Look more closely at his choice 
of phrase, ‘>if you like<’ implies the diagnoses term is directed towards myself, as the 
interviewer, and perhaps as a mental health professional.  Using the phrase ‘diagnosing’ is 
perhaps, as with ‘psychological’ used earlier, an attempt to ally the discourse with a 
repertoire I would be familiar with as a Mental Health Professional. 
In other Extracts, the use of madness as a type of diagnostic offering by the mental 
health professional can be used.  Furthermore, it is positioned as something very different to 
other official, psychiatric diagnoses: 
Example 35 <486-495> 
R1: I think would put people (.) um: in a different frame of mind about  their own, 
condition, about their own experiences hh um, in the in  the first instance, if 
someb’dy who was trying to diagnose my >mental  health< condition .hh, em with 
the term madness, I may fee:l, slightly more comfortable with it.  I know-I know that 
sounds bizarre, b’t madness seems something that is transient, that doesn’t stick, 
whereas something like schizophrenia really that seems like something that I’d never 
be able to get away from =I know NOW that it isn’t that, 
I: Yeah 
 
In the above extract, respondent 1 appears to speak on behalf of mental health suffers.  
The phrase ‘mental health’ is spoken rapidly, foregrounding the ‘term madness’ instead.  
After qualifying his next statement by disclaiming is as being seen as ‘bizzare’, respondent 1 
suggests that the term madness does not have a permanent branding on the person it’s 
attached to like psychiatric terms such as ‘schizophrenia’.  This may appear to run in contrast 
to the opinion of other respondents, however, respondent 1 is talking about the impact of the 
label as seen from his own viewpoint, rather than others.  In his expert, survivor role, 
madness has an ending whereas psychiatric terms as perceived as not having an end, perhaps 
even a brand for life. 
Furthermore, in Extract 36 below, madness appears to have a more flexible role than 
other ‘diagnosed terms’.  In talking about how a mental health professional might use the 
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term madness to reach out to the patient in order to understand an experience, respondent 1 
continues in his survivor patient position, asserting that the relationship between client and 
patient would allow for the ‘appropriate use’ of madness. The adjustment can be seen in line 
373 where he begins to suggest a mental health profession would treat a patient ‘as their 
diagnosis’, rather than ‘as a person’.  This is adjusted to a softer, more palatable phrase that 
constructs an image of two individuals in a helpful relationship, rather than the expert labeller 
vs. passive patient.  The ‘disintegration’ of everything other than madness in the Extract 
seems to dissolves the use of other terms, as well as the roles between the two parties: 
 
Extract 36 <lines 361-378> 
R1: ..if they are any good. .hh and I think that that meaning then is somehow em (.) it sort 
of disintegrates everything else. >I mean< once you’ve gotten down to madness and 
used it as a a in context, I  think there is very little you can detract or add to it.  
Cause I  think it is quite (0.1) it is quite em (.) specific in-te:rms, I mean if you 
use it as a as a label or if somebody says to you, how do you  feel about .hh 
being diagnosed (.) or how do you feel about ‘your  
R1: ..madness’, 
I: Yeah 
R1: ..I think (0.3) the (.) the reaction you get would be very different  and I think it’s 
dependant - it depends on how you see yourself inside of that relationship with the 
professionals. So >if that  professional treats you as a person< rather than as their 
diag- as somebody they are trying to make better. 
I:  Yeah 
R1:  Then I think it has got a place, I really do, I mean I think that madness it it’s is a very 
broad term, but it is also very (.) em::, it sort of leaves very little room for 
misunderstanding if you like. 
 
This proposition of a potentially equal relationship is noted in by other respondents.  
This is largely in relation to how relationships between mental health professionals and 
patients can be more helpful.  However, respondent 1 talks specifically about this relationship 
in the use or misuse of the term madness.  He aligns this with another clinically based 
discourse – ‘recovery’: 
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Extract 37 <lines 421-426> 
R1:   And there is a lot of, there is a lot of effort goes into I think  recovery, I think you have 
gotta put a lot of things to one side >and you’ve gotta stay< and focus on recovery. So 
anything that undermines that is really dangerous. But at the same time, I think 
madness can  start to bridge that gap between (.) em what it is that professionals  do 
for us ‘nd what we have to do for ourselves. 
 
However, even this term ‘recovery’ is re-claimed.  As seen from the Extract above, 
respondent 1 switches from the position of a champion of ‘recovery’ to a champion of 
equality.  At the end of the paragraph, he foregrounds the use of madness as the decision of 
choice, despite alluding that it could be seen as something that undermines ‘recovery’.  The 
destructive power of madness is also positioned as the healer, ‘bridging that gap’ between the 
functions of the professional and the patient’s own healing abilities.  Later the respondent re-
affirms this equalising movement: 
Extract 38 <lines 512-519> 
R1:  Em (0.1) B’cause it is not (.) in-in a funny way it does not feel very psychiatric, it 
does not feel very big and sort’f official. 
I:  Yeah. 
R1:   Um, it seems quite a kind way to speak to a person .hh, you know if you can introduce 
the term and you can say to them, this may be, perh:aps what you are experience and 
perhaps, you know, we can say we don’t know a lot about it, or we can say, we know 
enough about it to give you some he:lp. 
 
In the above Extract respondent 1 alludes to the suggestion that psychiatric, 
medicalised terminology are ‘big’ and ‘official’, by stating that he feels madness is the 
contrary.  The disarming effects of madness are highlighted with this new discourse of 
equalising and healing.  This particular use of madness positions the mental health 
professional on a more equal footing to the patient.  Indeed the term patient transitions to 
‘person’ in these past few extracts.  The holders of the ‘big and ‘official’ psychiatric 
terminology appear to admit limits to their knowledge by introducing madness as something 
that can be understood.  The power divide remains unequal in this Extract, as the suggestion 
that the mental health professional know ‘enough’ about this madness is still present.  
However, this ‘knowledge’ is framed as limited in itself and serves to help the ‘person’.  The 
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use of more psychiatric terminology is framed in a way that it is something that a person, in 
role of a patient, is given by the mental health profession, and they cannot do anything to get 
rid of it.  However, even for some that have been given a psychiatric title that others translate 
as madness, the consequences can also be something positive and useful for the person who 
has been deemed mad: 
 
3.5.2  The gift of madness: 
Extract 39 <lines 3675-3693>  
GR4: My family still ha:ve tha:t.  They sti::ll (.) >have no< contact at  all: apart from– 
my Mum and Dad find it very har::d to accept that  their daughter's got mental health 
problems, (.) >so we just don't talk about it<.  But my chil:dren (.) on the other han:d– 
it's KIND OF– when you say MADNESS to ME::– (0.1) PERSONALLY for ME:: it-
it's been the biggest gift in my life. 
I: O:ka:y? 
GR4: Becaus::e it's changed the way I look at peopl:e.  I've never::– if  someone is: 
different to me (.) it doesn't mean that they're not nor:mal, 
I: Yeah. 
GR4: We're just all different people.  >But it's< been a GIFT for me because my children 
have grow:n up (.) >and I've had< custody of them al:ways.  They've bee:n to (name 
removed), they've bee:n in the da:y  
GR4: ..hospital- they've seen all different people, >so they are< so: open  minded and so– 
they don't see a difference betwee:n (.) what other  people see as normal and 
abnormal. 
I: Yeah. 
GR4: So for ME:: it's bee::n >a gift<. 
 
The extract above is different to the previous extract 37, from respondent 1 in that the 
respondent (GR4) is talking about the effects of being labelled in a psychiatric, traditional 
way, that is then translate by others as ‘madness’.  Speaking as a survivor, the respondent 
challenges the personal meaning for herself and the ‘contagious’ consequences.  GR3 is able 
to shift the prevailing discourse of negativity/stigma, and allow it to re-dress how she sees 
others.  The ‘madness’ that her parents apparently find hard to accept, is able to be re-cast, as 
neither normal nor abnormal.  This consequence is also ‘contagious’ for her children who 
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apparently have the same ‘open’ attitude towards people who would otherwise be see as one 
or the other – normal or abnormal. 
There are numerous Extracts repeated attempts by the respondents, particularly in 
the group setting to re-position madness in creative people (Extract 40) as a source of their 
creative flair:  
 
Extract 40 <lines 4019-4032> 
GR2: >I JUST THINK<– well again I go back to eccentric, different,  .hhHIGHLY 
creative people.  There are many people in the acting profession, there are many 
people I know >with mental health issues::< who can paint, write, se::w, (.) all the 
creative things you can think of, (.) DA:NC:E. (.) ALL of which is very therapeutic.  
Take good pictures.  YOU NAME IT, and one can go to cla:sses and progress with 
that (.) and that is therapeutic. (0.1) I-I think  >probably< with-out the so: call::ed 
>mad people< or >whatever label you’re going to sa::y<, (.) the world would be a 
dreary dull place. 
 (.) 
I: It sounds there as though- if it's sold?, in the right wa:y?- then actually in that way it's 
almost desirable, 
GR1: YES, EXACTLY. 
 
This differs from the idea that someone has chosen to have this term identify them.  
The respondent suggests that madness could be the source of their talent.  However, as can be 
seen in the above transcript Extract 40, this view is disputed.  Here the respondent (GR2) not 
only attempts to position people in the creative industry as having a label such as madness as 
part of them, but fights to position them as different from how they are currently seen.  This 
is demonstrated in repeated emphasis in GR2’s accounts of people in this industry as ‘highly’ 
creative, capable of ‘YOU NAME IT’, perhaps meaning a number of different talents which 
she goes onto state (as opposed to suggest) include those that are therapeutic, meaningful and 
important (at a societal level). 
The temporary de-emphasis of terms like ‘madness’, ‘mental health’ or ‘any other 
label’ through discursive manoeuvre of quicker speech ensured the main point received the 
most attention.  These terms appear to be synonymous with one-another in this particular 
statement but the respondent does not impose a judgement on whether this is a good or bad 
trait to have, but rather implies that people who have these traits are talented.    
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My own response in Extract 40 appears out of synch with this, going further to suggest that it 
is something good, something to be desired if ‘sold’ in the right way.  Respondent GR2 
appears to do a good job of ‘selling’ this idea to me.  My own statement appeared to provide 
a ‘pitch’ to the group from my own understanding of GR2’s initial ‘sell’.  My pitch initially 
appeared to gather some consensus from some of the group, however, not by all: 
Extract 41 <lines 4033-4042> 
I: ..you kno:w, for someone to be highly creative, highly – you: know,- if [it's framed] in 
the right way. 
GR3:    [Ye::ah, ah::] So long as you don't take it >so far as to say< you  have to be, um, 
mad to be creative.  It's just that some creative people are mad– or >whatever you 
want to call it<– (.) um >but it's not essential< to creativity to be mad. 
GR2: It’s be INTERESTING to know what the percentages ar::e. 
GR3: Probably actually if you think about it probably not– not very much– maybe slightly 
more crazy people are creative than non-crazy people (.) but I doubt if there's a hu:ge 
difference actually. 
 
However, overall, the respondent GR3 held his position as the expert over all other 
parties.  The particular discursive manoeuvres employed appeared to be boosted by other 
external factors not noted on the transcript, such as note taking, which no other party did.  
The theme of specific discursive resources used such as ‘probably’ then ‘actually’ he 
successfully orientates his position as the expert/skeptic, against the voices of curiosity being 
encouraged by the rest of the group, including myself.  Whilst I attempted to encourage what 
I understood to be a possibility for positivity from the other respondents, the action 
orientation of GR3’s discourse served to disqualify my own curious positioning.  However, 
attempts to rebel came in through the ranks as the other members used raised tones coupled 
with words like ‘interesting’, which had the effect of a rebuttal from GR3’s expert discourse.  
The overall effect was that the emerging discourse of madness as being the source of positive 
and meaningful creativity was quashed.  In a way, the dynamic of this particular discursive 
dance resulted in a scene where the suggestion of madness as a positive, was ‘deemed mad’, 
and ‘reason’ was brought in to keep these ideas from becoming too far from reality.   
However, this opinion changes whenever the speaker of the term madness is changed 
to that of mental health ‘peer’. In the Extract below, GR3 struggles to find the correct term to 
emphasize the meaning and function of the term madness when used by mental health 
sufferers – peers.  He disqualifies my suggestion that the meaning is different when said by a 
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mental health peer compared with ‘other people’.  The Extract follows a statement from 
another group respondent that compared the use (or misuse) of mental health terms in the 
media with that of racial terms.  The respondent GR3 deflects my own suggestion, adding 
that the ‘meaning’ might be the same, and foreground the importance of who uses the terms.  
His suggestion that ‘mentally ill people’ use it and ‘it’s jocular’ is seen in the discourses of 
other respondents, though only when it is ‘meant’ in the ‘light-way’.  GR3 asserts that the 
meaning here remains the same and that for a mental health peer to use it enables a ‘jocular’ 
function, where ‘other people’ use the term, perhaps indicated media due to the preceding 
comments, though is not clarified as who the limits of ‘other’s are here.  GR3’s discursive 
position of expert then allows him, after support from his peers (e.g. GR2) to classify the use 
of madness by these ‘others’ as ‘less acceptable’: 
Extract 42 <lines 3806-3816> 
I: That is:– it's a REALLY big thing, because that way you're saying– so if it's 
something::g you said, someone that >has a mental health<  problem, (.) if they're 
saying these words then THAT means it’s >something very different< to anyone else 
using them. 
GR3: Erm, it may MEAN the same thing but it's not– it's not, i-it’s not  em: (.) 
>accusatory< or-or em– >trying to think of the right word<  I’m trying to think of- but 
if >mentally ill people use it about  themselves< it's jocular, 
GR2: YEA::H. 
GR3: ..whereas if OTHER people use it it's normally more sinister  
GR2: Yeah. 
GR3: ..and less (.) acceptable >in that respect<. 
 
As mentioned, the conversation leading up to that point surrounded media usage of 
mental health terminology.  The direction assumed to be taken by the media, as per the 
assertion of the group respondents, was to use terms that could possibly describe mental 
health problems in a person, though used in a flippant, careless way.  Here the term ‘bonkers’ 
is discussed: 
Extract 43 <3783-3791> 
I: ..and it was seen in a controversial way at the ti:me but then::- what does that term 
even mean? 
GR2: Well “NUTTERS” and “all sorts” and “PSYCHO:”, and (.) ALL OF THAT is very 
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wron::g. (.) No disrespect, you wouldn't be able to put “NIGGER”  in em:: [the paper 
or a RACIST REMARK OF ANY SORT.] 
GR3: [Well I was just going to say in a way] it's the kind of equivalent of,  
GR2: IT IS as ba::d. 
GR3: ..black people using nigger.  Because if you ARE::– if you DO >suffer from mental 
illness< you don't mind calling yourself “bonkers” or-or  – but you don't want other 
people calling it. 
 
In Extract 43 an accusation of mental health terminology being used in a flippant way 
is suggested by GR2.  This frames the use of mad-words in a careless, reckless manner, rather 
than a ‘light’, jovial usage of ‘mental health terminology’ as seen previously.  The tone of 
GR2 also suggests a personal attack and a sense of victimhood through discrimination.  Her 
speaking role switches to that of a victim, defending her rights as the discriminated against.  
This is taken further when she compares strong racially sensitive words that are no longer 
allowed to be used in the same way in the media.  
GR3 asserts that the self-use of these words would change the function of this 
discourse to have a different effect, just as it has with racial terms.  Respondent GR2 begins 
to suggest that the use of these types of mental health terminology are not seen as equivalent 
to racial terms in the media currently.  What she later calls ‘mentalism’ appears to be the 
attempt to begin to show that the (mis)use of such terminology should be seen as mental 
health’s equivalent to racism: 
Extract 44 <3838-3850> 
GR2: AND YOU'RE NOT ALLOW:ED TO BE RACIST OR SEXIST, so WHY SHOULD 
YOU BE ALLOWED TO BE::– >WELL LET'S MAKE A WORD UP!< 
GR4: Prejudiced.= 
GR2: =Mentalist. 
GR3:  Yeah. 
I: Ye:ah. 
GR2: You kno:w? (.) And they DO IT IN THE PAPER and I think, “That's wrong.” 
GR3: Yeah.- And I THINK probably– I mean times are changing and-and I think (.) in time 
>probably not< (.) all that many years it will become (.) not-acceptable to use sort of 
– >if you like< ‘mentalist’ terminology. 
GR2: OH: I ho:pe so::. ((breathy, soft tone)) 
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At the end of the conversation segment, the respondent GR2 continues her emphasis 
on of the victim-protester role, with the emphasis on ‘hope’ indicating that GR3’s preceding 
comment would be favourable though without certainty.  The direction of GR3’s comment 
asserts that there is a change in the current status of public attitude towards acceptable mental 
health terminology.  It this way he frames GR2’s ‘mentalist’ as a construct that is likely to 
come into existence and serve the similar function of the term racist.   
Previously in this analysis we can see that the function of the term madness could be 
seen in a different light, whether it be used by a fellow mental health sufferer and in some 
cases, if obviously used in a light, jovial manner.  It was even changed in retrospect to look at 
ways in which celebrities could be changing the derogatory discourse to that of the celebrity 
norm.  Again in retrospect, the idea that ‘creative people’ could have madness as the source 
of their ‘power’.   
In taking a similar social movement of adjusting a construction through the de-
construction and re-construction, the idea of re-claiming madness is another area that could 
be seen within the interviews.  This was not limited to retrospective ideas of how people (or 
their madness) can be re-positioned, or as a future hope for media’s misuse.  Instead terms 
such as madness were de-constructed with the idea they can be re-constructed to serve a 
different function in present and future contexts.      
3.5.3 Re-claiming Madness 
In the first instance where we see the re-framing of madness is through the use of 
existing repertoires.  Here respondent 1 changes the direction of focus outward, to society, 
and how they can be guilty of madness, though without been deemed mad:  
Extract 45 <lines 707-720> 
R1:  ‘Cause >it’s kind of< its very (.) it’s very ea::sy to see sort’f the word madness is 
being emm something that society can suffer from just as much as an individual (I 
guess), 
I:  Okay ((curious tone)) 
R1:  Eh and therefore your mo::re, your closer to to to people y’know, you don’t have to 
worry about the division of of your diagnosis, th’t  THAT creates stigma.  
I:  So:: it can be applied to society? (.) emm. 
R1:  Yeah definitely. [I think] 
I:       [Oka:y] Emm (.) >can you think about<, ways in which:: it can be in 
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society or talked about in society?= 
R1:  =Well we had the roits (.) didn’t we? And we saw a lot of people acting in a particular 
way mm and that was shear and utter madness ((whisper of last word)) 
 
Interestingly Respondent 1 choses to say madness is something ‘society can suffer 
from’, as can an individual.  However, the sense of suffering was not a discourse I was 
familiar with until he directed the focus to acts of mass rioting in London.  This linked with 
ideas about how behaviour can be seen as madness, seen earlier in the analysis.  However, for 
respondent 1, speaking from his role of mental health survivor, he asserts that the ‘division’ 
caused by the construction that madness is for the mental health creates the second construct 
of stigma, which has negative social functions.  It is not clear whether respondent 1 feels the 
rioters were experiencing madness, but the ability of the term to fit for this Extract in general 
society appears to be enough to dissolve the division of mental health versus society.  
Although ‘people acting in a particular way’ is deemed by the respondent as ‘madness’, this 
deeming describes their acts rather than them.  This differentiation is seen again on the last 
line where respondent 1 proclaims ‘that’ rather than them, was ‘shear and utter madness’.  
In the group forum, one of the respondents explained that the process of changing the 
meaning of madness is already occurring in India: 
 
Extract 46 <lines 3997-4004> 
GR1: So– but the Indian film industry is now using – promoting “bogal”  like we said it's 
eccentric or somebody  
I: Oh okay. 
GR2: Yeah:. 
GR1 ..you know like “bogal” like madness has now been related to the–  because to a lot of 
Indians the films is ALL THEY HAVE as an  escapism.  So the– a lot of 
people, a lot of actors, whatever, they  use this word now “BOGAL”! 
 
The respondent GR1 speaks as both a mental health peer but also as a member of 
another culture, therefore able to take a role of educator to the group.  As such, there is no 
ability for the other members to refute what he says.  In this Extract he declares that the 
Indian film industry is a source of mental diversion and perhaps therefore a relief to the other 
parts of their life.  This builds on a previous assertion that actors are ‘revered like gods’ (line 
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4015).  These ‘gods’ appear to have shifted the use of the term ‘bogal’, their equivalent to 
madness, to the eccentric, ‘mad hatter’ style noted by other respondents, but also as 
something to aim for, in the way GR2 attempts to re-position ‘creative people’ in general as 
holding as the source of their creative power.  
At first, there seems to be a similar pattern within the U.K., though with psychiatric 
terms. The respondents who identify as British suggest that there is a positive ‘spin’ on 
mental health with ‘celebrities’: 
 
Extract 47 <lines 3878-3886> 
GR3: ..it->it's a kind of< a badge of HONOUR now to be labelled manic  depressive when 
in fact it certainly isn't that, it's fa:r more of a problem. 
I: That seems like a new shift as well.   
GR2: Well YES::!- 
GR3: -It seems to me.  >I MAY BE WRONG< [but that's] what it... 
GR4:           [NO::] 
GR2:           [No no no::.] 
GR4: Especially the young POP STAR:S as well. 
 
Even here there is a discourse of  ‘us’ and ‘them’ with ‘celebrities’ and ‘non-
celebrities’, with a momentum of assumption spreading and being encourage amongst peers.  
Here the idea that having a diagnoses mental health issue could be seen as something to be 
proud of when a celebrity is judged as inaccurate by GR3.  His peers concur with this 
assumption at first.  However, he then adjusts this to suggest parts of this changing social 
discourse could be useful for mental health acceptability in general: 
 
Extract 48 <3855-3862>  
GR3: [The MORE people, artistic people or whatever], who are deemed as mentally ill, 
I: Yeah. 
GR3: ..then >the mor:e it becomes acceptable< to BE that way. 
GR4: It's fashionable [then.] 
GR3:    [Well yeah] actually yes. 
GR2:                          [Well one in fou:r.]  YES, >I believe< biPOLAR's  quite fashionable 
now. 
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When talking about terms that appear to have been or are currently seen as similar to 
madness, the group respondents looked toward a role seen as ‘mad’ in the past, perhaps 
similar to the bogal term re-claimed in Indian film now.  They explained the role of the court 
jester, and how the use of this term, could be seen and related to very differently: 
 
Extract 49 <lines 4125-4159> 
GR3: I think MAYBE (.) in earlier times people were more ACCEPTING of difference and 
of-of-of craziness than we are now. 
GR4: I agree.  I agree with that totally. 
GR3: We had the court jester (.) that was clever, >I think<, although they call them fool as 
well.  But I think th-they were talented.  I WASN'T  THERE. 
GR4: It doesn't SEEM so insulting 
GR3: NO. 
GR4: ..and negative. 
GR3: No, the term fool was not used derogatively at all until it was – it  was- 
GR2: -And the gooseberry [fool's very nice.] 
GR4:      [And the village id]iot was a kind of fun, 
GR3: Yeah! 
GR2: Yes. 
GR4: ..it was not– (0.2) I-I-I agree I think that it's ((mumbling))  
I: It seems that that person had a role ((questioning tone)) then? 
GR3: If you like, yes.   
I: And:: (.) it's odd to think em: (.) how– I mean WHAT image comes to  mind really 
when you think about that person in that role, erm. 
GR2: Well I think I PROBABLY WOULD FEEL quite maternal towards them. 
GR4: Yeah. 
GR2: Because if they have– are unable to be educated or whatever, only  reached to maybe 
the level of 11 or 12::, you would WANT TO care for  them and look after them 
if you had any empathy or caring feelings. 
I: And there seems to be there, it's easy to em:: RELATE to that person?  >It sounds 
like you're saying< there's something there that you would  understand and want to – 
in that sense you're saying look after them. 
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GR2: Child-like. 
GR4: And ACCEPT them. 
GR2: Yes, and ACCEPT. 
GR3: ACCEPT I think is the word, isn't it? 
GR2: I don't have a problem accepting. 
 
In this longer extract, GR3, under his expert subject positioning, explains that social 
reactions to ‘difference’ and ‘craziness’, was different in the past, relating this to the Extract 
of the court jester.  Without any encouragement, this proposal was immediately verified and 
accepted by his peer GR4.  The way in which GR4 positions the role of this jester appear to 
be very similar to how GR2 positions individuals in creative industries nowadays.  Being 
about to inhabit a position of ‘clever’ whilst being called a ‘fool’ seems to foreground their 
‘talent’ as their identifying feature.  Looking towards this past, the term ‘fool’ is removed 
from derogatory function also.    
My reaction suggested a role within society, though only partially validated by GR3.  
Instead, looking for their reaction this retro-constructed character GR2 was able to provide an 
emotional reaction, framed as maternal.  GR2 created a bigger construction around this 
imagined character to explain her maternal reaction.   
In lines 4152-4155 my attempt to make a hypothesis can be seen.  This served to offer 
a different discourse, breaking down disconnection and distancing from ‘difference’ towards 
the opposite: a person who can be related to and whom one would want to connect with.  This 
resulted in a general consensus amongst the group that had a function of ‘acceptance’.  GR3 
concurred that ‘accept’ was the right word and his peer affirmed that the social function of 
‘accepting’ is something she would be willing to do. 
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Chapter 4 - Discussion 
 This chapter has a number of objectives to: 1) recall the original aim of the study and 
then to summarise and draw initial conclusions from the analysis; 2) locate discourses within 
current research debates and relate them back to the current finding; 3)  outline implications 
of the current study on research and clinical application; 4) provide a critique of the current 
study; and 5) conclude with reflections on my epistemological/methodological position post-
research will then conclude the chapter.   
4.1 Aim of current study 
 The aim of this research study, as outlined in the earlier chapters, was to explore the 
various constructions of the term madness for mental health service users, and the perceived 
consequences of various discourses on madness.  The analysis of the interview data provides 
some initial insight into the ways in which madness can be perceived and used within 
different contexts (e.g. in the media, amongst friends/family, in professional use). 
4.2 Identity parade: Reviewing the identities used 
 As mentioned in the analysis chapter, the ways in which the respondents positioned 
themselves appeared to influence what discursive manoeuvres were then available to them.  
The use of these different voices serves to achieve different social actions.  Before 
summarising the findings from the analysis, it is therefore pertinent to explicate the different 
identities, or the 'speaking from' positions that allowed the constructions of the term madness 
to be conversed in particular ways.   
There were many different subjective identities used throughout the analysis.  No one 
participant identified themselves ‘as a Mad Person’.  However, there was strong support for 
the idea that a person could be seen or ‘labelled as mad’.  The identities chosen generally 
included: the mental health patient, a member of general society or an expert/survivor of the 
mental health societal experience.  Within the identity of the mental health patient, 
respondents varied as to whether they could talk ‘with knowledge’ or ‘without knowledge’ of 
what madness means.  Interestingly, the only respondent who spoke of a ‘true meaning of 
madness’ was someone who hesitantly identified himself as a mental health patient but also 
as someone ‘without knowledge’ of this thing called madness.  The subject positions, as they 
are otherwise known, can be more or less divided into talk from the view of the 'voice of 
reason' ('normal' member of the public, and/or a general health patient) or the 'voice of 
unreason' (mental health service user, or 'the other', the mad), as Foucault (1965) and his 
successors describe. The different identities that the respondents adopted appeared to serve a 
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number of functions:1) Eliminating self from madness; 2) Being able to talk as 'a normal'; 3) 
Talking as a ‘person’ who is externally labelled as mad but whose opinion is not only valid, 
but an expert by means of being a veteran.   
4.2.1 Identity parade: The Unknower.   
Some respondents made attempts to distance themselves from a label of mental 
illness, despite being told they have a mental health diagnosis.  In this case, their diagnosis 
was shifted towards something ‘neutral’; a medical description.  As seen in the analysis, this 
is most obvious with respondent 2 in the individual interviews.  As a result, his ideas on 
madness were positioned as ‘guesswork’, stemming from media replications and ideas of 
asylum days, rather than something that he could safely draw upon from his own subjective 
position.  This may replicate what Foucault (1979) terms ‘internalization’, whereby a 
person’s viewpoint is subjectively believed to come from themselves but is the internal 
reproduction of ideas imported from those in positions of power/authority, in this case, the 
media.  Furthermore, this respondent was insistent in evading any attempt to express opinion 
about ‘the voice of reason’, the perceived voice of mental health professionals.  This may 
have caused a degree of censorship in his responses, perhaps due to the researcher’s position 
within the mental health field or for reasons of power, in the sense described by Foucault 
(1977).  
However, the use of the phrases such as ‘I think, I THINK [sic] so, but I don’t know 
that’ established a means to avoid having personal knowledge of mental illness, therefore the 
internalization that was shared was limited media reproductions of madness.  This choice to 
position himself away from certain knowledge suggested that there was something to be 
known and positioned the researcher as the ‘expert’ on the meaning and use of mental health 
terminology.  However, this respondent later clarified that he felt the term ‘insane’ is the 
most powerful and active term used to describe someone with severe mental health problems 
from his own perspective.  Using this un-knower identity, wearing the ‘voice of reason’ hat, 
this respondent championed the idea that madness is also something neutral, flippant and 
non-offensive.  This will be explored further in the later parts of this chapter. 
4.2.2 Identity parade: From reason to (un)reason.   
The other identity used throughout both individual and group interviews was 
positioning oneself as someone who spoke through medicalised discourse.  This established 
an ‘y’know’ feature in which knowledge was presumed to be shared amongst speaker and 
listener (researcher included).  
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However, this also served to allow for stronger subject positions to be established, 
which enabled the speaker to show awareness of the ‘voice of reason’ discourse and 
challenge established constructions through an expert ‘voice of unreason’.  This expert came 
from personally gained knowledge through self-experience, or from a ‘veteran’, ‘survivor’ 
discourse at having been through the system and allowing the self to speak via ‘reason’ or 
‘unreason’ identities in order to express diverse views on madness.  Through the use of this 
dual identity, more 'established' general discourses were able to be challenged and the 
researcher was recruited ‘into the fold’. 
4.2.3 How do these identities identify madness?   
The analysis indicates a number of discursive positions available when the term 
madness is explored by mental health service users.  Overarching these positions, the term 
madness itself was placed within a continuum of similar words (e.g. crazy, insane, abnormal, 
bonkers, and criminally insane).  The particular ordering of terms in this continuum varied 
from person to person and therefore although it is of interest that some words appear to be 
more mad than others, we cannot say they are representative constructions for the group and 
therefore cannot place particular emphasis on any word over madness.  However, the analysis 
did indicate that for some respondents, madness, was not the maddest a person can be.  In 
such cases insane or criminally insane was positioned as ‘the ultimate extreme’ of mental un-
wellness.  The term madness was however actively held within the language of the 
respondents.  The constructions and function of those constructions showed variation in their 
meaning, intention and consequence for the speaker and the receiver. 
4.3 Constructions of madness 
Through the use of different identities, the analysis can be summarized by the 
following broad discourses:  
 The analysis chapter indicates that the term ‘madness’ can be placed within a 
continuum of similar terminology such as insane or crazy but the use of the term has varied 
functions: 1) Flippant non-offensive or labelling term; 2) Labelling and harmful, with or 
without intention to do so; 3) An accurate description of ‘an experience’ and; 4) Something 
labelling but positive, indicating creativity and uniqueness. 
Flippant Madness.  The first function of 'madness' was outlined as something that 
does not carry any offensive weight.  Instead, it was positioned as a phrase used in a light-
minded manner to describe a personality trait of someone, or as a phrase in language to 
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describe something ‘silly’.  The sense of difference is indicated but this difference (from the 
'normal') is within the boundaries of normality.  For one respondent in particular, the term 
madness is ‘so far away from mental illness, that it doesn’t really mean mental illness 
anymore.’  The 'accused' is therefore not excluded and the term can be used negatively 
(without intentional harm), or positively, to describe a positive difference from normality, 
though again, still within 'allowed boundaries'.  Through the use of madness constructed in 
this way, the term is not seen as labelling in the ‘branding’ sense but rather as a temporary 
label or a ‘bit of madness’.  Having ‘a bit’ appears acceptable to those who use the term, 
though there is variability in how it is received.  Therefore, despite intention, the end impact 
of the flippant use of madness may be injurious to those who are receiving this ‘bit’ of 
labelling. 
Harmful Madness.  However, from the counter-view, the analysis indicated that for 
some respondents, the term madness is both labelling and harmful no matter what the 
intention of the speaker was originally.  Furthermore, the speaker who inflicted this 
intentional or unintentional harm could be from either a mental health peer or by a member of 
general society.  This negative construction of madness was positioned as negative when used 
to talk about an individual or an individual’s behaviour, or even when used to describe an 
action or trait of the self.  The analysis suggests that the ‘deemers of madness’ will always 
associate madness with something ‘other’ and negative, therefore whether a person speaks 
about someone else or themselves, they are positioning the receiver of the term as the ‘other’.  
Experience of Madness.  Another way in which madness was perceived was as 'an 
experience'.  Having 'an experience' of madness was not vocalised by all the respondents, 
though when it was, it fitted with what mental health professionals would otherwise term a 
'psychotic episode'. This experience was felt to be temporary when talked about following an 
'episode', which was seen as reassuring, rather than labelling.  For the particular respondent 
who identified with madness being used by the mental health professional to explore or 
suggest an experience, it was felt that this term was accurate, 'closer to the bone' and more 
useful that psychiatric terminology which was felt to be more permanent - a branding that 
does not fade with time.  This experience was thought to be something that, when correctly 
acknowledged through the use of the term madness, could be relieving and understood.  
There was also a temporality or fleeting nature to the term positioned in this way, which ran 
contrary to the more diagnostic terms which were understood fully by ‘the expert’ and not by 
the receiver, and perceived as neither ‘removable’ or ‘temporary’. 
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Madness as a ‘positive’.  Lastly, madness was positioned as something positive.  This 
varied in three ways:  1) As a positive way of re-constructing ideas of both madness and 
normality, which can have a contagious effect on those around; 2) As a way to self-label in a 
positive way 3) As a way to positively re-label madness (or similar terms) for others.   
 The first two variations came from a respondent in the group interview who found 
that after being seen by a psychiatrist, she was then positioned by her family as ‘a mad 
person’.  However, she was able to the re-construct the meaning for herself and for her 
children, who then felt that having experienced the reality of psychiatric services, their ideas 
of normality and abnormality broke down – people became people again.  Despite the rest of 
her family continuing to position her as mad and ‘contagious’, her own view of madness was 
re-constructed. 
The last identified variation was seen in the group interview.  The way in which this 
positive re-branding was actioned differed between respondents.  On the one hand, 
respondents were able to talk about celebrities and those in creative fields and re-construct 
their positive traits as something stemming from madness.  Overall this was found to be 
‘debatable’ for other respondents, although the ideas of looking back at characters of the past, 
such as a court jester, and reframing them as clever and talented individuals.  They added that 
this character had perhaps a child-like quality, which enabled them to be relatable somehow, 
leaving some respondents to re-position their imagined reaction towards them as maternal.  
This invited respondents to re-frame their subject position as one that encouraged 
‘acceptance’.  Another perspective was relayed by a group respondent who explained that in 
India, the term ‘Bogal’ has been reclaimed to celebrate uniqueness and difference, which has 
been absorbed as a positive trait in film stars, who are apparently revered as gods in India.  
Therefore, in this case, the reclaiming has already begun and re-sold as desirable for ‘normal 
society’. 
4.4 Consequences: Who can wear madness and get away with it? 
One of the common associations of madness across the respondents was with the 
identity of 'The Mad Hatter' from Alice in Wonderland.  This connection appeared to serve a 
number of purposes for those who used the term.  Firstly, the breadth of its recognition meant 
that respondents were able to talk about the term and have it recognised.  This also enabled 
them to be seen as speaking from 'the voice of reason', the majority side of society, looking 
objectively at a construction that is light-hearted and inoffensive.  With the character being a 
part in a fictional tale, there seems to be some creativity allowed in how the character's mad 
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identity can be viewed by larger society.  In denouncing the character's actions as 'silly', 
respondents also manoeuvred the meaning of madness into 'silliness' as opposed to something 
relating to severe mental illness. 
 The use of the reference Mad Hatter allowed a use of language understood by all the 
potential players of the mad debate.  This would include people with experience of having a 
mental health problem, mental health professionals and the general public.  Although the 
character-term served as an example of 'light' usage, it also creates an image that anyone can 
be familiar with, even without having contact with someone who could be described as 'mad'. 
The character image that appears to be recognised by all the respondents then goes further, to 
be allowable to describe eccentric people in society.  With a comparison made to a famous 
film critic, one of the participants suggested that the image exuded by the individual was 
powerful and yet positive.  Although he described the critic as being 'feared' by the creative 
industry, an image of strength and empowerment was echoed in his recollection.  For the 
respondent, the label of 'mad' was conveniently sourced as stemming from an object - the 
'mad hats', she wore.  Interestingly, this somehow symbolised the wearers willingness to be 
seen as different and eccentric.  Being an object, this also perhaps enabled to wearer to drop 
the 'mad' label when it suited her.  Wearing the 'mad hats' would therefore show that the 
wearer wants the world to see them in a way they want to be seen.  Overall, although 
'different' and 'eccentric', the ability to choose how to be seen, even with madness attached, 
exudes an image of power, control, confidence and respect.  This self-labelling runs contrary 
to societal labels or statuses that are given or attributed to someone (see Goffman, 1963).  
This particular 'mad hatter' used the label of madness to control her image and to stay 'the 
right side of different'.  That is to say, she remained within the border of normal society, but 
projected an image of the 'allowed' parts of what it is to be seen as 'mad'.    
4.5 Maddening ideas of ‘normality’ 
Overall the analysis of the individual interviews from the respondents indicated 
something unexpected – a stronger construction for ‘normality’ than madness.  The ominous 
‘true meaning of madness’ was alluded to, in order to identify someone with severe mental 
health difficulties, though an actual image of what this might look like remained elusive.  
Positioning madness as an experience appeared to be the strongest connection to a 
construction of the term itself rather than a construction of what it is not.  However, this 
frame of reference was voiced following a personal experience of such a phenomenon - an 
experience - but then creating an imagined scenario in which it would have been used 
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between the respondent and a psychiatrist or mental health professional.  Therefore, ideas 
around how ‘actual madness’ can be talked about in a mental health setting were only 
enabled through a ‘survivor’ or ‘veteran’ subject position.  Without this, and despite madness 
‘sticking around’ in language, the clearest image of what madness might be is from media 
representations or from a much more defined societal identification of what it is not – 
normality.  
4.5.1 What do we know of normality?   
Returning to the ideas of French philosopher Foucault, we have some possible insight 
into the introduction of what can be seen as ‘normal’.  In his story of the origins of medicine, 
titled 'The Birth of the Clinic', Foucault asserts that the original role of medicine was not as it 
is today.  Rather that conceiving ideas ‘health’ against a single standard against which one 
can be measured, Foucault suggests that early medicine’s focus was in terms of a harmonious 
functioning of the individual, and that the role of medicine was to provide ‘techniques for 
curing ills’ (Foucault, 1976, p.34).  In the later 18th Century, Foucault states that medicine 
began to fashion ideas around the ‘healthy man’, by study of ‘the non-sick man’ and a 
definition of ‘the model man’ (Foucault, 1976).  At this point medicine assumed a ‘normative 
posture’ by which advice around health and dictated standards of normality (including 
morality) for individuals and the society in which individuals live, became cemented in 
modern culture.  In the accounts given towards ideas of madness, such constructions of 
normality are so entrenched into society that what we may take to be natural, or understand as 
our own (what Foucault calls internalization), may in fact be disseminated from readily 
available powerful discourses from medicine, media and society.   Therefore, constructions of 
'normality' have been established for some time and the author of this social language appears 
to be medicine.  
More recently, according to Parker and colleagues notions of ‘health’ only continue to make 
sense when the idea of ‘sickness’ in constructed and compared against it.  In this way, Parker 
asserts that constructs of “insanity’, ‘illness’ and ‘abnormality” could not exist without their 
‘powerful partners (‘sanity’, ‘health’, or ‘normality’)’ (Parker et. al, 1995, p.4).  The analysis 
indicates that such ideas remain present in the discourses of the mental health service users 
interviewed.   
Within these discourses of normality came the idea of what constitutes madness as a 
counter-part to normality.  This was seen mostly in non-conformist behaviour but extended to 
a ‘state of mind’ by which a person would somehow know to be beyond the boundaries of 
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normality.  Who ‘a person’ would incorporate here was extended to those with and without 
mental health problems.  This implied sense of knowledge over this understanding of 
abnormal behaviour or state of mind was directed towards the researcher for confirmation by 
some of the respondents.  For other respondents, the action of directing this assertion towards 
the research appears to function as a self-confirmatory social acknowledgement (i.e. as 
members of society we all know this – we have access to a shared knowledge). Parker adds 
that these ideas should be ‘put under erasure’, by which he defines: to ‘question [a word’s] 
taken-for-granted meaning, to mark it as a problem to be challenged’ (Parker et al., 1995, 
p.4).  This idea encompasses the deconstructive goal of the current study. 
4.5.2 Madness: The deviant within us all?   
Much of the literature that discusses ideas of normality comes from sociology and 
parts of philosophy.  Within the former example, the work of Scheff (e.g. 1966) is widely 
recognised in sociological circles.  However, it does not appear to have branched out into 
psychology and certainly not into clinical practice.  The reason it is important to highlight this 
is because these theories are relevant to psychology and deconstructing these ideas could 
promote a positive social change.  Much of the early work on 'normality' has been limited in 
terms of its links to mental health and instead focussed on 'deviance' with regard to anti-social 
behaviour and criminality.  A brief look at the introductory chapter of this thesis highlights 
the overlap of 'deviance' with madness, especially with regard to nonconformist behaviour.  If 
historical ideas of madness created ideas of 'other' and a break from normality, then revisiting 
the ideas from this part of sociology is therefore also relevant to deconstructing ideas of 
madness and consequences thereof.  The overlap of theories of power from names familiar in 
psychology (e.g. Parker, Foucault, Szasz, Bentall) are present in sociology.  For instance, 
according to Becker (1963), studying the act of the individual is unimportant because 
'deviance' is simply rule breaking behaviour that is labelled deviant by persons in positions of 
power. This would overlap with psychiatry (inclusive of general society), otherwise known as 
the ‘voice of reason’ who are enabled to judge a rule break as behaviour outside of that which 
society 'allows'.  Indeed Becker (1963) describes rules as the reflection of certain social 
norms held by the majority of a society, whether formal or informal.  Therefore one does not 
have to be ‘an expert’ but knows the generally held ‘rules’ and are attuned to noticing ‘rule 
breaking’.  Importantly, this also includes ‘the self’ being aware of these rules:    
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) describes a Panopticon: a circular prison 
with a central tower that would allow for maximum observation of all the prisoners by a 
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warden.  Importantly the prisoners would act as if they were observed, even when they were 
not. This self-observation lends itself to the idea of internalisation, that observations and 
judgements of others are believed to be our own.  The idea of ‘discipline’ then ‘moves from 
something inflicted on others to something which becomes internalized and we move from 
regulation by others to self-regulation’ (Parker et al, 1995, p.60).  Therefore these societal 
norms are not just imposed by ‘the normals’ but within us all.  However, fear of breaking a 
rule just by having a human experience and reacting to that experience sounds a difficult 
burden to manage.  This may produce a self-stigma before an individual is ‘out’ to others. 
4.5.3 Stigma, Status, Other.   
The debate on the term ‘stigma’ can be sourced from Erving Goffman in his seminal 
1963 book where he defines it as ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting within a social 
interaction’ (Goffman, 1963, p.3).  Once having this ‘attribute’ a person is thought to be 
‘reduced…from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one’ (Goffman, 1963, p.3).  
Therefore, relating this to mental health, if a person feels they have this part within them they 
would understandably have reservation about sharing this with others.  In doing so they risk, 
what the respondents in the current study have described as madness – difference from what 
society expects or will allow.  As noted earlier, for one respondent, the act of being seen by a 
psychiatrist was enough to ‘fit the mould’ of madness in the view of their family.  Goffman 
also describes the same positioning of madness ‘by association’ as the respondent endured: 
‘to spread from the stigmatized individual to his/her close connections’ (Goffman, 1963, 
p.30).  In his later 1967 essay ‘The Stigmatized Self’, Goffman talks about the stigmatised 
person having a sense of being a normal person, ‘a human being’ as everyone else, though 
‘he may perceive, usually quite correctly, that whatever others profess, they do not really 
“accept” him and are not ready to make contact with him on “equal grounds”.’ (Goffman, 
Lemert & Branaman, 2008, p.75).  This may make one wonder how it is that anyone manages 
to access mental health services.     
This is very relevant today as it would undoubtedly have an effect on how people feel 
they can interact with others (including seeking help) when the idea of ‘a bit of madness’ 
surfaces within them.  In the current study, the term was also associated with heinous acts 
that ‘make the headlines’ and position the person’s mental health issue as the cause of their 
behaviour.  Labelling terms such as ‘pycho’ were also deemed synonymous with this aspect 
of madness.  This was noted in the introduction with regard to media and public perceptions 
of madness (e.g. Wessley, 2012). Overall, throughout the analysis, a strong construction of 
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madness (in this case as synonymous with mental health), was described as something 
‘essentially negative’ and break from ‘the norm’.  As this was described as a general view, 
rather than an ideal held specifically by those with mental health complaints, it indicates a 
degree of stereotyping of mental health terminology and those with an ‘attribute’ of a ‘mental 
health problem’.  This can be either a self-held attribute or one which is given to a person.   
Studies show that the assignment of negative attributions to these socially prominent 
differences (i.e., the perception that the differences or ‘otherness’ is undesirable) lead to 
separation.  According to Green and colleagues, separation occurs when the reactions of 
others to these differences lead to a pronounced sense of “otherness” or “felt stigma” (Green, 
Davis, Karshmer, Marsh, & Straight, 2005).  In these cases the individual's personal 
awareness that others are treating him or her differently due to some personal attribute is 
‘felt’, just as it was described by the respondent in the analysis. 
The analysis also indicates there are different ideas of what constitutes mental health, 
and for some, the action of being seen by a psychiatrist is enough to be tarred ‘mad’ by those 
around us.  Even in making an appointment to see a psychiatrist, the person is already ‘a 
patient’, speaking to ‘a specialist’.  Therefore how can one be able to talk on equal grounds.  
This links to Barrett’s (1996) assertion (outlined into introduction chapter) that patient’s 
narratives are only included as part of a diagnostic construction.  This reduces opportunity for 
equal talk in a number of ways: 1) the subjective position of feeling unequal inside the 
medical setting; 2) The discursive manoeuvre of voice being translated into ‘patient talk’ and 
transformed into a medical construction; 3) the ‘person’ being transformed into ‘patient’, 
which can equal a label of ‘mad’ for some members of ‘normal society’.      
Goffman is also cited for his work on ‘status’.  The most relevant area of status for the 
current study is the idea of a master status (Goffman, 1963).  This is generally depicted as a 
stigma or attribute to an individual that takes precedence over all other parts of their ascribed 
(or otherwise) identity.  Goffman related this to physical disability but also to those who may 
be discriminated against due to stigma.  In mental health, this would mean that an individual 
would first be seen as a ‘mental health patient’, or ‘mad’, and then as whoever, mother, 
father, employee.  This was reflected to impact on the person’s perception of ability to 
function in the ‘normal world’.  Worryingly, current changes in the clinical domain indicate 
that ‘the normal world’  is becoming increasingly harder to inhabit. 
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4.5.4 Normality crisis.   
This issue is more pressing than it may initially seem as the barriers of normality are 
shrinking.  What is 'allowed’ is changing.  In the newest addition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; APA, 2013), which was noted in the 
introductory chapter, there have been updates which have proved controversial for a number 
of reasons.  One example, which is representative of the type of changes decreed, is the 
adjustment of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD).  Previously, a person would be allowed 
‘diagnostic immunity’ if symptoms such as persistent low mood, loss of enjoyment and 
pleasure and disruption to everyday activity followed a recent bereavement.  However, the 
exception (or exemption) has now been removed.  Grief, much like many other human 
behaviours and previously ‘natural’ processes, are now subject to medical scrutiny – grief is 
mental illness/madness.  The latest edition has been received scathing criticism from a 
number of bodies including the British Psychological Society, who issued an official 
response to the DSM-5, noting the increasing medicalization of normal human responses and 
behaviours and recommended a rejection of a ‘top-down’, ‘diagnostic fit’ approach (BPS, 
2011).  As Winnicot famously described: 
The capacity to become depressed, to have a reactive depression, to mourn loss, is something 
that is not inborn nor is it an illness; it comes as an achievement of healthy emotional growth 
... the fact is that life itself is difficult ... probably the greatest suffering in the human world is 
the suffering of normal or healthy or mature persons ... this is not generally recognized. 
Winnicot (1988, p.149) 
More recently, Harper (2013) describes the current dilemma faced when a person 
weighs up whether to access services or not.  This adds to the consequences self-stigma as 
‘many people in distress and their relatives seem to feel that without diagnosis, they will, in 
some way, be “blamed” or seen as morally responsible for their distress. That a moral 
discourse is so culturally available as an alternative to a discourse of psychiatric diagnosis 
hints at its powerful social functions’ (Harper, 2013, p. 80). Therefore a moral discourse 
exists at a societal level that created a push and pull of responsibility.  Harper adds that if we 
are to move away from a diagnostic discourse, we need to consider how we address these 
social functions (Harper, 2013).  If these discourses are held at a societal level it may be that 
some of the constructions (and consequences thereof) can be located within a more general 
medium – the media.  
 110 
4.6 Locating constructions of madness: Media  
As noted earlier in this chapter, the analysis also indicated that the use of the term 
‘madness’ is not always flippant.  That is to say, it can be both intentionally used to indicate 
something unintentionally negative but with the consequence of being potentially offensive.  
Therefore despite there being variety in terms of how madness can be intentionally used by a 
person, it is evident that the influence of the media and it’s chosen style of wording is not 
acceptable those with mental health concerns.  The analysis points to common themes 
depicted in media headlines where a person who has committed a serious crime and has a 
mental health problem will ‘make the front page’, and a media-chosen synonym for mental 
health is used, often with 'mad', 'insane', 'bonkers', 'psycho' or 'nutter' being used 
interchangeably.  According to the respondents of this study, these terms are not synonymous 
and not acceptable.   
According to Philo (1994), media items that link ‘mental illness’ and ‘violence’’ 
received front page coverage whereas the contrasting ‘sympathetic’ positioning (such as 
health columns or problem pages) received back-page treatment.  Philo (1994) found that the 
‘violence to others’ category of coverage outweighed the ‘sympathetic’ alter by a ratio of 4 to 
1.  In the current study, the effect of such careless usage was reported as a temporary yet 
powerful increase in the social stigma of mental health.  Specifically, respondents reported 
that although the person being written about may have a completely different diagnosis, the 
effect is nonetheless like ‘a torch shone on anyone with mental health problems’.  Indeed 
Philo (1994) argues that media presentations are also ‘a very powerful influence on beliefs 
about the nature of mental illness’ (Philo, 1994, p. 173), and worryingly suggests that this 
influence can override an individual’s personal experience.  This ability to override could 
have influenced the interpretative repertoires used by the respondents and thus the 
information.  The emotional impact of shame and anger, discussed by Scheff (1999) as a 
consequence of labelling could be felt in the tone of the respondents when discussing this 
particular social phenomenon.     
 Some of the terminology noted in the introduction chapter are present in the 
interviews.  Nairn’s (2007) reports of media depictions of madness indicated an overlap with 
the respondents’ own constructions.  Firstly, the idea that someone would be ‘out of control’ 
is seen in the reports of murderers who have mental health issues. For one respondent, a 
person who is ‘criminally insane’ conjures an image of someone who has no control 
whatsoever.  According to the respondents, the focus of the media narrative is that the mental 
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illness is the cause of the terrible acts, but that the person being talked about becomes the 
label.  The analysis indicates that there is still is a mis-understanding of someone with mental 
health problems as someone who is mad.  The additional identical citing of ‘possession’ as a 
description of someone with a mental health difficulty also mirrors Nairn's (2007) depictions. 
These examples were assumed to be both negative and stemming from a lack of knowledge 
over mental health and how to talk about people with mental health concerns.  These suggest 
that media depictions of madness and mental health may relate to constructions that continue 
to exist in the public psyche.  Furthermore, if Nairn (2007) is correct in his suggestion that 
society relies upon recycled vocabulary, metaphors and narrative fragments (not just those 
seen in the media), the findings from this study indicate that this general discourse exists and 
that it will persist.    
 Another construction that was identified from the analysis was the idea of someone 
with a mental health problem being related to as contagious.  Within this negative context, 
this association of contagion apparently spread to those who surrounded the identified person.  
The idea of contagion is part of a wider discourse which Parker and colleagues have reported 
(Parker et. al, 1995).  In their statements, they suggest that this produces a ‘demonising’ 
effect, positioning the individual as ‘the other’ and therefore speaking from the voice of 
unreason. 
Barrett (1996) conversely describes the ability of clinicians to use ‘lay’ language in 
determining official diagnoses, describing patient’s behaviour as ‘odd’ and using lay 
language to create a bridge to discuss mental health symptomology (e.g. they are ‘settled’).  
This shows a mutual understanding of lay constructions of madness that not only are both 
parties aware of but both are able to make use of. 
4.7 Reclaiming: Madness or Normality? 
As noted in the introduction, Thomas Scheff has been cited as the main figure in the 
debate of Labelling Theory.  In his recent work Scheff (2010a) appears to mirror some of the 
narratives proclaimed in the current study.  He states that 'eccentricity and unconventionality 
may be labelled as mental illness' (Scheff, 2010a, p. 232).  Furthermore, he goes on to 
support the position taken by the respondent GR3 in suggesting that 'unconventiality is 
accompanied by a high level of eccentricity' (Scheff, 2010a, p.232). As mentioned earlier, 
respondent (GR1) outlined the changes occurring in India, where the term Bogal (the 
equivalent to madness) has been reclaimed by the film industry and is now championed as a 
positive trait of difference through eccentricity.  On the surface, this does not appear to have 
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taken place in the UK at a recognised level.  However, the Mad Pride movement described in 
the introduction (see Curtis et al., 2000) shows that some re-claiming of the term for these 
purposes may be gaining ground.  If this the case, where does this leave the traditional debate 
of labelling theory? 
 In recent work, Scheff (2010b) explains that he feels the ideals of labelling theory 
failed.  He hoped that initially labelling theory could provide a social alternative to the 
medical model.  However, Scheff states that the reach of the theory became limited to 
sociology, and did not extend to the public domain it was meant to upon impact.  However 
the language that Scheff uses does appear to correspond to similar interpretive repertoires 
used by the respondents of the current study.  In particular, the idea that anything outside 
‘societal norms’ positions a person as ‘abnormal’, within the realms of madness provides an 
overlap of labelling theory and discourses seen in this current context.  With a quick glance at 
some of the quotes from the respondents, it can be seen that a construction of ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ is persistent.  In not thinking or behaving in a way that ‘society expects’ respondents 
felt that madness has come to embody this labelling or positioning – you are one or the other.  
The idea that this is a construction, or a recycled assumption on societal views is also present.  
Therefore the psycho-social discourse debated by Scheff may indeed have penetrated into 
some general awareness.  However, the ability to choose which side of the divide to position 
oneself appears to lie with those on the more desirable end – normal society. 
 The current study indicates that ideas of normality may be clearer in the mind-set of 
society than madness.  Therefore, this provides an opportunity to create a debate or ‘put 
under erasure’ (Parker et al., 1995) both normality and madness.  One could tentatively infer 
that madness has been constructed to mean little more than ‘opposite to normal’ and therefore 
there is less to deconstruct than there is to‘re-construct’. 
4.8 Implications of the findings 
 The current study provides some initial insight into the constructions of the term 
madness held by a small group of service users.  Whilst there appear to be differing views on 
what the term has come to mean, there is an indication that there are four different types of 
usage of the word.  At this point in the discussion these ideas will be re-stated for summation: 
1) Flippant non-offensive or labelling term; 2) Labelling and harmful, with or without 
intention to do so; 3) An accurate description of ‘an experience’; and 4) Something labelling 
but positive, indicating creativity and uniqueness.  Each of these areas can be helpful in 
dismantling currently held positions held on the term madness.   
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From a clinical point of view, the use of the term, and similar terms should be 
considered from both a professional and user perspective.  This is because the current study 
suggests that the source of knowledge related to the term is the same for everyone, from 
literature, media and cultural/familial dissemination.  The study also provides a window into 
the positive use of the term as used in individual professional-client environments. Instead of 
the sole use and explanation of psychiatric diagnosis to fit the person (or person’s) symptoms, 
the additional or alternative use of the term madness to identify an experience the person may 
have gone through is available.  If building on Barrett’s (1996) observation of using lay and 
clinical terminology to bridge understanding, this would indicate something to which patients 
could relate and understand more easily than clinical terms.   
The analysis also revealed that if used in this way, it would indicate a temporality for 
this experience, a passing phase.  Indeed Parker and colleagues advise that ‘we have to 
connect language with the institutions in which it is used’ (Parker et. al, 1995, p.4).  
However, they add that ‘we need some account of the ‘irrational’ or the ‘unreasonable’ in 
human experience which language excludes.  It excludes what it deems to be irrational at the 
very moment it constructs it’ (ibid).  Therefore this allowance of language should be two-
way.  Rose (2009) on the other hand favours increasing acceptance rather than ‘restrictive 
normalisation’.  In this way, Rose would allow those with experiences of distress to be able to 
‘come out’ as coined by the LGBT community. Scheff (2010b) highlights the problems with 
automatic labelling (with stigma consequences) and normalising (with enabling 
consequences) and instead recommends discourse that re-connects the person as a normal 
member of society, which can occur through non-clinical conversation.  However, 
normalising may be difficult for professionals to relay when talking about (or around) 
psychosis.   Instead a movement towards ‘acceptance’ in the way Rose (2009) advocates may 
help normalizing conversation.   
Another concept that is currently used in mental health services is ‘recovery’.  Rufus 
May, a Clinical Psychologist who has experienced and been treated for schizophrenia in the 
past, has discussed the importance of different factors in seeing ‘recovery’ (May, 2014).  
Instead of using psychiatric diagnoses, May describes using 'individualised mad experiences' 
and 'individualised labels' rather than macro labels that create assumed individual and societal 
repercussions - usually of failure and permanence.  These macro labels are felt to hinder the 
process of recovery and add to the real-world consequences of mental distress (stigma, 
unemployment, poor housing, loss of rights etc.).  May identifies these consequencial after-
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effects as being more difficult than recovery from the distress and confusion itself. (May, 
2014, p.2).   
Therefore, in liaising with other professionals, psychologists may be able to support 
recovery for the service user, not just from clinical symptoms.  The use of clinical language is 
important in teams as well as with patients. This study indicates the use of the term ‘mad’ to 
describe an experience may be useful (as suggested by one respondent).  However, the de-
construction of terms and the use of service user’s language if it includes terms such as 
madness, may be more fruitful. 
 Many clinicians reading this may find these statements ‘interesting’ as opposed to 
practically applicable.  Diagnostically speaking, 'psychosis' is perhaps thought to represent a 
true experience of madness.  In the introduction chapter, the idea of ‘psychosis’ being 
synonymous with madness is present in current literature.  Some may feel that moral, social 
or philosophical ideas proposed here ‘go out the window’ when dealing with this type of 
complaint.  However, research from Garrett and colleagues (2006) showed that when 
exercising a degree of reflexivity and guidance, clinicians were able to 'normalize' psychotic 
symptoms by locating analogies to psychosis in their own mental life.  They found that 
‘transient’ disruptions occurred frequently meaning ‘at least some psychotic symptoms are a 
pathological expression of psychological processes latent in and widely distributed 
throughout the general population’ (Garrett et al., 2006, p.595).  This may suggest that there 
is little need to maintain the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide, and that it may be clinically and 
socially useful to relocate focus into what it is to be human. 
4.8.1 Clinical applications, considerations and future research.   
In this section the implications in terms of clinical practice and research will be 
separated.  This is to allow a degree of space for social action to be highlighted before 
returning to the shortcomings of the current study and recommendations for further 
investigations. 
4.8.2 Implications for clinical practice.   
Counselling Psychologists sit in a unique position, not only within mental health 
services but within the community. Therefore, they are suited not only to voicing concerns 
over clinical practice on a number of levels but also as agents of change in the community.  
This could include, GP, schools/universities, Local/National Health Authority, Parliament 
and within Service User Groups.  A degree on independence from external institutions 
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facilitates this role.  As such, Counselling Psychologists have free rein to take forwards 
concerns such as the BPS on DSM 5 updates and work within with levels of public debate to 
ensure that policies and procedures (e.g. NICE guidelines) are aware of all the voices (reason 
and unreason) and decide upon future action based on a wider body of opinion than is 
currently endorsed/encompassed.   
4.8.3 Empowering reflexive and reflective clinicians – An era of the deconstructionists?   
As noted above, Counselling Psychologists hold a number of positions.  One of these 
is in Multidisciplinary Teams (MDT) in private or NHS groups.  The underpinning 
philosophy of Counselling Psychologists is such that all human responses to the world are 
seen as equally valid.  This means that as a profession, whilst acknowledging his or her 
expertise, he or she does not automatically assume the hierarchical position of expert in 
relation to the client ’s experience, and can instead advocate for the client’s experience 
(Orlans & van Scoyoc, 2009; Woolfe, 2010).  This philosophy may prove difficult for other 
professions to accept, especially when psychiatry is usually positioned as the most 
responsible person authority in charge of an individual’s wellbeing.  However, from the 
current study and on reflection of relevant literature thereafter, it seems that the perception of 
such (in)equality may be relevant in terms of people accessing services.  It may also impact 
on patients who remove themselves from services, in order to retrieve/reclaim normality 
status and dissociate from mental health ‘attributes’.  This may be familiar to those who 
observe patients who disengage and try the ‘cold turkey’ approach to medication removal.   
 In terms of context, Counselling Psychologists work in public (Primary and 
Secondary Care) and private practice, lecture, research and provide consultation.  Therefore 
they are uniquely positioned to encourage a degree of deconstruction on terminology and 
encourage reflexive practice. Rather than separating out such behaviours as ‘abnormal’ and 
‘mad’, Psychologists can describe and encourage other mental health professionals to act in 
ways that increase understanding and compassion, grounding them in their appropriate social 
context.   
On a skill level, this would be supported by Counselling Psychologist’s ability to 
formulate (HCPC [professional practice guidelines], n.d., p. 17).  As proposed by Johnstone 
(2010), the strength of psychology lies in its use of formulation: in contrast to psychiatric 
diagnosis which reduces meaning and context to a list of visible symptoms, formulation 
enables restoration of meaning to a person’s distress, placing their problems within an 
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understandable context.  In MDT meetings, a degree of group de-construction, refection and 
formulation should be encouraged. 
Counselling Psychologists could also encourage a range of clinicians (as well as NHS 
managers/stakeholders and politicians) to attend Service User Forums where a process of 
deconstruction and re-construction in mental health terminology and functional consequence 
of currently held constructions can be understood in terms of real-world impact and service 
provision. 
4.8.4 Immediate and future impact of the study.  
At present there is an ongoing movement from mental health charities such as Mind 
and ReThink to bring mental health into the open and give the ‘general public’ an opportunity 
to talk about mental health and to support those who experience mental health concerns.  This 
has been named ‘Time to Change’.  Over the course of this study it has gained momentum 
and exposure, no doubt creating a means to highlight the difficulty normally faced by those 
who experience mental health distress.  It highlights 'statistical information' (or constructions) 
such as 1 in 4 will have a mental health problem.  However, this does not challenge the 
assumptions of mental health labelling and unwanted ‘membership’ of the mental health 
community itself.  Instead we might look to provide more overlap with LGBT community 
with media posters re-claiming terminology (e.g. ‘some people are gay – get over it’ from 
Stonewall).  Something similar, such as ‘people experience mental health problems – get over 
it’ might be an interesting way to challenge current assumptions.  As Meg Barker reflects:  
We need to move to a more biopsychosocial model of distress. We need to recognise that 
distress – in its various forms – happens for complex multiplicity of reasons, and that we can 
have a personal role in exacerbating and ameliorating it, but that acknowledging such a role 
does not mean that we are totally ‘to blame’ or ‘at fault’. We need to understand that we can 
all access support rather than it being something only for a certain few, and that different 
things work for different people at different times. We need to challenge either/or 
illness/wellness dichotomies and to consider other possible models and metaphors for 
distress. Barker (2011)  
The current study will be disseminated back to the Service Users who took part in the 
research, as well as any other service users and NHS staff who wish to receive this 
information.  An executive summary will be made available to them as well as reporting back 
to the NHS REC Ethics Committee.  The thesis will be reviewed and converted into a 
publishable format so that it is accessible to any interested parties.  At the time of writing, the 
project has been accepted for a poster presentation at the DCoP 2014 annual conference.  The 
researcher’s role as a visiting lecturer for MRCPsych students (Psychiatry Training 
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Programme) will also provide a means to reflective, deconstructive thinking in diagnosis and 
clinical practice.   
4.9 Evaluation of the study 
As noted in the methodology section (see 2.2.3 Validity and quality: scientific rigor), 
the usual notions of validity and reliability should be considered differently with a qualitative 
project, especially one viewed from a social constructionist perspective.  Some of the 
strengths of the current study are that the inclusion of participant validation within the 
interviews, maintaining ecological validity by interviewing within a familiar environment and 
engaging reflexively throughout the study, including the write-up. The study engages with the 
notion of deliberate limited reliability in terms of terms of generalizability, however the 
addition of the studies on stigma, labelling, status and diagnoses, show that the sample may 
be representative of service user discourses.   
Issues of validity were addressed by the open ended flexible approach taken whereby 
the researcher’s assumptions on the meaning and relevance of concepts and categories as 
qualitative research uniquely allows (Willig, 2008). A degree of participant validation 
encouraged, rather than adhered to, in order to ‘check-in’ with the concepts discussed by the 
researcher and to clarify statements of the respondents.  
Qualitative research is less concerned with reliability as it does not try to gain 
consistent answers that can be generalised.  However, as the methods and reflexive activity of 
the researcher were outlined clearly, they may be replicable and used to find similar 
constructions as Silverman (1993) endorses.  Additionally, as Willig (2008) notes, when a 
phenomenon -in this case constructions and functions of discourses- are found, it shows that 
this aspect of experiencing the world exists, and may exist for others.  Therefore, although 
this research does not claim to have revealed some ultimate truth or that the opinions shared 
are the same as for all service users, the data gathered remains rich, relevant and provokes 
some thoughts for further research. 
Issues and solutions.  One of the issues faced by the researcher of the current study 
was how best to collect and analyse data from the group discussion.  At the time of writing, 
there is no specific guidance as to how data from focus group discussions can be transcribed 
and/or analysed by Discourse Analysis.  This could be developed further in order to allow the 
importance of turn-taking, ‘rupture’ in the interview, and provide additional non-verbal cue 
information that could be realised via video interview methods.  
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The current study had a small sample size.  However, the type of data being collected 
and the amount of time needed for transcription and analysis meant that this number was 
acceptable for the aims of this doctoral research.  If a larger study were to be conducted with 
similar aims, the sample size would not need to be much larger if using discourse analysis.   
4.9.1 Future research.   
Future studies may benefit from retaining small groups, in order that the treatment or 
assessment of the topic be conversational and open enough for all parties to feel able to share 
where they can.  The ability to feedback findings in a more formal way would lend itself to a 
Grounded Theory methodology.  However, without an initial study such as that being 
undertaken here, there would be a degree of loss as ideas may be censored or altered if taken 
too far beyond a usual ‘debate format’ to which these service users are accustomed.   
Given the variability in which respondents in this study volunteered an opinion on a 
mental health professional's ideas on madness, a further study may look towards obtaining 
different population groups which would include: NHS professionals (mental health and 
general health), NHS service users, non-NHS individuals with mental health concerns and 
general members of the public without a mental health concern.  In addition, the use of 
documentary data could be used to establish an analysis of generally held discourses on 
madness.  In the journey of this research, the flurry of relevant media depictions of madness 
were evident to the researcher.  A further story may even track media depictions as they 
occur during research in order to capture present, rather than historical portrayals of madness.   
Some themes of future research might pick up on areas which appeared interesting and 
relevant in the current study but were beyond the scope of the research question: 
1. ‘Continuum’ terminology – What means what for whom? 
2. In-group stigma – disassociation from within. How mad is mad and what kind of 
human distress can be admitted without loss of master status? 
3. Video interview and techniques for analysing micro conversation – dominant versus 
quiet voice.  What is not being said in vocalised discourse. 
4. Service User led Research on necessary conditions for equal talk inside and outside of 
mental health services. 
5. Demystifying normality: What is normality?  What are the boundaries?  Who decides 
what is allowed? 
6. Anti-psychiaty and pro-psychology in service users – is this a phenomenon? 
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7. Texture of madness – Fluid versus fixed/transient versus permanent. 
8. Reclaiming feminism – Mental Health, racism and LGBT: Oppression for all? 
9. Combatting a master status of mentally ill or ‘mad’ – Service User Perspective. 
4.10 Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to begin to get an understanding of what constructions of 
madness are held by NHS service users.  The study used Discourse Analysis to explore the 
service users’ constructions of madness through the use of language and examined the 
function of different interpretive repertories on their subjective world.   
 Contemporary understanding on the meaning of madness seems to be evolving so that 
idiographic knowledge can be obtained to inform current practice.  It is debatable whether 
there will come a point where a consensus is reached whereby the meaning of madness today 
is fixed and becomes generally accepted from all points of view.  Therefore the search for 
nomothetic, generalizable knowledge in research may prove futile.  However, understanding 
and perhaps challenging currently held views may be useful, both at a societal level and a 
clinical one. Presently the meaning of madness is explained through psychiatric publications 
or through attempts to unravel power dynamics between psychiatry and patients.  The beliefs 
about what it is to be mad, mentally ill or having a mental health problem today is 
particularly important for the counselling psychologist and their client.  Indeed when talking 
about ‘beliefs and illness’, Halligan (2007) suggests that this influences how clients make the 
facts and causes of their presentation understandable, how they evaluate expectations of 
recovery and how they respond to treatment.  Perhaps more importantly, our ideas about 
madness are everyone’s ideas on madness, therefore we must act to deconstruct ideas of both 
madness and normality if we are to understand what is it to be human and experience human 
suffering.      
 In closing, it seems as if the voice of unreason is becoming more accessible to the 
academic and therapeutic community. However, if a slight adjustment in practice is 
encouraged, the gateway to debate can allow for the voices of all levels to be heard.  This 
does not necessarily mean that the power divide between mental health professionals and 
those who access services will be dissolved.  It may however prove to be a more equal 
playing field where clinicians are allowed to be curious and service users are able to feel 
heard as though two humans are in the room together. The implications for research and 
clinical practice are encouraging.  However, the biggest outcome of deconstructing madness 
may be that society looks for answers outside of the media.  As the term madness is 
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seemingly ‘up for grabs’, one wonders how a word which stands up to Bhaktin’s idea of 
‘great time’ (Lindsey, 1993) will be re-constructed and who will re-claim it?  Instead of the 
current movement 'Time to Change' encouraging comforting talk to those in need, a more 
powerful request is to talk about what is not being talked about – let’s begin with ‘what is 
normal’ and see what is left when we attempt to reconstruct ‘what is madness’. 
4.11 Personal Reflection   
As a member of the LGBT gay community myself– and it has been with hesitation that 
I vocalise my membership of this group – I have noticed a tendency from myself and from my 
peers to speak as though from the voice of ‘the normal’, the majority.  In being part of 
something which at times you do not have to identify yourself with, a silent identity, there is a 
sense that you can have more authority, be taken more seriously and heard, if speaking from 
the voice of ‘the normal’.   Parker and colleagues (1995) talk about the identities of the Irish 
or Jewish community as another example of a group who are not always immediately 
identified as ‘the other’, though face discrimination.  Looking back over my own decisions, I 
now feel I identify with the discursive positioning used by some of the respondents.  In 
particular, respondent 2 who appeared to be trying very hard not to identity himself with 
‘true mental health’.  For him, the use of clinical language helped to neutralise his unwanted 
membership of ‘the mentally ill’ and instead talk to me, as a member of ‘general society’, 
peer-to-peer.  The parallel process in my own life might be not to be too loud when making 
LGBT statements, not to make too much of a fuss or ‘rock the boat’.  The world treats me 
‘well enough’ and although some are obviously oppressed, I am not, at least in my day-to-
day life.  However another parallel process come into play when thinking about something 
that shines the limelight on my membership, such as a pride event, a celebrity coming 
out/being accused of some sexually deviant scandal, being gay makes the headline, and it’s 
positioned as the cause of ‘the deviance’.  Just as the respondents talked about media scandal 
positioning mental health as a problems with heinous acts, the same aftershock occurs within 
my own community.  I do not feel this has impacted on my analysis or reporting of the 
findings, though it reassures me that whilst we are talking about madness, we can also be 
talking about difference, which more people might identify with than it seems. 
From my beginnings in lecturing psychology to psychiatry trainees, I now see the idea 
of normality and abnormality in a new light.  In both preparing and disseminating the 
information to these medical doctors, I noticed the interest in 'the abnormal' with positive 
and moral intentions - to help.  However, due to my epistemological positioning and also 
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thanks to this research project, I find myself deconstructing the very same topics on which 
these doctors will soon be examined.  As such I re-state things that are languaged into 
existence and necessary for their exam whilst re-directing their attention towards themselves 
and the acknowledgement and understanding of human pain without such language.   
One might say I am trying to 'normalise', though I would contest that this assumes 
'normal' is an actual way a person can be.  Therefore, I would prefer to be accused of 'de-
constructing'.  I have had good feedback following these lectures as this approach gives them 
validation of experience of mental health, daring to be sourced from their own 'expertise' of 
what it is to be human, rather than as soon-to-be experts of the mind translated into a 
medical discourse.  I sincerely hope that this process of deconstruction is contagious, and 
that a cure cannot be found! 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Information Sheet 
 
 
 
What is this thing called  
‘madness’? 
 
Could you spare some time to talk about mental 
health language, sharing your thoughts and feelings? 
If ‘YES’ then please contact the researcher using the 
details below to take part in a 20-60 minute interview 
or group discussion. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Brian Murray    
Doctorate Counselling Psychology Student   
City University London    
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
- Alternative contacts: 
Dr. Jay Watts           Dr. John Prentice 
Academic Research Supervisor   Principle Clinical Psychologist 
City University London                 WLMHT 
   j
Appendix B – Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
Researcher:   Brian Murray    Email:   
 Telephone:  
Information Sheet 
The study:  What do we mean by madness: How and where do we use it today? 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to find out how people use mental health terminology and how they feel about 
these terms. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be interviewed for 20-60 minutes by the researcher who will have a conversation with you on the 
theme of the research question.  The interview will be recorded, typed up like a script and stored by the 
researcher for analysis later. The study will not affect your care in any way. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Talking through some of the feelings people have on mental health topics can be informative and 
empowering for the participant.  It is also hoped research will help mental health professionals and service 
users to be aware of different ways to talk about mental health so that a more transparent exchange is 
available when people access mental health services. 
What will happen to the results of this study? 
The results will be as part of the researcher’s Doctorate Thesis.  They data will be anonymised and kept a 
period of 5 years as per the British Psychological Society guidelines for research that may be published. A 
copy of outcome of the study will be made available on request. 
Limits to confidentiality and further support 
No personally identifiable data will be used in the results of this study.  However, if the researcher feels you 
are at harm to yourself or others during the study, the researcher will speak with you and is obliged to 
break confidentiality in order to relay necessary information to your care coordinator in order to provide 
any necessary support. 
Your consent to participate in this study is based on the understanding that the data will be used fairly, held 
securely and that you have the right to withdraw your consent at any time without having to give a reason. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read about the study.   
Feel free to ask any further questions. 
 
General information on participating in research: 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/a-participants-guide-to-mental-health-clinical-research/  
Appendix C – Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project:   
What do we mean by Madness: How and where is it used today? 
Name of Researcher:  Brian Murray  
(The participant should complete the whole of this sheet himself/herself) 
Please circle “YES” or “NO” 
Have you read the participant information sheet?  
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study 
including any possible risks?  
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?  
Do you understand that your participation is voluntary, and that you are 
free to withdraw from the study: at any time; without having to give a 
reason; without affecting your future medical care, or legal rights?  
Have you been told that strict confidentiality will be maintained? 
I understand that the data collected during the study may be looked at by 
individuals from regulatory authorities and/or West London Mental 
Health NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research.  I 
consent for these individuals to have access to my records. 
Would you like your GP/care-coordinator to be informed of your 
participation in this study? (delete as appropriate) 
If yes, please give details: 
YES/ NO 
YES/ NO 
 
YES/ NO 
 
YES/ NO 
YES/ NO 
 
YES/ NO 
 
YES/NO 
Do you agree to take part in this study? YES/ NO 
Participants initials and signature:  
Date: 
COPY KEPT BY RESEARCHER AND PARTICIPANT 
Brian Murray – City University Doctorate Student     email: k 
Supervised by Dr. Jay Watts                                        email: 
Appendix D – General Interview Questions 
 
 
 
  
 
 
General questions for interview: 
 
• I would like to talk to you about the terms people use when talking about 'madness'.   
(Await possible response or go to first question) 
• What comes to mind when you think of that term? (Can you tell me more about that) 
• What does that bring up for you?  (Can you tell me more about that) 
• What do you think that may bring up for other people? (Can you tell me more about that) 
• Where and when would you use the term? (Can you tell me more about that) 
• What happens when you use it? (Can you tell me more about that) 
• Where do you think other people use the term? (Can you tell me more about that) 
• What does do you think it beings up in that instance? (Can you tell me more about that) 
 
 
Themes to explore 
 
• How do we talk about madness today? 
•  What terms do we use?  
• In what way is the word used? 
• In what context does it have meaning? 
• What are the implications of these meanings? 
• What effects may they have? 
Appendix E – City University NRES Sponsor Letter 
  
 
  
 
 
Appendix F – Debrief Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in our study. 
 
As you were told initially, we are looking at what different ideas people hold when they use the terms 
around the theme of ‘madness’.   
 
The study hopes to build a better understanding of how we understand the term and the perceived 
implications of those different ideas.  In gaining individual opinions from a variety of settings, it is hoped 
that a more informed view might taken when the modern-day terminology is used in current services.  This 
may impact on service provision of mental health services and also our general understanding of the 
meaning and use of these terms. 
 
Please keep this sheet to contact us with any further queries regarding the study.  On request, you will also 
have the option to have a copy of the outcome of the study when completed. 
 
As mentioned before, you have the right to withdraw your consent to participate in the study.  This right 
continues after this time and you may have any data collected from you removed from the study. 
 
Thank you again for participating. 
 
 
 
Brian Murray –  City University Doctorate Student      
email:     
Supervised by: Dr. Jay Watts       Dr. John Prentice 
email:     
 
Please note that participation in the study is voluntary and that you are free to withdraw from the 
study at any time without having to give a reason and without affecting your future medical care, or 
legal rights.   
Appendix G – Transcription Convention 
  
 
 
 
Notation Example Description   
[     ]  over[lapping]  
    [lapping]
 speech  
Speech that 
overlapped         
>  <   it’s >almost as if<
  
Increase in speed of 
speech 
::  Em:::  
   
Relative increase in 
length of preceding 
letter (holding the 
tone)  
((   )) ((nodding)) Comments on non-
verbal cues in 
interview 
(.)   Well (.) I guess so Short pause in 
speech (less than 1 
second)  
(0.1) Yes. I’m (0.1), I’m 
sure 
Pause of 1 second   
(0.1=1 second, 0.2= 
2 seconds etc.) 
____ maybe that’s true
  
Emphasis on 
particular vocal 
delivery of word or 
part of word 
=  Speech is= 
=Latched by someone
  
No discernable gap 
between speech 
.hh    well .hh yes!  Audible in-breath 
(length indicated by 
amount of h’s) 
.hh I guess so .hh yes. Audible out-breath 
(length indicated by 
amount of h’s) 
CAPS well I THINK so, YES
   
Speech that is 
noticeably louder 
than surrounding 
speech 
Note: Courier 10pt font was used as recommended by Hepburn and Potter (2009)14.  This marks 
speech overlaps etc. more clearly. 
 
In addition, the following conventions were adopted for grammar and punctuation: • Commas, semi-colons, colons, hyphens, exclamation marks, question marks and full-stops were used 
as per prose • Commas were used between repeated words • Commas were used between letters or sounds that were repeated (stutters) • Commas were used between unlinked clauses • Hash was used for interrupted speech (mostly self-interruptions) • Double quotation marks were used for direct reported speech, or active voicing • Speech errors were included • Contractions (gonna, dunno, wanna, kinda) were used 
                                                          
14
 Hepburn, A. & Potter, J. (2009). Transcription.  Retrieved from 
http://homepages.lboro.ac.uk/~ssjap/transcription/transcription.htm 
Appendix H – Sample Transcript 
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Section C: Case Study 
 
Hysteria or Human Suffering? 
1.1  Introduction and Rationale 
“Lock me away and throw away the key”. 
This was a common sentence used by this client.  It seemed to serve to support the acquired 
persona as a ‘hysteric’, in the classic sense used by Breuer and Freud in (1893) to describe Anna O. 
and others alike (see Breuer and Freud, 1957).  Interestingly, the image exuded from her during our 
first meeting was likened to a painting from 1887 in which Jean-Martin Charcot demonstrates to his 
colleagues that the symptoms of hysteria were as real as those of any organic disease (Appendix I). 
Being wheeled in by her husband in a wheelchair and with eye-gaze mimicking that of a blind person, 
this client had baffled NHS services.  The reason for choosing her for this client study is to explore 
the consuming force the client exuded on others, including myself.  If thought of as 'a classic case of 
hysteria', akin to the early era of psychoanalysis, how might a modern day psychology service make 
sense of this person? I will attempt to open this up to try to offer a possible explanation as to how the 
client’s early history, gave rise to the need for a barrage of defences and how these same protective 
mechanisms brought her to the brink of self-destruction.   
I hope this will be useful for future cases where the client mistakenly seen as an unfathomable 
spectacle rather than a classic case of human nature, struggling for survival by all means necessary.  
Interestingly, keeping track of the therapist's own humanity will turn out to be fundamental for the 
therapy process. 
1.1.1 Why Psychodynamic Therapy?  
After at the presenting problems from the referral letter during my pre-assessment 
supervision, this client was deemed most suitable to undertake psychodynamic therapy.  It 
seems that the client’s current issues were a reflection of long standing difficulties, largely in 
connection with personal relationships, manifesting in anxiety.  A previous course of CBT 
had enabled her to manage symptoms of agoraphobia, though not address underlying 
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difficulties.  It was felt that the psychodynamic model would be best suited to ‘hold’ the 
client, as Winnicot (1945) describes, in order to explore the causes of her psychic pain and 
begin the move from a position of absolute dependence to relative independence.   
1.1.2 Psychodynamic – The Adaptive Perspective.   
Overall, this piece of work was formulated within the ‘Adaptive’ perspective (see Johnstone 
and Dallos, 2006) of psychodynamic thinking.  According to Johnstone and Dallos (2006) this area of 
the psychodynamic perspective has been influenced by systemic and behavioural thinking, in terms of 
“the relationship of the internal [past] to the external ‘real’ world” (Johnstone and Dallos, 2006, p.59).  
This is particularly pertinent to this case as the client’s difficulties fit with what Johnston and Dallos 
(2006) describe as a dynamic process in which internal and external interact with a variety of 
processes of the past.  They go on to specify these problems as “the distortion and misinterpretation of 
other people’s motives and actions; the selection of specific individual and relationship contexts 
which are familiar and meet our expectations; and the subtle pressure which at unconscious levels 
invites others to respond in particular ways” (Johnstone and Dallos, 2006, p.59). For this client, the 
current difficulties in her present life, in romantic, family, and social relationships, have reflected 
patterns of relating to others that prove to be maladaptive and echo failed attempts at resolving 
conflicts that have been used in the past.  As well as current life situations revealing clues to the 
dynamics of the past, the ‘Adaptive’ perspective also holds that through examining the 'transference' 
and 'countertransference' (Freud, 1910/2001) between the client and the therapist, some of these 
conflicts of the present (and perhaps therefore the past) are acted out within the therapy space. 
From my first encounter with this client, she presented with almost the full range of known 
‘defence mechanisms15’ (Freud, 1937). Linking this to Malan’s (1995) schematised figure of the 
‘triangle of person’ (defense, anxiety, hidden feeling) and ‘triangle of conflict’ (other, therapist, past), 
summarises the dynamic interplay between the client any myself in order to taken to explore, 
experience and work through some of the difficulties encountered by this client throughout this piece 
of work. 
                                                          
15
 Terms that Anna Freud adapted from her father's (Sigmund Freud) earlier work on Ego Defences (see S. 
Freud 1894, 1896; A. Freud, 1937). 
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1.2  Context 
NB: For the purposes of this Client Study I have altered personally identifiable information to 
protect the anonymity of this client and her family.   
The client, Gill (pseudonym), was seen as an outpatient in an Older Adult Psychology Service 
based in London. The client was aged between 60-70 and only just met the age criteria for the Older 
Adult Service.  New patients were first assessed by a member of the Community Mental Health 
Team.  However, as this client was known to Adult Mental Health Services and had previously 
received psychological treatment (CBT), it was felt that a psychologist would be best placed to 
conduct the initial assessment and make an informed decision as to further intervention.  The MDT 
would then be updated about any significant changes, particularly in terms of risk.  A psychiatrist 
would only be involved should there be a need for a medication review.  Any changes to diagnosis 
could be made by the assessing psychologist and seconded by a peer. The GP will only be updated on 
initial plan and an end of treatment review letter. 
1.2.1 The referral.   
This client was referred by her GP due to ‘extreme distress as a result of physical difficulties’.  
The GP added that there had been extensive physical and neurological investigations to explain the 
client's ongoing complaint of intense dizziness’, which has ‘left her debilitated’, although none have 
come back with any explanation.  He noted a ‘psychiatric history of PTSD, Anxiety, Depression and 
Agoraphobia’, as well as ‘inpatient admission in her youth’.  The GP history stated there was a query 
of ‘early abuse from age 13-17, reported by her previous therapist’.  The GP also felt that her husband 
was ‘affected by the strain of being a full time carer for the client’.  There was no mention of the 
presenting psychical complaints stemming from a somatoform aetiology but rather that the client’s 
physical condition, which was undiagnosed, was causing symptoms of distress for which he felt 
psychiatric medication and/or psychological intervention would be necessary. 
1.2.2 Convening the first session.   
I telephoned Gill in January 2012 to explain we had received the referral and to offer an initial 
appointment in which my supervisor would also be present.  Gill was happy to confirm her attendance 
and noted no special requirements.  At the appointment, two weeks later, Gill arrived 30 minutes 
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early, pushed in on a wheelchair by her husband.  Immediately we changed our plans and had the 
appointment in a large meeting room.  This was in order to fit in the wheelchair and have all four of 
us present (plus the wheelchair).   
1.1.3 The presenting problem.   
Gill explained that her current problems began 1 year ago when she had an argument with her 
eldest son's wife, Vicky (pseudonym).  According to Gill, they had a number of disagreements which 
culminated in Vicky writing Gill confrontational letters.  Gill stated that this happened around the 
same time that she had a dizzy-spell whilst in a local supermarket.  This episode resulted in a physical 
experience of the 'world falling apart', according to Gill.  This meant she felt unable to walk unaided, 
or be a passenger in a car without the windows being blacked out and sitting in a particular position in 
the backseat with a pillow.  It also left her unable to bathe, dress, walk unaided and also not able read 
or write. The problem was deemed physical and as yet unsolved. 
1.3  Initial assessment and formulation.   
From the referral and the initial meeting, I was able to formulate a provisional understanding 
of the client’s distress.  On the surface it appeared that Gill is suffering from an unknown physical 
problem.  This has caused her to rely heavily on her husband, as she feels disabled by the experience 
of dizziness whenever she makes any movements.  It has also stunted her ability to read or write and 
communicate with the world independently.  As a result her world became small, requiring her 
husband for everything.   
At this provisional formulation, Gill's psychical difficulties were not discounted as purely 
psychological.  However, it was clear that she was experiencing an extreme emotional reaction to her 
ongoing physical experience. Gill related the cause back to some bullish, emotionally demanding 
letters from her daughter-in-law.  The significance of the relationship with her daughter in-law was 
outlined in the first session, as a sort of intense mother-daughter arrangement.  This appears to be 
significant.  It is possible that Gill over-identified with this needy cause (child-Vicky) that was later to 
become the wife of her son, and actually experienced Vicky as version of her younger self.  Gill 
appears to actions suggest she ‘projected’ (Freud, 1915/2001) herself onto Vicky and created an 
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enmeshed relationship in order to engage in a pattern of what Freud (1909/2001, 1926/2001) calls 
‘undoing’, in a sense re-writing the her own past by making sure that Vicky was 'protected' until 
adulthood.  When this relationship changed, Vicky became angry, resentful and quietly threatening 
towards Gill.  This de-stabilised Gill’s existing image of her younger self and transformed instead into 
the darker, feared image of her adolescence, her abuser.  Gill’s world became intolerable, just as it did 
when she was 19 when she felt incapable of sustaining herself was admitted to a psychiatric hospital.  
The solution from her ‘unconscious’ (see Freud, 1915/2001) was to hide from the pain she 
experienced as a teen and was re-experiencing in the present.  Her physical difficulty enabled her to 
be protected from reading hurtful letters, hearing hurtful phone calls and safely able to give the 
responsibility of engaging in the world to her husband.  Just as he cared for her during her 
agoraphobia, he was again forced to accept his carer role.  This maladaptive pattern of hiding from 
pain did well to protect her from the outside world, although the unconscious engineering of these 
actions were not in her conscious awareness.  Therefore, Gill felt understandably anxious about the 
prospect of being debilitated for the rest of her life. 
1.3.1 Negotiating a contract and therapeutic aims.   
I agreed to see Gill for 50 sessions of psychodynamic therapy.  The aim of the therapy was to 
try and explore, confront and ‘work through’ (Freud, 1914/2001) some of Gill's anxieties in the 
present, to enable her to feel more able to function in day to day life.  At the initial meeting there was 
no explicit mention of abuse but Gill did talk about dark events that she found traumatic, during her 
adolescence, that were perhaps connected to everything. We agreed to try to look at and attempt to 
process some of those early painful experiences during our work together.   
1.3.2 Biographical details.   
As mentioned previously the client’s details identifiable details have been altered to protect 
her anonymity.  I have also altered the specifics of her family details for the same reason.  Gill is 67 
and was an only child to Dereck and Belinda who died in their 70s.  Gill is married to Graham, 65 and 
they have 2 sons, Barry, 40, and Martin, 37.  Both sons are married.  Barry is married to Vicky and 
they have a daughter together, Isabella, aged 5. 
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1.4  The sessions  
1.4.1 First steps (Session 1-4).   
During the first few sessions, Gill insisted that her husband come with her into the room.  
They held each other’s had for most of the designated 50 minutes.  Gill would speak in a high pitched, 
shrill voice.  She was able to discard the wheelchair after the first session and use a crutch thereafter.  
Gill usually began by talking about physical problems, such as dizziness, headaches and sinus 
problems.  Often she would talk through me, not joining my gaze directly.  With her husband present, 
Gill would only every trace her difficulties back for 1-2 years, to the worst part of the conflict with 
her daughter-in-law. 
Both Gill and Graham explained the desperateness of their situation and focused their anger at 
the lack of help from the medical profession.  Gill was tormented by the lack of ability to do anything 
without her husband, whilst her husband Graham felt increasingly suffocated by this role.  Although 
Graham would back her up with some of the recent events, such as the hospital appointment 
attendance and problems with their daughter-in-law, he consistently questioned why the problems 
have gotten worse.  Gill would squeeze his hand tightly when I asked anything other than medical 
issues. 
Reflection:  During this time I felt as though I was able to contain the emotions within the 
room, though barely.  When it came to discussing medical appointments and hope for recovery, I felt I 
was participating in a lie, a group denial.  The pressure they appeared to place into a medical cure 
seemed unreasonable.  It felt as though it was very obvious that the pain from Gill’s early history 
needed to be acknowledged, however, nobody, including myself was doing so.  I felt a knot in my 
stomach and little room to escape the feeling, other than to hope alongside the couple that some 
investigations would come back with an answer. 
Supervision: In discussing the problems with my supervisor, he thought I should explore my 
counter-transference.  It was felt that my reactive-counter-transference, as Clarkson (2005) calls it, 
had limited by inner disquiet with the situation in the room.  The part of myself that did not agree with 
the ‘false hope’ that was being expressed by Gill and Graham was felt to run in conflict with the part 
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that needed the ‘false hope’ to be true within the couple.  In exploring what would happen if this 
collective agreement were removed, we believed the true cause of the pain might feel too 
overwhelming to speak of.  Certainly this would fit with Gill’s history of being admitted as an 
inpatient when she was 19 due to what she calls ‘a nervous breakdown’.  Therefore, instead of 
removing this important defence entirely, it was thought that acknowledging that there was a feeling 
from my side that there was a lot of things unspoken and unacknowledged.  Gill agreed to this and 
asked her husband to wait outside for the remainder of our sessions.  This was the first sign that we 
were able to talk beyond the surface, beyond the context of medical appointments. 
1.4.2 Getting to the bottom of the surface –Sessions 5-10.   
Without her husband present, Gill felt able to discuss the different aspects of her past, 
including her abuse.  She told me that her husband did not know about this, although when Graham 
was there previously, it seemed from his reactions to ‘talk of the past’ that he did know, although they 
never spoke of it.  To protect the client’s anonymity, I will highlight only the main parts and 
change any identifiable details.  Gill explained that her abuser was known to the family and 
employed her in his local business from the age of 13.  As our sessions progressed, Gill would go 
through periods of removing herself from this story and saying it was all talked through with a 
previous therapist.  During our conversations around her more recent difficulty with her daughter-in-
law, the topic seemed to flow back to the time she was abused.  Gill eventually found herself able to 
say that her abuser initially made her feel special and looked after.  She apparently tried to preserve 
this feeling when the abuse began, though found this increasingly difficult.  When the abuse ended, 
she informed her parents, who informed the police, though nothing was done and her family did not 
discuss it further.  During this time she met Graham who wanted to date her.  She described how she 
was not interested in him and asked a friend to let him down gently.  However, when she was 
admitted to a psychiatric hospital 2 years later, Graham visited her in the ward.  Gill explained that 
she felt unable reject his proposal of courtship.  She recalls him being very caring at the time and 
found herself getting married within a couple of years.  I felt Gill desperately wanted me to know that 
he was very caring, polite and helped her in every practical way.  I reflected this back to Gill, bringing 
in the current context in which this caring role still remains within their dynamic.  Gill explained that 
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she had two children after that point but due to her agoraphobia, could never walk them to school, 
play outside with them or go to any events.  She assured me they were fine and well-rounded adults 
now.  However, I felt as though there was a break from acknowledging her true feelings from the 
point at which she found herself in a marriage that she was not altogether happy with. 
Reflection: I felt that Gill squeezed in a lot of information in a few sessions.  I recall feeling 
very tired on those days when I would have my appointment with her.  At the time I thought this was 
due to a lack of feeling of progress, though my supervision helped me to understand that once again I 
was being duped into consenting to ‘glossing over’ strategy where psychic pain existed.  I feel that it 
was perhaps the experienced of feeling emotionally stretched by account after account of events that 
were traumatizing that I perhaps needed to go with the client’s defence of rationalization and 
suppression (Freud, 1937) . 
Supervision: My supervisor discussed the possibility of a dissociated narrative being 
required for both the client and myself for these painful events, in order for them to feel tolerated.  
The tiredness I felt before and after the sessions left me with a feeling of disintegration.  This perhaps 
mirrored the more intense experience of disintegration within Gill.  At the time of her abuse, this was 
needed.  It fits with Milton’s (1994) thoughts on perverse attempts to solve feelings of childhood 
abuse.  However, it did not answer why I had this feeling.   
Personal therapy: In exploring my own feelings within personal therapy (without disclosing 
case details), I found myself reacting as though I was being abused during the sessions with this 
client.  I realised that I had not just been ‘going along’ with talking around painful issues but I had no 
opportunity to speak at all sometimes.  For the first time I recalled the client interrupting me several 
times so that I could not speak.  Eventually, I stopped attempting to speak and had a barrage of 
painful events thrust upon me. 
1.4.3 Change of response.   
Through supervision and personal therapy, I could see that the client was using the defensive 
nature of what Klein (1946, 1952) calls ‘projective identification’.  However, although discovering 
that the client was ridding herself of the unwanted parts within herself was useful, it did not give me a 
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grasp of how I could keep or somehow give back this feeling to the client in a non-painful way - I did 
not want to become the abuser. 
Looking at Bion’s (1962a, b) developed notion of projective identification, I felt that Gill was 
trying to use the ‘evacuative’ process to forcefully rid herself of unwanted feelings.  At first glance 
this would seem to link with the unwanted pain from the time of her abuse.  However, it also includes 
the suppressed memory of an unsupportive mother and father following the abuse, who did not 
function as the ‘container’ (Bion 1962a, b) that she needed.  Gill’s retreat within herself then lead her 
to marrying a partner who she was not attracted to but felt protected by.  The blame and shame that 
perhaps would otherwise have been attributed to 30 years of being an agoraphobic woman who could 
not be the mother she felt she should be was instead ‘evacuated’ into me.  I felt an inner self-blame for 
not being able to handle this onslaught of painful information from Gill.  However, in being aware of 
this process unfolding between us, it meant I could develop the capacity for what Bion (1962b) calls 
‘reverie’.  This would enable the confusing, painful and at times unbearable feelings and impulses to 
be contained and reflected upon during our sessions.  The hope was that the client could 're-introject' 
(Bion, 1962b) her raw feeling states, with an increasing capacity to cope with them.  Through 
repeated cycles of me being able to cope, and Gill introjecting the capacity to do so too, we could 
establish what Bion (1962b) describes as the ‘container-contained relationship’. 
1.4.4 A life lost to madness - why would I do this? (Sessions 10-35).   
When I next met with Gill, she began by updating me on her medical appointments.  She had 
a new physical ailment that she felt should be investigated.  We discussed how she felt about the 
process of therapy and if she thought on some level that I should be finding and taking painful 
feelings away from her.  Gill agreed that if her anxiety was not there that the physical problems may 
be more bearable but questioned whether I would be able to sort out everything.  Gill drew the 
discussion back to the time when she was ‘rehabilitated’, following behaviour therapy.  She explained 
that she was able to go out, meet close friends and go shopping.  According to Gill this is all she could 
have hoped for.  Gill became both angry and desperate within her tone of voice.  The target of her 
anger was her husband.  Gill explained she was angry at him for not being more understanding and 
 152 
 
emotional when she was unwell and that she needed a husband not a carer.  Looking back at her 
history we discovered ‘a new ailment’.  Gill found herself taking her anger out on Graham, though felt 
guilty as he was also her only source of practical help.  Gill explained this dynamic has existed since 
they first met, although she ‘lived through [her] 20s on psychiatric medication’, so it was not an 
obvious problem for some time.  She then disclosed that they were not at all suited and that she felt 
that her life could have been very different if she had been with someone more emotionally and 
creatively in tune with her.   
We began to explore the possibility that there was little room for Gill to emerge from her 
anxious state to the person she would like to be with some being ‘so caring’.  Gill explained that 
during the times when she has began to be more like the person she would like to be, something 
usually intervenes to stop her.  Examples of this included her husband needing to go out to the pub 
with friends or their son (leaving Gill at home), insistence form her husband to take it slow, or a the 
emergence of a new physical ailment.  For the first time we were then able to explore a connection 
between her emotional experience and her physical difficulties.  Gill was at first able to make the 
connection between feeling trapped, experiencing anxiety and noticing physical problems.  Then on 
one session she told me I should have her locked away and throw away the key because she was 
obviously mad.  In exploring the reason why she felt this way, Gill exclaimed that if her physical and 
emotional experiences were created by herself that she must be mad.  She became tearful when adding 
that it would mean that she missed her children’s important milestones, that she sacrificed her own 
life, making herself disabled ‘just’ to avoid problems.  At this point Gill disagreed with the whole 
theory and was furious – with me. 
Supervision – During my supervision appointments at this tense time in the therapy work I 
was able to try to make sense of the processes at work within the client and myself.  My supervisor felt 
that we had potentially removed the client’s largest defence, which he painted as a survival strategy.  
The anger she felt towards me perhaps reflected the need for her to displace the feelings she felt 
toward herself and project them onto me.  We explored the possibility that the client needed to be 
angry at the part of her self that stole her 20s, forbade the emergence of the person she could have 
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been and for getting into a marriage that would cement this pattern.  This may have released some 
feelings of guilt from the period she had to deny her children a full-time parent.  During the 
supervision it was felt that I needed to maintain my ability to contain these negative feelings, so that 
the client could bear to hold these parts within herself through re-introjection. 
1.4.5 Reformulation.   
During the time when Gill told her parents about her abuse (and perhaps implicitly 
beforehand), she must have attempted to communicate her sense of being frightened, ashamed and 
distressed to them.  As little action was taken to resolve the problem, and with nobody else to turn to 
Gill may have used the ‘communicative’ form of projective identification (Bion, 1962a, b) to rid 
herself of her feelings whilst seeking the necessary containment from them.  However, her parents 
were unable to be emotionally attuned to her need for this distress to be held and managed.   
Therefore she was unable to re-introject the part of herself that had would otherwise have been 
painful, yet containable.  Remarkably she was able to survive for 2 years before having a nervous 
breakdown and admitted into a psychiatric hospital. The treatment was medical sedation which further 
supported Gill’s idea that her experience was uncontainable.  Gill then found herself in a relationship 
with someone who was again not emotionally attuned but was willing to take care of her practical 
needs.  Years later she met a neglected young neighbour (and future daughter-in-law) Vicky, and 
found a chance to fix or ‘undo’ as Freud (1909/2001, 1926/2001) uses the term,  the damage she 
suffered as a teenager by becoming the perfect mother to Vicky.   This was not a problem during 
Gill’s agoraphobia.  However, she then began get ‘well’, becoming more independent and able to go 
out, spending time with friends her own age.  This shattered her intensely close relationship with her 
Vicky, as well as strained relations with her husband who was forced to become more than a carer but 
a husband.  Whilst Graham resisted this change by going out more with his friends to the pub, Vicky’s 
response was more detrimental.  Vicky began to pass messages through her husband Barry, Gill’s son.  
She would also write emotionally charged letters to her stating her feeling abandoned my Gill and that 
she was manipulative and deceitful.  This resulted in Vicky being re-cast the abuser Gill felt she had 
escaped from.  Gill had nobody to support her emotionally, just like when she was 17 and found 
herself unable to remain able to stand the environment, surrounded by dizziness that would keep her 
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safe (yet disabled at home), unable to read or write (unable to read painful letters) and relying on her 
husband to return to his caring role.  
1.4.6 Pleased to finally meet you Mrs. Butler (sessions 35-45).   
In the following session, Gill informed me that she had a huge argument with her husband.  
Apparently this happened quite frequently, although this one was more significant.  Gill’s husband 
ended the argument by going out to the pub.  Gill told me that she had made some important 
decisions.  She decided that she was not going to return to the person she used to be, no matter whom 
this was a problem for.  The argument with Graham apparently surrounded Gill’s need for him to 
‘step it up’ and get what she was going through, not just helping her around the house.  We explored 
the past and wondered how possible it would be to change the person she chose to marry.  Gill 
became tearful and began to tell me about the real person she missed, her younger self.  She told the 
story of a girl who was full of hope and wonder.  Part of this was apparently preserved during her 20s.  
At this time she would write stories and poetry.  Gill wanted to regain this part of herself and write 
poems so that her granddaughter could one day read them.   
In later sessions, Gill would now and again return to our discussion over her past and the role 
it played in her physical status.  Gill felt it was impossible to fully accept that her current difficulties 
were due to her unresolved past due to her ongoing physical health appointments.  She then explained 
how she knows of cases of conversion disorder, whereby someone could lose one of their senses in 
order to protect them from something traumatic.  When asked if her past could be classed as traumatic 
she responded ‘yes’, but deflected the spotlight by stating she was talking about famous cases in the 
past.  I realised I was once again the presence of a highly intelligent woman who was using 
intellectualization (Freud, 1937) in order to avoid the pain associated with her past trauma.  It also 
served to help her function in the present, as her physical symptoms were becoming more 
manageable.  I did not push the connection to the past, though the intertwined themes emerged 
whenever Gill would speak about her husband or daughter-in-law.  Gill spent the net few sessions 
planning small goals for herself, such as going out in the garden unaided and writing a line of words 
at a time. 
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Then on one particular session I noticed that Gill was able to look directly at me.  Her voice 
sounded different, the shrillness had gone.  As she told me about her small but significant successes, 
she reminded me that she was not going back to the person she was before.  As she left the room I 
noticed that she was no longer using her crutch. 
Supervision:  During the meetings with my supervisor, we explored the change in character.  
Although Gill had said she would not fully accept the connection with the past, she was able to talk 
about it when she intellectualised, keeping her distance from the true pain. I felt more able to contain 
her distress and talk with less pressure about connections between the past and the present.  I no 
longer felt the extreme tiredness before and after our sessions.  I felt this was a sign of some progress, 
although my supervisor shared his idea that I too could be intellectualising, keeping my distance from 
the pain and therefore making it bearable for myself too.   
Reflection: With the end of our work approaching, it would make sense that we were both 
hoping for progress.  Gill did not tell me out loud that her past trauma caused a fantastic string of 
defences (Freud, 1937) that left her disabled, though I did feel that she was testing the waters with the 
'intellectualisation' of this idea, perhaps slowly making the idea bearable. 
1.4.7 Ending.   
At the end of our work Gill brought me some of her poems.  She wrote them down and her 
husband typed them up.  Gill explained she had found humour in her creative writing, a part she had 
long forgotten in her personality.  Instead of taking away her success and wanting to interpret this act 
as a type of ‘sublimation’ defence (Freud, 1937), I felt it was more fitting to highlight the strengths 
shown in Gill throughout our time together.  Gill learnt how her past defences were once needed for 
survival and that more mature defence could now be used for everyday living. 
Talking about the ending of our work left Gill feeling sombre.  She explained that there is a 
part of her that feels like a young child crying and she does not know how to comfort her.  Drawing 
upon her re-discovery of her creative side, Gill added that this would be her means to look after that 
part.  We shared the feeling that the journey together had been long and not always easy.  She had 
come to terms with the idea that her husband could not soothe her pain but was instead a practical, 
 156 
 
loyal husband.  Her relationship with her daughter-in-law was unresolved, though Gill had begun to 
feel that she was the adult in their relationship and that she would decide how close or far she lets 
Vicky get.  I hoped this more adult-self would remain able to look after her own needs whenever she 
feels the threat of pain that life can bring. 
Gill requested no further psychological input and refused the offer of a follow-up review by a 
Community Mental Health Nurse.  She was discharged from the service back into the care of her GP.  
She was made aware she could be re-referred at any time should the need arise. 
1.5 My supervision journey 
Throughout this work I felt my supervisor’s role was needed more than usual.  At first I 
thought this was due to the nature of the case, my need to get it right and the pressure of a ‘trainee’ 
holding a ‘complex case’.  My supervisor presented this case to me initially a case of classic hysteria, 
in the sense Breuer and Freud (1957) used.  Contemporary terminology would probably term this a 
Somatoform Disorder (DSM–IV–TR (2000) 4th ed., text rev.).   When introduced in this way, I felt 
that my supervisor would expect some type of remarkable recover, just as in the classic texts (see 
Breuer and Freud, 1957).  As the client became to behave in this way, deposing of the wheelchair 
after the first appointment, the pressure to continue that pace inflamed the situation further.  The most 
useful part of my supervision was my supervisor allowing me to say that I felt stretched by this client.  
During this time I feel he was able to provide the same thing I was eventually able to provide my 
client, the ‘alpha function’ (Bion, 1962b), or container that allowed such raw material to be processed.  
Strachey (1934) talks about an ‘auxillary ego’, which I think fits my supervisory relationship by 
expanding my capacity to deal with the client and reflect upon it in words.  Identifying my own 
counter-transference (Freud, 1910/2001) helped me to gain an insight into the client’s world, as well 
as those around her.  If a fraction of what was experienced by me was experience by someone else, 
e.g. her husband, it would be understandable not to feel able to cope.  In this example, he went to the 
pub. 
In the end (and through making use of personal therapy) I realise that I must create a space to 
nurture my own internal supervisor to be able to develop as a therapist.   
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1.6 Learning about psychotherapeutic theory and practice  
I have never before experienced Projective Identification (Klien 1946, 1952; Bion, 1962b) in 
such a strong way before.  What supervised me is that I was not aware of the ‘symptoms’ I carried, or 
that they did not belong to me. I was happy to decide I had a cold or did was affected by the cold 
weather (my own rationalising). Working with this client has allowed me to be less ‘anti-defences’.  I 
now feel that carrying some of the more mature defence mechanisms are perhaps a requirement for 
living.  I have read about this way of thinking before but I have never seen it applied in such an 
authentic way before.  It also changed the idea for me that you need to rid someone of their defensive 
strategies, especially as they might not be ready to have them removed, or even exposed.  Working 
with the client at their level of readiness has been enormously helpful to understand.  I’ve also learnt 
that personal therapy can be so useful to take yourself outside of the client, work, theory environment, 
in order to check-in with yourself.  The dynamic relationship between these different environments 
helps to serve the client but also service the therapist’s own wellbeing.  I believe that this unique 
ability will retain my draw to the psychodynamic working beyond this doctoral programme. 
1.7 Learning from the case about myself as a therapist 
 The pressure I felt to do well with this interesting case made me think of the classic hysteria 
picture with Charcot, painted by André Brouillet in 1887 (Appendix  I).  I never wanted to be either 
Charcot or any of the other professionals that were trapped in their fascination about this ‘mystery’.  
Instead of the ‘mystery’ I wanted to find out about the person.  I got a sense that Gill too wished to be 
found as a medical or psychological marvel which made it difficult to work with at times.  However, 
throughout our work together I found that it was not the desire to be seen in this way but rather the 
NEED to be seen this way, otherwise a less glamorous and painful past would be the only cause.   
I have learnt that I need to be able to use all of my resources to understand both the client and 
myself during a piece of therapeutic work.  The pressure to feel I was getting somewhere was made 
more difficult by the exhaustion I was not aware I carried.  After making use of my personal therapy 
and supervision, I was more aware of my inability to think in the sessions.  I felt assured by my 
feeling of being stretched as it meant that for the client, her experience was bearable, just about.  It 
became more containable as we progressed and I felt more able to develop my capacity for ‘reverie’ 
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(Bion, 1962b).  Thinking about future clients that might stretch me in the same way, I believe I will be 
more in touch with what is required of me before I become over-stretched.  However, given the 
experiences that the clients have had in their own lives, I am glad that I am in a profession that allows 
the idea that a person’s experiences can be contained and that the world does not fall apart if they dare 
to let another person know how they really feel.  I hope that ability stays with me. 
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Appendix I 
Brouillet, A. (1887).  Un Leçon Clinique à la Salpêtrière [Oil Painting] Retrieved from: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ea/Charcot_experience_histeric-
hipnotic.JPG/800px-Charcot_experience_histeric-hipnotic.JPG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a file from the Wikimedia Commons. Information from its description page there is shown 
below.  
Commons is a freely licensed media file repository. 
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Section D:  Publishable Paper 
 
Qualitative Counselling Psychologists:  Why research proposals continue to be 
lost in translation? 
 
“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be 
counted.”  (Cameron, 1963, p.13) 
1.1  Overview 
Current debates on qualitative versus quantitative have reached a consensus that 
mixed methods should be the preference of researchers (See Creswell, 2011, for overview). 
However, as will be seen later in this paper, this has not been implemented in a way that 
appears to bring any new insights due to biases in perceived readership or in research 
institutions. Furthermore, the identity crisis that continues to impede counselling 
psychologists as researchers may affect our ability to use methodologies that answers the 
questions we wish to seek, instead bending our epistemological stance to avoid seeming 
‘woolly’.  According to Rafalin (2010) ‘the need to grapple with the complexities of our 
relationship with research is greater now than ever for all psychological practitioners – 
including counselling psychologists’ (Rafalin, 2010, p.44).  Therefore if we are to maintain 
and improve upon our research credentials, the author argues that we should make use of our 
grounding in epistemological understanding and ask the questions that need asking, using 
methodologies that facilitate rather than compound – qualitative methods. 
A brief background on the counselling psychologist’s position within the debate will 
be outlined before relating this to the on-going identity crisis that affects this position.  The 
connection between these two dichotomies appear to share an overlap with a world in which 
differing epistemological positions establish friction between research and clinical practice 
(and the respective identities).  A case example from the author will be presented as well as 
some recommendations as to what ideas should be held in mind when considering whether to 
sacrifice epistemological and ontological heritage in order to produce recognised research.   
1.2  Where are ‘we’ in the current debate? 
The debate on quantitative versus qualitative continues from theory-level in the 
classroom to the research ethics boardroom.  Whilst looking at the key features of the 
discussion, there are parallel dichotomies between areas of public health.  For example, when 
